Home/ATT&CK Technique/Inhibit System Recovery
ATT&CK Technique

Inhibit System Recovery

T1490 · impact

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options. Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features.

Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups. A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device.

Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations. On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall). Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network - whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.

In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.

ContainersESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows

Actors Using This

14
iranAgrius
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
north_koreaAndariel
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT38
russia_speaking_cybercrime8Base
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
russia_speaking_cybercrimeBlack Basta
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
credential-access earlier

Atomic Tests

13
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, if no shadow volumes exist the message "No items found that satisfy the query." will be displayed. If shadow volumes are present, it will delete them without printing output to the screen. This is because the /quiet parameter was passed which also suppresses the y/n confirmation prompt. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc788055(v=ws.11)
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - wbadmin Delete Windows Backup Catalog
Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, "The backup catalog has been successfully deleted." will be displayed in the PowerShell session.
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair
Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed in the powershell session.
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
powershellelevatedwindowsWindows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil. Executes Get-WMIObject. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8, so upon execution there may be no output displayed.
Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();}
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - Delete Backup Files
Deletes backup files in a manner similar to Ryuk ransomware. Upon exection, many "access is denied" messages will appear as the commands try to delete files from around the system.
del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - wbadmin Delete systemstatebackup
Deletes the Windows systemstatebackup using wbadmin.exe. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families. This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.
wbadmin delete systemstatebackup -keepVersions:0
command_promptelevatedwindowsWindows - Disable the SR scheduled task
Use schtasks.exe to disable the System Restore (SR) scheduled task
schtasks.exe /Change /TN "\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR" /disable
command_promptelevatedwindowsDisable System Restore Through Registry
Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable system restore on the computer. See how remcos RAT abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
powershellelevatedwindowsWindows - vssadmin Resize Shadowstorage Volume
Adversaries generally try to Resize Shadowstorage Volume using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage.
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /For=C: /On=C: /MaxSize=20%
command_promptelevatedwindowsModify VSS Service Permissions
This atomic test alters the security settings of the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) by modifying its permissions, potentially impacting system recovery operations. The specific permissions set by the command are as follows: - Deny Generic All (GA) permissions to Network Users (NU) - Deny GA permissions to Everyone (WD) - Deny GA permissions to Anonymous (AN) - Allow Full Access (FA) and Generic All (GA) permissions to Everyone (WD) in System ACL (SACL) - Allow Object Inherit and Inherit Only (OIIO) Full Access (FA) and GA permissions to Everyone (WD) in SACL These permissions can significantly restrict VSS functionalities, including backup and restore operations. As such, it is essential to run this test only in a controlled environment with administrative privileges. A cleanup command is provided to reset VSS permissions to a common default configuration, which should be verified against your specific system's configuration. It's crucial to use this cleanup command after testing to ensure the system's backup and recovery capabilities remain functional. Running this test on a production system or critical environment is not recommended without proper precautions and a robust recovery plan.
sc sdset VSS D:(D;;GA;;;NU)(D;;GA;;;WD)(D;;GA;;;AN)S:(AU;FA;GA;;;WD)(AU;OIIOFA;GA;;;WD)
shelevatedmacosDisable Time Machine
Disables Time Machine which is Apple's automated backup utility software. Attackers can use this to prevent backups from occurring and hinder the victim's ability to recover from any damage.
sudo tmutil disable
powershellelevatedwindowsWindows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via Diskshadow
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via Diskshadow binary. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Crytox. The binary is present by default in Windows Server operating systems (since Windows Server 2008). Upon execution, it will delete all shadow copies of the server.
"delete shadows all" | diskshadow.exe

Mitigations

4
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1018User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies.

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege
  • Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted.
  • Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies.
  • Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse.
  • Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts.
  • Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits.
  • Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies.
  • Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes.
  • Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts.
  • Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics.
  • Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins.
  • Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions.
  • Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.
Tools for Implementation Built-in Tools
  • Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement.
  • Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools
  • Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration.
  • Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.
Privileged Account Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
M1028Operating System Configuration

Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality. Proper OS configurations address security vulnerabilities, limit attack surfaces, and ensure robust defense against a wide range of techniques.

Disable Unused Features
  • Turn off SMBv1, LLMNR, and NetBIOS where not needed.
  • Disable remote registry and unnecessary services.
Enforce OS-level Protections
  • Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows.
  • Use AppArmor or SELinux on Linux for mandatory access controls.
Secure Access Settings
  • Enable User Account Control (UAC) for Windows.
  • Restrict root/sudo access on Linux/macOS and enforce strong permissions using sudoers files.
File System Hardening
  • Implement least-privilege access for critical files and system directories.
  • Audit permissions regularly using tools like icacls (Windows) or getfacl/chmod (Linux/macOS).
Secure Remote Access
  • Restrict RDP, SSH, and VNC to authorized IPs using firewall rules.
  • Enable NLA for RDP and enforce strong password/lockout policies.
Harden Boot Configurations
  • Enable Secure Boot and enforce UEFI/BIOS password protection.
  • Use BitLocker or LUKS to encrypt boot drives.
Regular Audits
  • Periodically audit OS configurations using tools like CIS Benchmarks or SCAP tools.
Tools for Implementation Windows
  • Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO): Centrally enforce OS security settings.
  • Windows Defender Exploit Guard: Built-in OS protection against exploits.
  • CIS-CAT Pro: Audit Windows security configurations based on CIS Benchmarks.
Linux/macOS
  • AppArmor/SELinux: Enforce mandatory access controls.
  • Lynis: Perform comprehensive security audits.
  • SCAP Security Guide: Automate configuration hardening using Security Content Automation Protocol.
Cross-Platform
  • Ansible or Chef/Puppet: Automate configuration hardening at scale.
  • OpenSCAP: Perform compliance and configuration checks.
M1038Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions.

Application Control
  • Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution.
  • Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.
xml"`) Script Blocking
  • Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources.
  • Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g.
, Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned) Executable Blocking
  • Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as %TEMP% or %APPDATA% directories.
  • Implementation: Block execution of .exe, .bat, or .ps1 files from user-writable directories.
Dynamic Analysis Prevention
  • Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time.
  • Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.
M1053Data Backup

Data Backup involves taking and securely storing backups of data from end-user systems and critical servers. It ensures that data remains available in the event of system compromise, ransomware attacks, or other disruptions. Backup processes should include hardening backup systems, implementing secure storage solutions, and keeping backups isolated from the corporate network to prevent compromise during active incidents.

Regular Backup Scheduling
  • Use Case: Ensure timely and consistent backups of critical data.
  • Implementation: Schedule daily incremental backups and weekly full backups for all critical servers and systems.
Immutable Backups
  • Use Case: Protect backups from modification or deletion, even by attackers.
  • Implementation: Use write-once-read-many (WORM) storage for backups, preventing ransomware from encrypting or deleting backup files.
Backup Encryption
  • Use Case: Protect data integrity and confidentiality during transit and storage.
  • Implementation: Encrypt backups using strong encryption protocols (e.g., AES-256) before storing them in local, cloud, or remote locations.
Offsite Backup Storage
  • Use Case: Ensure data availability during physical disasters or onsite breaches.
  • Implementation: Use cloud-based solutions like AWS S3, Azure Backup, or physical offsite storage to maintain a copy of critical data.
Backup Testing
  • Use Case: Validate backup integrity and ensure recoverability.
  • Implementation: Regularly test data restoration processes to ensure that backups are not corrupted and can be recovered quickly.

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 23
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 2
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

CAR Analytics

2
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2021-01-009Low coverageDetecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize

After compromising a network of systems, threat actors often try to delete/resize Shadow Copy in an attempt to prevent administrators from restoring the systems to versions present before the attack. This is often done via vssadmin, a legitimate Windows tool to interact with shadow copies. This action is often employed by ransomware, may lead to a failure in recovering systems after an attack.

The pseudo code detection focus on Windows Security and Sysmon process creation (4688 and 1). The use of wmic to delete shadow copy generates WMI-Activity Operationnal 5857 event and could generate 5858 (if the operation fails). These 2 EventIDs could be interesting when attackers use wmic without process creation and/or for forensics.

Splunk - Splunk Search - Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize
((EventCode="4688" OR EventCode="1") (CommandLine="*vssadmin* *delete* *shadows*" OR CommandLine="*wmic* *shadowcopy* *delete*" OR CommandLine="*vssadmin* *resize* *shadowstorage*")) OR (EventCode="5857" ProviderName="MSVSS__PROVIDER") OR (EventCode="5858" Operation="*Win32_ShadowCopy*")
Elastic - Elastic Search - Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize
(EventCode:("4688" OR "1") AND process.command_line:(*vssadmin*\ *delete*\ *shadows* OR *wmic*\ *shadowcopy*\ *delete* OR *vssadmin*\ *resize*\ *shadowstorage*)) OR (EventCode:"5857" AND ProviderName:"MSVSS__PROVIDER") OR (EventCode:"5858" AND Operation:*Win32_ShadowCopy*)
LogPoint - LogPoint Search - Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion or Resize
(EventCode IN ["4688", "1"] CommandLine IN ["*vssadmin* *delete* *shadows*", "*wmic* *shadowcopy* *delete*", "*vssadmin* *resize* *shadowstorage*"]) OR (EventCode IN "5857" ProviderName IN "MSVSS__PROVIDER") OR (EventCode IN "5858" Operation IN "*Win32_ShadowCopy*")
CAR-2021-05-003Moderate coverageBCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification

This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.

Pseudocode - Pseudocode - detect attempts to add a certificate to a certificate store
processes = search Process:Create
bcdedit_commands = filter processes where (
  exe = "C:\Windows\System32\bcdedit.exe" AND command_line="*recoveryenabled*" )
output bcedit_commands
Splunk - Splunk code
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user

Comply & Defend

Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
About
All capabilities
Live statistics
Data sources
Privacy policy
Terms of service
threatengine.sh  ·  Open-source threat intelligence platform  ·  100+ authoritative sources  ·  Every fact traces to its origin