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Threat Actor

Eldorado Ransomware

eldorado_ransomware · unknown_likely_russia_aligned · active since 2024-03

Eldorado Ransomware (Group-IB canonical first-disclosure June-July 2024) is a financially-motivated cybercriminal RaaS operation that emerged March 2024 via RAMP forum affiliate-recruitment posts.

operationally distinctive in the ransomware ecosystem for Go (Golang) programming-language- based encryptor development (operationally less common than dominant C/C++ and Rust patterns), enabling native cross- compilation for Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi hypervisor variants.

targeting profile documents operationally distinctive real-estate-sector concentration (~25-30% of disclosed victims) alongside healthcare and education verticals.

RaaS affiliate framework with explicit CIS-country victim exclusion in affiliate terms consistent with broader Russian-aligned cybercriminal ecosystem norms.

standard double-extortion operational model with rclone-mediated Mega.nz exfiltration and leak-site publication.

operationally distinct from and ecosystem-adjacent to all other ransomware clusters curated separately in this corpus including development-language-distinctive Rust-based clusters (ALPHV/ BlackCat, Cicada3301), code-genealogy-derivative successors (Lynx via INC Ransom.

DragonForce and Brain Cipher via LockBit Black builder.

Termite via Babuk source code).

unknown_likely_russia_aligned confidence: high 7 aliases

Profile

Eldorado Ransomware (Group-IB canonical first-disclosure, June-July 2024) is a financially-motivated cybercriminal ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in approximately March 2024 via affiliate-recruitment posts on the RAMP underground forum (a Russian-language cybercriminal forum). The cluster is operationally distinctive in the ransomware ecosystem in two dimensions: (1) GO-BASED RANSOMWARE ENCRYPTOR DEVELOPMENT. Eldorado is one of a small number of ransomware operations developed in the Go (Golang) programming language, operationally distinctive in the ransomware ecosystem where C/C++ and Rust dominate ransomware encryptor development. The Go-based development provides operational advantages including native cross-compilation for straightforward cross-platform deployment (Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi variants), Go's concurrency primitives for multi-threaded parallel encryption performance optimization, statically-linked binary deployment eliminating runtime dependency complexity, and modest detection-evasion advantages against signature-based detection tools focused on more common C/C++ ransomware binary patterns. The Go-based development operationally distinguishes Eldorado from the broader ransomware ecosystem development-language patterns, C/C++ dominant (8base, Phobos-ecosystem operators.

conventional ransomware development), Rust-based (ALPHV/BlackCat, Cicada3301, ALPHV code-lineage successor), C/C++ Windows + adapted cross-platform (LockBit and most successor clusters). (2) REAL ESTATE SECTOR TARGETING CONCENTRATION. Group-IB analysis documented an operationally distinctive targeting concentration in the real estate sector, approximately 25-30% of disclosed victims being real estate organizations. The targeting concentration is operationally distinctive in the ransomware ecosystem where most operations maintain more diversified targeting profiles. Healthcare and education sectors represent additional significant targeting verticals. Operational tradecraft includes initial access via compromised credentials and selective N-day vulnerability exploitation, conventional lateral movement, data exfiltration via rclone to cloud storage, Go-based ransomware encryption with VMware ESXi hypervisor targeting variant, double-extortion pressure via leak-site data publication, and RaaS affiliate framework with explicit CIS-country victim exclusion in affiliate terms (operationally consistent with broader Russian-aligned cybercriminal ecosystem norms). Eldorado is curated alongside the broader ransomware ecosystem coverage in this corpus. Its operational distinctiveness within this ecosystem is the Go-based encryptor development and the real-estate-sector targeting concentration.

Aliases

7
eldorado_ransomwareeldorado ransomwareeldoradoeldorado raaseldorado ransomware operatorseldoradoransomwareel dorado ransomware

Notable Campaigns

3
2024-2025Go-Based Ransomware Development Operational Significance
2024-2025Real Estate Sector Targeting Concentration, Operational Targeting Profile
2024Group-IB Canonical Public Disclosure, Eldorado Ransomware (June-July 2024)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
Group-IBSentinelOneSophosTrend MicroHalcyonSOCRadarCyfirmaRecorded FutureBleepingComputerCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Key reporting
reportGroup-IB: Eldorado Ransomware, Emerging RaaS Operation Analysis (June-July 2024), canonical first-disclosure
reportSentinelOne: Eldorado Ransomware Go-Based Cross-Platform Analysis
reportSophos X-Ops: Eldorado Ransomware Operational Analysis
reportSOCRadar: Eldorado Ransomware Dark Web Profile
reportHalcyon: Eldorado Ransomware Threat Intelligence Profile
reportMalpedia Actor / Malware Profile: Eldorado Ransomware

Operational

State sponsor

Cybercriminal ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in approximately March 2024 and was canonically disclosed by Group-IB Research in June-July 2024. The cluster's operational origin is unclear in the public record, Group-IB analysis documented that operational forum posts associated with the cluster suggest Russian- language operator origin, but the cluster has not been formally attributed to specific national origin, government affiliation, or established cybercriminal organization. Group-IB analysis documented that the cluster's affiliate- recruitment posts on the RAMP underground forum (a Russian- language cybercriminal forum hosting affiliate recruitment for multiple ransomware operations) explicitly excluded CIS-country victim targeting in operator terms-of-affiliate- participation, operationally consistent with the broader Russian-aligned cybercriminal ransomware ecosystem norms that prohibit CIS-country victim targeting.

The cluster's operational tooling is operationally distinctive in the ransomware ecosystem for being developed in the Go (Golang) programming language, Go-based ransomware development is operationally less common than C/C++ and Rust-based development. The cluster operates as a financially-motivated cybercriminal operation with no known state sponsorship.

Motivations
financial_gain, ransomware_extortion, double_extortion_data_exfiltration_and_encryption, cross_platform_ransomware_deployment, go_based_ransomware_development, ransom_payment_extraction
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)34/60 · 56%
Runtime / container (Falco)7/60 · 11%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

1 mapped
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External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
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