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ATT&CK Technique

Endpoint Denial of Service

T1499 · impact

Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications.

Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion. An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service.

These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).

To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.

Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack.

In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.

In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers. For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see Network Denial of Service.

WindowsLinuxmacOSContainersIaaS

Actors Using This

14
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
russia_aligned_false_flag_hacktivismAnonymous Sudan
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
russia_apt_sandwormCaddyWiper
russia_speaking_cybercrimeCarbanak
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeCasbaneiro / Metamorfo
malaysia_origin_with_international_affiliatesDragonForce
anonymous_offshoot_multi_ideology_driftGhostSec
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeGrandoreiro
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeGuildma / Astaroth
russia_apt_sandworm_adjacentHermeticWiper
ukraine_government_volunteer_offensive_operationsIT Army of Ukraine

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.

Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1037Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration.

Ingress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers.
  • Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges.
Egress Traffic Filtering
  • Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications.
  • Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected.
Protocol-Based Filtering
  • Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue.
Network Segmentation
  • Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized.
  • Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems.
Application Layer Filtering
  • Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic.
  • Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.

Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 1
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

Caldera Emulation

2
MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.
impactdarwin, linux, windowsDisrupt WIFI
./wifi.sh off
impactlinuxShutdown Target System
0x48, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x50, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x66, 0x68, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe3, 0x50, 0x66, 0x68, 0x2d, 0x68, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x50, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x2f, 0x73, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x49, 0xba, 0x73, 0x68, 0x75, 0x74, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x41, 0x52, 0x41, 0x50, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe7, 0x52, 0x53, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe6, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc0, 0x3b, 0x0f, 0x05

Comply & Defend

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