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Threat Actor

APT39

apt39_chafer · iran · active since 2014

APT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten / ITG07 / Rana Intelligence Computing / Cobalt Hickman / Cadelle / G0087) is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber-espionage actor formally attributed to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security operating through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing, established by the September 17, 2020 US Treasury OFAC sanctions designating Rana as an MOIS front and sanctioning 45 associated Iranian nationals.

active since at least 2014, APT39 occupies a uniquely distinct niche among Iranian APTs: its primary mission is the collection of personal information (call detail records, SMS content, passenger name records, travel itineraries, location data, contact lists, communications metadata) supporting MOIS physical surveillance and tracking of specific individuals (Iranian dissidents and diaspora, journalists, foreign-government targets)

targeting consistently emphasizes telecommunications providers for bulk subscriber and CDR collection, airlines and travel agencies for PNR collection, and hotels for guest records, with documented compromises across the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.

tradecraft includes the SEAWEED / CACHEMONEY / POWBAT custom backdoor family, Android surveillance implants for cellular tracking (uniquely documented among Iranian state-actor toolkits), AutoIt-based droppers, BITS-based persistence, database-targeted collection of travel/PNR repositories, and continued operations through 2026 demonstrating operational resilience under sustained US attribution and sanctions pressure.

iran confidence: high 18 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0087 ↗

Profile

APT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten / ITG07 / Rana Intelligence Computing / Cobalt Hickman / Cadelle / G0087) is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber actor formally attributed to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) operating through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing. Active since at least 2014 (with some indicators back to 2012), APT39 occupies a uniquely distinct operational niche among Iranian APTs: where APT34 (also MOIS) is the broad regional espionage collector, MuddyWater (also MOIS) is the regional script-and-RMM-centric operator, APT33 (IRGC) is the destructive-capability holder, and APT35 (IRGC) is the dissident-and-influence-operations specialist, APT39's mission is the targeted collection of personal information, call detail records, SMS content, passenger name records (PNRs), travel itineraries, contact lists, location data, and communications metadata, supporting MOIS physical surveillance and tracking of specific individuals. Attribution was formalized by the September 17, 2020 US Treasury OFAC sanctions designating Rana Intelligence Computing as an MOIS front company and sanctioning 45 associated Iranian nationals for 'a years-long malware campaign that targeted Iranian dissidents, journalists, and international companies in the travel sector.' The FBI simultaneously published an Indicators of Compromise advisory detailing eight distinct tooling sets, demonstrating Rana / APT39's significantly broader and more modular toolkit, including Android surveillance implants for cellular tracking, than previously publicly documented. The Rana attribution remains the most specific US government public designation of an MOIS-front-company cyber operation to a named entity. Targeting consistently emphasizes telecommunications providers (for bulk subscriber and CDR collection), airlines and travel agencies (for PNR / itinerary collection), hotels and hospitality (for guest stay records), and a focused set of individual targets: Iranian dissidents and diaspora, journalists, and selected government targets in the Middle East and Western states. Geographic reach is global, Iran, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America, with documented compromises of a European travel reservations company, an African airline, Indian targets, and Middle Eastern carriers. Technical tradecraft is broadly conventional but well-executed: SEAWEED, CACHEMONEY, POWBAT, and AutoIt-based custom backdoors; Mimikatz and LaZagne credential harvesting.

PsExec and RDP lateral movement.

database-targeted collection (T1213 family including PNR databases)

BITS-based persistence.

PHPKraken, ASAgent, and DrupalGardens web shells.

Android implants for mobile surveillance (one of the few state-actor mobile-malware capabilities formally documented in MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile). The May 2021 Bitdefender disclosure of continued APT39 / Chafer operations against Middle Eastern air transportation post-OFAC- sanctions demonstrates that public attribution did not significantly disrupt the group's operational tempo.

Aliases

18
apt39chaferremix kittenitg07rana intelligence computingrana instituteranacadellecobalt hickmancobalthickmanradio serpensmoisministry of intelligence iranvajavevakg0087apt 39apt-39

Notable Campaigns

10
2022-2026Sustained Operations Through 2026
2021Bitdefender Chafer Targeting Air Transportation Sector (May 2021)
2020COVID-19-Themed Phishing Against Iranian Citizens (2020)
2020US Treasury OFAC Sanctions on Rana Intelligence Computing (September 17, 2020)
2020FBI Eight-Set IOC Advisory on Rana (September 17, 2020)
2020Android Surveillance Implants for Cellular Tracking (2020)
2019FireEye APT39, Focused on Personal Information (January 29, 2019)
2018-2020Sustained Middle East Telecom and Travel Targeting (2018-2020)
2018Symantec Chafer Widening Targeting (February 2018)
2015Symantec Chafer Disclosure, Iran-Based Middle Eastern Targeting (December 2015)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
FBICISANSAUS Cyber CommandUS Department of TreasuryUS Department of Treasury OFACUS Department of StateUK NCSCFive EyesMicrosoftMandiantFireEyeGoogle Cloud Threat IntelligenceCrowdStrikeSymantec / BroadcomCisco TalosKasperskyIBM X-ForceTrend MicroSentinelOneClearSkyBitdefenderRecorded FutureInsikt GroupCheck Point ResearchSecureWorksAustralian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)Citizen LabAmnesty International
Key reporting
reportFireEye / Mandiant: APT39, An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information (January 29, 2019)
reportSymantec Security Response: Iran-Based Attackers Use Back Door Threats to Spy on Middle Eastern Targets (December 7, 2015)
reportSymantec: Chafer, Latest Attacks Reveal Heightened Ambitions (February 2018)
reportBitdefender: Iranian APT39, A Closer Look at Chafer (2020)
reportBitdefender: Iranian APT Targets Mideast Airliner with Watering Hole Attack (May 2021)
reportClearSky: Pay2Kitten, A Resurgence of Pay2Key (December 2020)
reportCheck Point Research: Rancor, The Year of the Phish (June 2019)
reportCisco Talos: Seasonal Research, Iranian Actors Pop (March 2018)
reportKaspersky GReAT: Chafer Used Remexi Malware to Spy on Iran-Based Foreign Diplomatic Entities (January 2019)
reportUS Treasury OFAC SM-1127: Treasury Sanctions Iranian Cyber Actors for Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (September 17, 2020)
reportFBI: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing Co. (September 17, 2020)
reportFBI Wanted Notice: Rana Intelligence Computing Co. and Associated Operators
reportRecorded Future / Insikt Group: APT39 Iran Profile
reportAustralian Cyber Security Centre: Iranian Cyber Actor Leverages Known Flaw to Target Organisations
reportCouncil on Foreign Relations: APT 39 Cyber Operations Tracker
reportCrowdStrike: Adversary Profile, Remix Kitten
reportEuRepoC: APT Profile, APT 39

Operational

State sponsor

Iran Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS / VAJA) operating through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing (Rana Institute). Attribution formalized by the September 17, 2020 US Treasury OFAC sanctions naming Rana Intelligence Computing as an MOIS-front and designating 45 associated Iranian nationals, alongside the FBI Indicators of Compromise advisory the same day.

Motivations
espionage, intelligence_gathering, personal_information_collection, dissident_surveillance, travel_and_movement_tracking, communications_surveillance, counterintelligence, domestic_surveillance, regional_security_collection, regime_objectives
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)36/60 · 60%
Runtime / container (Falco)6/60 · 10%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)15/60 · 25%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

10 mapped
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
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NIST 800-53
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