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ATT&CK Technique

Permission Groups Discovery

T1069 · discovery

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways.

This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.

ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

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Actors Using This

iranAgrius
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
north_koreaAndariel
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT1
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaAPT38
iranAPT39

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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.

initial-access earlier

T0865 · Spearphishing Attachment ×1.82

privilege-escalation earlier

T1055.012 · Process Hollowing ×1.82 T1546.001 · Change Default File Association ×1.82 T1546.011 · Application Shimming ×1.82 T1484 · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification ×1.82 T1484.001 · Group Policy Modification ×1.82

credential-access earlier

T1555.005 · Password Managers ×1.82

discovery same

T1069.002 · Domain Groups ×1.82 T1069.001 · Local Groups ×1.82 T1087.003 · Email Account ×1.82 T1007 · System Service Discovery ×1.82

lateral-movement later

T1550.003 · Pass the Ticket ×1.82 T1021.007 · Cloud Services ×1.82

collection later

T0801 · Monitor Process State ×1.82

other same

T1562.003 · Impair Command History Logging ×1.82

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Detection Coverage

2/6 layers

Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).

Behavioral / log (Sigma) 3

Analytics (MITRE CAR) 3

Runtime / container (Falco) none

File / malware (YARA) none

Network (Suricata/Snort) none

Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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CAR Analytics

MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.

CAR-2013-04-002Low coverageQuick execution of a series of suspicious commands

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

Commands of interest

arp.exe.
at.exe.
attrib.exe.
cscript.exe.
dsquery.exe.
hostname.exe.
ipconfig.exe.
mimikatz.exe.
nbstat.exe.
net.exe.
netsh.exe.
nslookup.exe.
ping.exe.
quser.exe.
qwinsta.exe.
reg.exe.
runas.exe.
sc.exe.
schtasks.exe.
ssh.exe.
systeminfo.exe.
taskkill.exe.
telnet.exe.
tracert.exe.
wscript.exe.
xcopy.exe ### Output Description The host on which the commands were executed, the time of execution, and what commands were executed.

pseudocode

processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
 or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
 or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
 or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
 or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
 or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
 or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
 or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
 or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped

DNIF

_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $App=regex(arp\.exe|at\.exe|attrib\.exe|cscript\.exe|dsquery\.exe|hostname\.exe|ipconfig\.exe|mimikatz.exe|nbstat\.exe|net\.exe|netsh\.exe|nslookup\.exe|ping\.exe|quser\.exe|qwinsta\.exe|reg\.exe|runas\.exe|sc\.exe|schtasks\.exe|ssh\.exe|systeminfo\.exe|taskkill\.exe|telnet\.exe|tracert\.exe|wscript\.exe|xcopy\.exe)i group count_unique $App limit 100
>>_agg count
>>_checkif int_compare Count > 1 include

LogPoint

norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image IN ["*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\attrib.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsquery.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\mimikatz.exe", "*\nbstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nslookup.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\runas.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\ssh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\taskkill.exe", "*\telnet.exe", "*\tracert.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\xcopy.exe"]
| chart count() as cnt by host
| search cnt > 1

CAR-2016-03-001Moderate coverageHost Discovery Commands

When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment.

The information returned may impact choices an adversary can make when establishing persistence, escalating privileges, or moving laterally. Because these commands are built in, they may be run frequently by power users or even by normal users. Thus, an analytic looking at this information should have well-defined white-or blacklists, and should consider looking at an anomaly detection approach, so that this information can be learned dynamically.

Within the built-in Windows Commands

hostname.
ipconfig.
net.
quser.
qwinsta.
sc with flags query, queryex, qc.
systeminfo.
tasklist.
dsquery.
whoami Note dsquery is only pre-existing on Windows servers.

pseudocode

process = search Process:Create
info_command = filter process where (
 exe == "hostname.exe" or
 exe == "ipconfig.exe" or
 exe == "net.exe" or
 exe == "quser.exe" or
 exe == "qwinsta.exe" or
 exe == "sc" and (command_line match " query" or command_line match " qc")) or
 exe == "systeminfo.exe" or
 exe == "tasklist.exe" or
 exe == "whoami.exe"
)
output info_command

Splunk

index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\hostname.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\ipconfig.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\net.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\quser.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\qwinsta.exe" OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\sc.exe" AND (CommandLine="* query *" OR CommandLine="* qc *")) OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\systeminfo.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\tasklist.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\whoami.exe")|stats values(Image) as "Images" values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" by ComputerName

EQL

process where subtype.create and
  (process_name == "hostname.exe" or process_name == "ipconfig.exe" or process_name == "net.exe" or process_name == "quser.exe" process_name == "qwinsta.exe" or process_name == "systeminfo.exe" or process_name == "tasklist.exe" or process_name == "whoami.exe" or (process_name == "sc.exe" and (command_line == "* query *" or command_line == "* qc *")))

LogPoint

norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 (image in ["*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\tasklist.exe", "*\whoami.exe"] OR (image="*\sc.exe" command IN ["* query *", "* qc *"))

CAR-2020-11-006Moderate coverageLocal Permission Group Discovery

Cyber actors frequently enumerate local or domain permissions groups. The net utility is usually used for this purpose. This analytic looks for any instances of net.exe, which is not normally used for benign purposes, although system administrator actions may trigger false positives.

Pseudocode - Pseudocode - net.exe instances

processes = search Process:Create
net_processes = filter processes where (
  exe = "net.exe" AND (
  command_line="*net* user*" OR
  command_line="*net* group*" OR
  command_line="*net* localgroup*" OR
  command_line="*get-localgroup*" OR
  command_line="*get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership*" )
output net_processes

Splunk - Splunk Search - net.exe instances

(index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe" AND (CommandLine="* user*" OR CommandLine="* group*" OR CommandLine="* localgroup*" OR CommandLine="*get-localgroup*" OR CommandLine="*get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership*")

LogPoint - LogPoint Search - net.exe instances

norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image="C:\Windows\System32\net.exe" (command="* user*" OR command="* group*" OR command="* localgroup*" OR command="*get-localgroup*" OR command="*get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership*")

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Caldera Emulation

MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.

discoverywindowsAccount-type Admin Enumerator

Import-Module .\powerview.ps1;
$backup = "#{backup.admin.ability}";
$userName = "#{domain.user.name}";
$userPassword = "#{domain.user.password}";
$secStringPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString $userPassword -AsPlainText -Force;
$credObject = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($userName, $secStringPassword);
Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName #{remote.host.fqdn} -Credential $credObject

discoverywindowsDiscover Domain Admins

Import-Module .\powerview.ps1;
Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName #{remote.host.fqdn}

discoverywindows, darwin, linuxPermission Groups Discovery

gpresult /R

Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse

CVETechnique ActorTool Family

drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges

External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves

MITRE ATT&CK Atomic Red Team car (MITRE)

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