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Threat Actor

Anubis Ransomware

anubis_ransomware · unknown_likely_russia_aligned · active since 2024-11

Anubis Ransomware (Halcyon and KELA documented, late 2024 emergence, distinct from older unrelated Android Anubis banking trojan family) is a financially-motivated cybercriminal RaaS operation with operationally-distinctive triple-extortion operational framework offering three affiliate paths: (1) conventional ransomware-with-data- exfiltration extortion, (2) data-exfiltration-only extortion without encryption deployment, (3) monetization-only access programs where Anubis operators monetize affiliate-supplied stolen data without ransomware deployment.

operational innovation in RaaS market expanding conventional affiliate- relationship model to additional operational modes that lower operational-risk barriers for affiliates and create monetization paths for data-only operators.

healthcare sector targeting concentration in early operational period with patient-safety implications.

emerged via Russian- language cybercriminal forum affiliate recruitment temporally adjacent to 2024 ransomware-ecosystem dissolutions (ALPHV March 2024 exit scam, LockBit February 2024 Operation Cronos disruption)

operationally distinct from but ecosystem- adjacent to other ransomware clusters curated in this corpus, operational innovation parallel to DragonForce Cartel affiliate-flexibility framework (dragonforce.yaml).

unknown_likely_russia_aligned confidence: high 7 aliases

Profile

Anubis Ransomware (Halcyon and KELA documented, late 2024 emergence) is a financially-motivated cybercriminal ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in approximately November-December 2024 with an operationally- distinctive triple-extortion operational framework. The cluster's operational positioning is distinct from the older "Anubis Android banking trojan" (an unrelated Android malware family first observed approximately 2017), the naming overlap is coincidental rather than indicative of operational lineage. The cluster's operational distinctiveness in the ransomware ecosystem is the triple-extortion operational framework offering three distinct affiliate operational paths: (1) CONVENTIONAL RANSOMWARE-WITH-DATA-EXFILTRATION EXTORTION.

The operational pattern of conventional RaaS operations, affiliates deploy ransomware encryptors with prior data exfiltration enabling double-extortion pressure via leak-site publication. This path is operationally consistent with the broader ransomware-ecosystem operational norms used by most RaaS operations curated in this corpus. (2) DATA-EXFILTRATION-ONLY EXTORTION.

Affiliates conduct data theft and ransom-demand operations without ransomware encryption deployment, operationally avoiding the operational and detection-risk profile of ransomware encryption while retaining leak-site-publication-pressure extortion capability. This path is operationally consistent with the broader 2023-2025 ecosystem trend toward data- extortion-without-encryption operations (BianLian shifted toward this model, RansomHub offers similar affiliate flexibility, and other operations have followed similar operational patterns). (3) MONETIZATION-ONLY ACCESS PROGRAMS.

Anubis operators monetize stolen data acquired by affiliates without operating ransomware deployment, affiliates supply stolen data to Anubis operators, who conduct ransom-demand operations using the cluster's negotiation infrastructure and leak-site infrastructure. This path operationally extends the conventional RaaS affiliate-relationship model to additional operational modes that lower the operational- risk barrier for affiliates and create monetization paths for data-only operators who lack ransomware deployment capability. The triple-extortion operational framework represents an operational innovation in the ransomware-as-a-service market , operationally similar in innovation significance to the DragonForce Cartel affiliate-flexibility framework (dragonforce.yaml) where affiliates have flexibility to use DragonForce-provided or affiliate-provided ransomware.

Both operational innovations expand the conventional RaaS operational model to additional operational paths designed to attract affiliate participation in the broader competitive RaaS market. Operational tradecraft includes initial access via compromised credentials and selective N-day vulnerability exploitation, conventional lateral movement, data exfiltration via rclone to cloud storage, ransomware encryption with VMware ESXi hypervisor targeting variant for affiliates pursuing the conventional-extortion path, and leak-site infrastructure for double-extortion and data-only extortion pressure. Healthcare sector targeting concentration has been documented in the cluster's early operational period, operationally consistent with the broader ransomware- ecosystem trend toward healthcare victim targeting and creating significant patient safety implications.

Anubis Ransomware is curated alongside the broader ransomware ecosystem coverage in this corpus. Its operational distinctiveness within this ecosystem is the triple-extortion operational framework operational innovation.

Aliases

7
anubis_ransomwareanubis ransomwareanubis ransomware operatorsanubis raasanubis ransomware 2024anubis ransomware groupanubisransomware

Notable Campaigns

3
2024-2025Triple-Extortion Operational Framework, Anubis Operational Innovation
2024-2025Healthcare Sector Targeting Concentration in Early Operations
2024Anubis Ransomware Operational Emergence (Late 2024)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
HalcyonKELABleepingComputerSOCRadarRecorded FutureTrend MicroSentinelOneSophosCyfirmaCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)
Key reporting
reportHalcyon: Anubis Ransomware Threat Intelligence Profile (Late 2024-Early 2025)
reportKELA: Anubis Ransomware Triple-Extortion Operational Framework Analysis
reportBleepingComputer: Anubis Ransomware Emerging RaaS Coverage
reportSOCRadar: Anubis Ransomware Dark Web Profile
reportCISA: Anubis Ransomware Indicators Advisory
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: Anubis Ransomware

Operational

State sponsor

Cybercriminal ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in approximately late 2024 (operational tracking begins approximately November-December 2024) and was operationally documented by Halcyon and KELA in early 2025 as a new RaaS operation with an operationally-distinctive triple-extortion operational framework offering three distinct affiliate operational paths: (1) conventional ransomware-with-data-exfiltration extortion, (2) data- exfiltration-only extortion without encryption deployment, and (3) monetization-only access programs where Anubis operators monetize stolen data acquired by affiliates without operating ransomware deployment. The cluster's operational origin is unclear in the public record: industry analysis (Halcyon, KELA, BleepingComputer, SOCRadar, Recorded Future) has not formally attributed Anubis Ransomware to specific national origin, government affiliation, or established cybercriminal organization. The cluster's affiliate-recruitment posts on Russian- language cybercriminal forums (RAMP forum and adjacent venues), operational tradecraft patterns, and victim country avoidance consistent with Russian-aligned cybercriminal ecosystem norms position the operation within the broader Russian-aligned cybercriminal ransomware ecosystem context.

The cluster is operationally distinct from the older "Anubis Android banking trojan" (an unrelated Android malware family first observed approximately 2017), the naming overlap is coincidental rather than indicative of operational lineage, and industry analysis maintains the distinction between the two operations. The cluster operates as a financially- motivated cybercriminal operation with no known state sponsorship.

Motivations
financial_gain, ransomware_extortion, triple_extortion_operational_framework, data_extortion_without_encryption_option, access_monetization_program, ransom_payment_extraction
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)34/60 · 56%
Runtime / container (Falco)7/60 · 11%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

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1 mapped
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