Home/ATT&CK Technique/Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
ATT&CK Technique

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1140 · stealth

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

One such example is the use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. Another example is using the Windows copy /b or type command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution.

The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.

ESXiLinuxmacOSWindows

Actors Using This

14
iranAgrius
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
north_koreaAndariel
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT17
chinaAPT1
russiaAPT28
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT31

Atomic Tests

11
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsDeobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information
Encode/Decode executable Upon execution a file named T1140_calc_decoded.exe will be placed in the temp folder
certutil -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc.txt
certutil -decode %temp%\T1140_calc.txt %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe
command_promptwindowsCertutil Rename and Decode
Rename certutil and decode a file. This is in reference to latest research by FireEye [here](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html)
copy %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\tcm.tmp
%temp%\tcm.tmp -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt
%temp%\tcm.tmp -decode %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe
shlinux, macosBase64 decoding with Python
Use Python to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
ENCODED=$(python3 -c 'import base64;enc=base64.b64encode("#{message}".encode());print(enc.decode())')
python3 -c "import base64;dec=base64.b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
python3 -c "import base64 as d;dec=d.b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
python3 -c "from base64 import b64decode;dec=b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
python3 -c "from base64 import b64decode as d;dec=d(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
echo $ENCODED | python3 -c "import base64,sys;dec=base64.b64decode(sys.stdin.read());print(dec.decode())"
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && python3 -c "import base64;dec=base64.b64decode(open('#{encoded_file}').read());print(dec.decode())"
shlinux, macosBase64 decoding with Perl
Use Perl to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
ENCODED=$(perl -e "use MIME::Base64;print(encode_base64('#{message}'));")
perl -le "use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64('$ENCODED'));"
echo $ENCODED | perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64(<STDIN>));'
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;open($f,"<","#{encoded_file}");print(decode_base64(<$f>));'
shlinux, macosBase64 decoding with shell utilities
Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | base64)
printf $ENCODED | base64 -d
echo $ENCODED | base64 -d
echo $(echo $ENCODED) | base64 -d
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d < #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | base64 -d
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | base64 -d
bash -c "{echo,\"$(echo $ENCODED)\"}|{base64,-d}"
shlinuxBase64 decoding with shell utilities (freebsd)
Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | b64encode -r -)
printf $ENCODED | b64decode -r
echo $ENCODED | b64decode -r
echo $(echo $ENCODED) | b64decode -r
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64encode -r #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64decode -r < #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r
shlinuxFreeBSD b64encode Shebang in CLI
Using b64decode shell scripts that have Shebang in them. This is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell script. Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html) by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS). Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml) for it.
echo #{bash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
echo #{dash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
echo #{fish_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
echo #{sh_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
shlinux, macosHex decoding with shell utilities
Use common shell utilities to decode a hex-encoded text string and echo it to the console
ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | xxd -ps -c 256)
printf $ENCODED | xxd -r -p
echo $ENCODED | xxd -r -p
echo $(echo $ENCODED) | xxd -r -p
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p < #{encoded_file}
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p
echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p
shlinux, macosLinux Base64 Encoded Shebang in CLI
Using Linux Base64 Encoded shell scripts that have Shebang in them. This is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell script. Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html) by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS). Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml) for it.
echo #{bash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
echo #{dash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
echo #{fish_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
echo #{sh_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
bashlinux, macosXOR decoding and command execution using Python
An adversary can obfuscate malicious commands or payloads using XOR and execute them on the victim's machine. This test uses Python to decode and execute commands on the machine.
python3 -c 'import base64; import subprocess; xor_decrypt = lambda text, key: "".join([chr(c ^ ord(k)) for c, k in zip(base64.b64decode(text.encode()), key)]); command = "#{encrypted_command}"; key = "#{xor_key}"; exec = xor_decrypt(command, key); subprocess.call(exec, shell=True)'
command_promptwindowsExpand CAB with expand.exe
Uses expand.exe to extract a file from a CAB created locally. This simulates adversarial use of expand on cabinet archives. Upon success, art-expand-source.txt is extracted next to the CAB.
mkdir "#{output_dir}" >nul 2>&1
echo hello from atomic red team > "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"
makecab "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt" "#{cab_path}"
pushd "#{output_dir}"
expand "#{cab_path}" -F:* .
popd

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 14
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 1
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

CAR Analytics

1
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2021-05-009Moderate coverageCertUtil With Decode Argument

CertUtil.exe may be used to encode and decode a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- and -----END CERTIFICATE----- tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded.

Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process.

Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used
  • encodehex and decodehex. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.
Pseudocode - Pseudocode - CertUtil with Decode Argument
processes = search Process:Create
certutil_downloads = filter processes where (
  exe =”C:\Windows\System32\certutil.exe” AND command_line = *decode* )
output certutil_downloads
Splunk - Splunk code
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id

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