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ATT&CK Technique

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016 · discovery

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. show ip route, show ip interface). On ESXi, adversaries may leverage esxcli to gather network configuration information. For example, the command esxcli network nic list will retrieve the MAC address, while esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get will retrieve the local IPv4 address.

Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.

ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
◆

Actors Using This

14
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
north_koreaAndariel
franceAnimal Farm
chinaAoqin Dragon
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT17
chinaAPT1
russiaAPT28
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
▸

Atomic Tests

9
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsSystem Network Configuration Discovery on Windows
Identify network configuration information Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn multiple commands to list network configuration settings. Output will be via stdout. 
ipconfig /all
netsh interface show interface
arp -a
nbtstat -n
net config
command_promptwindowsList Windows Firewall Rules
Enumerates Windows Firewall Rules using netsh. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn netsh.exe to list firewall rules. Output will be via stdout. 
netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all
shmacos, linuxSystem Network Configuration Discovery
Identify network configuration information. Upon successful execution, sh will spawn multiple commands and output will be via stdout. 
if [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd="netstat -Sp tcp"; else cmd="netstat -ant"; fi;
if [ -x "$(command -v arp)" ]; then arp -a; else echo "arp is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
if [ -x "$(command -v ifconfig)" ]; then ifconfig; else echo "ifconfig is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
if [ -x "$(command -v ip)" ]; then ip addr; else echo "ip is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
if [ -x "$(command -v netstat)" ]; then $cmd | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[[:lower:]]' | sort | uniq -c; else echo "netstat is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
command_promptwindowsSystem Network Configuration Discovery (TrickBot Style)
Identify network configuration information as seen by Trickbot and described here https://www.sneakymonkey.net/2019/10/29/trickbot-analysis-part-ii/ Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn `ipconfig /all`, `net config workstation`, `net view /all /domain`, `nltest /domain_trusts`. Output will be via stdout. 
ipconfig /all
net config workstation
net view /all /domain
nltest /domain_trusts
powershellwindowsList Open Egress Ports
This is to test for what ports are open outbound. The technique used was taken from the following blog: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/poking-holes-in-the-firewall-egress-testing-with-allports-exposed/ Upon successful execution, powershell will read top-128.txt (ports) and contact each port to confirm if open or not. Output will be to Desktop\open-ports.txt. 
$ports = Get-content "#{port_file}"
$file = "#{output_file}"
$totalopen = 0
$totalports = 0
New-Item $file -Force
foreach ($port in $ports) {
    $test = new-object system.Net.Sockets.TcpClient
    $wait = $test.beginConnect("allports.exposed", $port, $null, $null)
    $wait.asyncwaithandle.waitone(250, $false) | Out-Null
    $totalports++ | Out-Null
    if ($test.Connected) {
        $result = "$port open" 
        Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green $result
        $result | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file
        $totalopen++ | Out-Null
    }
    else {
        $result = "$port closed" 
        Write-Host -ForegroundColor Red $result
        $totalclosed++ | Out-Null
        $result | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file
    }
}
$results = "There were a total of $totalopen open ports out of $totalports ports tested."
$results | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file
Write-Host $results
command_promptwindowsAdfind - Enumerate Active Directory Subnet Objects
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Subnet Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html 
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=subnet) #{optional_args}
command_promptwindowsQakbot Recon
A list of commands known to be performed by Qakbot for recon purposes
"#{recon_commands}"
bashelevatedmacosList macOS Firewall Rules
"This will test if the macOS firewall is enabled and/or show what rules are configured. Must be run with elevated privileges. Upon successful execution, these commands will output various information about the firewall configuration, including status and specific port/protocol blocks or allows. Using `defaults`, additional arguments can be added to see filtered details, such as `globalstate` for global configuration (\"Is it on or off?\"), `firewall` for common application allow rules, and `explicitauths` for specific rules configured by the user. Using `socketfilterfw`, flags such as --getglobalstate or --listapps can be used for similar filtering. At least one flag is required to send parseable output to standard out. 
sudo defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf
sudo /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate
command_promptwindowsDNS Server Discovery Using nslookup
Identify System domain dns controller on an endpoint using nslookup ldap query. This tool is being abused by qakbot malware to gather information on the domain controller of the targeted or compromised host. reference https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/ 
nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.%USERDNSDOMAIN%
◈

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 9
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 2
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
◈

CAR Analytics

2
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2013-04-002Low coverageQuick execution of a series of suspicious commands

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

Commands of interest
  • arp.exe.
  • at.exe.
  • attrib.exe.
  • cscript.exe.
  • dsquery.exe.
  • hostname.exe.
  • ipconfig.exe.
  • mimikatz.exe.
  • nbstat.exe.
  • net.exe.
  • netsh.exe.
  • nslookup.exe.
  • ping.exe.
  • quser.exe.
  • qwinsta.exe.
  • reg.exe.
  • runas.exe.
  • sc.exe.
  • schtasks.exe.
  • ssh.exe.
  • systeminfo.exe.
  • taskkill.exe.
  • telnet.exe.
  • tracert.exe.
  • wscript.exe.
  • xcopy.exe ### Output Description The host on which the commands were executed, the time of execution, and what commands were executed.
pseudocode
processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
 or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
 or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
 or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
 or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
 or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
 or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
 or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
 or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped
DNIF
_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $App=regex(arp\.exe|at\.exe|attrib\.exe|cscript\.exe|dsquery\.exe|hostname\.exe|ipconfig\.exe|mimikatz.exe|nbstat\.exe|net\.exe|netsh\.exe|nslookup\.exe|ping\.exe|quser\.exe|qwinsta\.exe|reg\.exe|runas\.exe|sc\.exe|schtasks\.exe|ssh\.exe|systeminfo\.exe|taskkill\.exe|telnet\.exe|tracert\.exe|wscript\.exe|xcopy\.exe)i group count_unique $App limit 100
>>_agg count
>>_checkif int_compare Count > 1 include
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image IN ["*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\attrib.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsquery.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\mimikatz.exe", "*\nbstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nslookup.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\runas.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\ssh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\taskkill.exe", "*\telnet.exe", "*\tracert.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\xcopy.exe"]
| chart count() as cnt by host
| search cnt > 1
CAR-2016-03-001Moderate coverageHost Discovery Commands

When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment.

The information returned may impact choices an adversary can make when establishing persistence, escalating privileges, or moving laterally. Because these commands are built in, they may be run frequently by power users or even by normal users. Thus, an analytic looking at this information should have well-defined white-or blacklists, and should consider looking at an anomaly detection approach, so that this information can be learned dynamically.

Within the built-in Windows Commands
  • hostname.
  • ipconfig.
  • net.
  • quser.
  • qwinsta.
  • sc with flags query, queryex, qc.
  • systeminfo.
  • tasklist.
  • dsquery.
  • whoami Note dsquery is only pre-existing on Windows servers.
pseudocode
process = search Process:Create
info_command = filter process where (
 exe == "hostname.exe" or
 exe == "ipconfig.exe" or
 exe == "net.exe" or
 exe == "quser.exe" or
 exe == "qwinsta.exe" or
 exe == "sc" and (command_line match " query" or command_line match " qc")) or
 exe == "systeminfo.exe" or
 exe == "tasklist.exe" or
 exe == "whoami.exe"
)
output info_command
Splunk
index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\hostname.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\ipconfig.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\net.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\quser.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\qwinsta.exe" OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\sc.exe" AND (CommandLine="* query *" OR CommandLine="* qc *")) OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\systeminfo.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\tasklist.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\whoami.exe")|stats values(Image) as "Images" values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" by ComputerName
EQL
process where subtype.create and
  (process_name == "hostname.exe" or process_name == "ipconfig.exe" or process_name == "net.exe" or process_name == "quser.exe" process_name == "qwinsta.exe" or process_name == "systeminfo.exe" or process_name == "tasklist.exe" or process_name == "whoami.exe" or (process_name == "sc.exe" and (command_line == "* query *" or command_line == "* qc *")))
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 (image in ["*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\tasklist.exe", "*\whoami.exe"] OR (image="*\sc.exe" command IN ["* query *", "* qc *"))
▸

Caldera Emulation

7
MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.
discoverywindowsFind Domain
nbtstat -n
discoverydarwin, linux, windowsNetwork Interface Configuration
sudo ifconfig
discoverydarwinPing network
for ip in $(seq 190 199); do ping -c 1 $(echo #{domain.broadcast.ip} |
cut -d. -f-3).$ip -W 1; done
discoverydarwin, linux, windowsPreferred WIFI
./wifi.sh pref
discoverywindowsRemote Host Ping
ping #{remote.host.fqdn}
discoverydarwin, linux, windowsScan WIFI networks
./#{payload:9f639067-370a-40ba-b7ac-6f1c15d5a158} scan
discoverydarwinSnag broadcast IP
ifconfig | grep broadcast
▣

Comply & Defend

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