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ATT&CK Technique

Network Logon Script

T1037.003 · persistence, privilege-escalation

Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to.

Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.

Windows
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Actors Using This

5
russia_apt_sandwormCaddyWiper
russia_apt_sandworm_adjacentHermeticWiper
russia_apt_sandwormPrestige ransomware
russia_apt_sandwormRansomBoggs
russia_apt_sandwormSwiftSlicer
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
execution earlier
T1569 · System Services ×11.33T1569.002 · Service Execution ×7.21
discovery later
T1069.002 · Domain Groups ×9.52
lateral-movement later
T1080 · Taint Shared Content ×9.92
impact later
T1488 · Disk Content Wipe ×34.00T1496 · Resource Hijacking ×19.83T1499.004 · Application or System Exploitation ×19.83T1529 · System Shutdown/Reboot ×14.88T1495 · Firmware Corruption ×14.65T1561 · Disk Wipe ×8.50T1565.001 · Stored Data Manipulation ×7.93T1565.002 · Transmitted Data Manipulation ×7.93T1499 · Endpoint Denial of Service ×7.44T1561.002 · Disk Structure Wipe ×7.14
other same
T1036.001 · Invalid Code Signature ×11.33
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions
  • Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories.
  • Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder.
  • Properties.
  • Security tab.
  • Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.
Harden File Shares
  • Disable anonymous access to shared folders.
  • Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., /bin or /sbin on Linux). Use tools like chown and chmod to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.
conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
  • Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.
Audit File System Access
  • Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts.
  • Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.
Restrict Startup Directories
  • Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like /etc/, /usr/local/, and Windows directories such as C:\Windows\System32.
  • On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F.
  • On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like lsattr or auditd.
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-03, CA-07, CM-02, CM-06, SI-03, SI-04, SI-07
D3FEND12 defensive techniques
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
MITRE ATT&CKAtomic Red Teamcar (MITRE)
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