Home/ATT&CK Technique/Multi-hop Proxy
ATT&CK Technique

Multi-hop Proxy

T1090.003 · command-and-control

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network.

the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks - such as the publicly available Tor network - to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network. Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.

ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows

Actors Using This

14
iranAgrius
russia_aligned_false_flag_hacktivismAnonymous Sudan
chinaAPT10
russiaAPT28
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT31
north_koreaAPT38
chinaAPT40
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)
chinaBillbug
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeBumblebee Operators / EXOTIC LILY
north_koreaCitrine Sleet

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier
privilege-escalation earlier
command-and-control same

Atomic Tests

4
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellwindowsPsiphon
Psiphon 3 is a circumvention tool from Psiphon Inc. that utilizes VPN, SSH and HTTP Proxy technology to provide you with uncensored access to Internet. This process will launch Psiphon 3 and establish a connection. Shortly after it will be shut down via process kill commands. More information can be found about Psiphon using the following urls http://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html https://psiphon.ca/faq.html
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat"
powershellwindowsTor Proxy Usage - Windows
This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality. Upon successful execution, the tor proxy will be launched, run for 60 seconds, and then exit.
invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -Command {cmd /c "#{TorExe}"}'
sleep -s 60
stop-process -name "tor" | out-null
shelevatedlinuxTor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD
This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality. Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched.
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && sysrc tor_enable="YES" && service tor start || sudo systemctl start tor
shmacosTor Proxy Usage - MacOS
This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality. Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched.
osascript -e 'tell application "Terminal" to do script "tor"'

Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1037Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration.

Ingress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers.
  • Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges.
Egress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications.
  • Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected.
Protocol-Based Filtering
  • Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue.
Network Segmentation
  • Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized.
  • Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems.
Application Layer Filtering
  • Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic.
  • Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.

Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 3
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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