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ATT&CK Technique

Pass the Ticket

T1550.003 · lateral-movement

Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.

When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.

A Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). A Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys.

For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.

Windows
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Actors Using This

4
russiaAPT29
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeDarkSide / BlackMatter
malaysia_origin_with_international_affiliatesDragonForce
unknown_likely_russia_alignedFog Ransomware
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier
T1588.006 · Vulnerabilities ×3.57
execution earlier
T1569 · System Services ×8.50T1569.002 · Service Execution ×5.41
persistence earlier
T1136 · Create Account ×3.61
credential-access earlier
T1558 · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets ×44.62T1003.003 · NTDS ×5.25
discovery earlier
T1069.002 · Domain Groups ×11.90
lateral-movement same
T1021.006 · Windows Remote Management ×4.86T1550.002 · Pass the Hash ×4.82T1550 · Use Alternate Authentication Material ×4.58
command-and-control later
T1219 · Remote Access Tools ×5.25T1090.003 · Multi-hop Proxy ×4.03
exfiltration later
T1048.002 · Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol ×26.44T1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol ×3.50
other same
T1562.002 · Disable Windows Event Logging ×19.83
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Atomic Tests

2
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsMimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack
Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos 
"#{mimikatz_exe}" "kerberos::ptt #{ticket}"
powershellelevatedwindowsRubeus Kerberos Pass The Ticket
Requesting a TGT on a remote system and retrieving it locally before requesting a service ticket with it. This is a Pass-The-Ticket attack because the TGT is obtained on the remote system, then used from a different machine (local). PsExec is used to execute commands on the remote system, and the "C$" admin share is used to retrieve the TGT, so the current user must have admin rights remotely and other PsExec prerequisites must be met. 
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -accepteula \\#{target} -w c:\ -c "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe" asktgt /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /domain:#{domain} /outfile:ticket.kirbi
Set-Location "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
Move-Item -Force "\\#{target}\c$\ticket.kirbi" ticket.kirbi
Write-Host "Successfully retrieved TGT from '#{target}', now requesting a TGS from local"
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe" asktgs /service:cifs/#{target} /ticket:ticket.kirbi /ptt
Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ticket.kirbi"
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe" purge
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Mitigations

4
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1015Active Directory Configuration

Implement robust Active Directory (AD) configurations using group policies to secure user accounts, control access, and minimize the attack surface. AD configurations enable centralized control over account settings, logon policies, and permissions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.

Account Configuration
  • Implementation: Use domain accounts instead of local accounts to leverage AD’s centralized management, including group policies, auditing, and access control.
  • Use Case: For IT staff managing shared resources, provision domain accounts that allow IT teams to log in centrally, reducing the risk of unmanaged, rogue local accounts on individual machines.
Interactive Logon Restrictions
  • Implementation: Configure group policies to restrict interactive logons (e.g., direct physical or RDP logons) for service accounts or privileged accounts that do not require such access.
  • Use Case: Prevent service accounts, such as SQL Server accounts, from having interactive logon privileges. This reduces the risk of these accounts being leveraged for lateral movement if compromised.
Remote Desktop Settings
  • Implementation: Limit Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access to specific, authorized accounts. Use group policies to enforce this, allowing only necessary users to establish RDP sessions.
  • Use Case: On sensitive servers (e.g., domain controllers or financial databases), restrict RDP access to administrative accounts only, while all other users are denied access.
Dedicated Administrative Accounts
  • Implementation: Create domain-wide administrative accounts that are restricted from interactive logons, designed solely for high-level tasks (e.g., software installation, patching).
  • Use Case: Create separate administrative accounts for different purposes, such as one set of accounts for installations and another for managing repository access. This limits exposure and helps reduce attack vectors.
Authentication Silos
  • Implementation: Configure Authentication Silos in AD, using group policies to create access zones with restrictions based on membership, such as the Protected Users security group. This restricts access to critical accounts and minimizes exposure to potential threats.
  • Use Case: Place high-risk or high-value accounts, such as executive or administrative accounts, in an Authentication Silo with extra controls, limiting their exposure to only necessary systems. This reduces the risk of credential misuse or abuse if these accounts are compromised.
Tools for Implementation
  • Active Directory Group Policies: Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure, deploy, and enforce policies across AD environments.
  • PowerShell: Automate account configuration, logon restrictions, and policy application using PowerShell scripts.
  • AD Administrative Center: Manage Authentication Silos and configure high-level policies for critical user groups within AD.
M1018User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies.

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege
  • Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted.
  • Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies.
  • Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse.
  • Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts.
  • Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits.
  • Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies.
  • Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes.
  • Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts.
  • Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics.
  • Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins.
  • Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions.
  • Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.
Tools for Implementation Built-in Tools
  • Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement.
  • Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools
  • Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration.
  • Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.
Privileged Account Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
M1026Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.

Account Permissions and Roles
  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security
  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring
  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
Tools for Implementation Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management
  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management
  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
M1027Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse.

Windows Systems
Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure
  • Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters).
  • Password complexity requirements.
  • Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords).
  • Account lockout duration and thresholds.
Linux Systems
Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
  • Use pam_pwquality to enforce complexity and length requirements.
  • Implement pam_tally2 or pam_faillock for account lockouts.
  • Use pwunconv to disable password reuse.
Password Managers
  • Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords.
Password Blacklisting
  • Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords.
Regular Auditing
  • Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners.
Tools for Implementation Windows
  • Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies.
  • Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords.
Linux/macOS
  • PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules.
  • Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations.
Cross-Platform
  • Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords.
  • Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords.
  • NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.
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Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 4
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-02, AC-03, AC-05, AC-06, CA-07, CM-02, CM-05, CM-06, IA-02, IA-05, SI-04
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