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ATT&CK Technique

Shared Modules

T1129 · execution

Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API). Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system.

For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective. The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in dlfcn.h in functions such as dlopen and dlsym.

Although macOS can execute .so files, common practice uses .dylib files. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like LoadLibrary at run time.

LinuxmacOSWindows

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Actors Using This

14

iranAgrius
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeAmavaldo
north_koreaAndariel
franceAnimal Farm
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaAPT38
chinaAPT40
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)

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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.

resource-development earlier

T1608.004 · Drive-by Target ×1.55

initial-access earlier

T0866 · Exploitation of Remote Services ×1.55 T1659 · Content Injection ×1.55

execution same

T1559.001 · Component Object Model ×1.55

persistence later

T0859 · Valid Accounts ×1.55 T1542.001 · System Firmware ×1.55

privilege-escalation later

T1055.012 · Process Hollowing ×1.55 T1546.011 · Application Shimming ×1.55

discovery later

T1614 · System Location Discovery ×1.55 T1614.001 · System Language Discovery ×1.55 T0846 · Remote System Discovery ×1.55

lateral-movement later

T1080 · Taint Shared Content ×1.55

impact later

T1488 · Disk Content Wipe ×1.55

other same

T1070.002 · Clear Linux or Mac System Logs ×1.55 T1036.008 · Masquerade File Type ×1.55

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Atomic Tests

1

Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.

command_promptwindowsESXi - Install a custom VIB on an ESXi host

An adversary can maintain persistence within an ESXi host by installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs). [Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence)

#{pscp_file} -pw #{vm_pass} #{vib_file} #{vm_user}@#{vm_host}:/tmp
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{vib_install}"

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Mitigations

1

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.

M1038Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions.

Application Control

Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution.
Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.

xml"`) Script Blocking

Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources.
Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g.

, Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned) Executable Blocking

Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as %TEMP% or %APPDATA% directories.
Implementation: Block execution of .exe, .bat, or .ps1 files from user-writable directories.

Dynamic Analysis Prevention

Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time.
Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

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Detection Coverage

1/6 layers

Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).

Behavioral / log (Sigma) 1

Analytics (MITRE CAR) none

Runtime / container (Falco) none

File / malware (YARA) none

Network (Suricata/Snort) none

Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53CM-02, CM-07, SI-03, SI-04, SI-07, SI-10

Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse

CVETechnique ActorTool Family

drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges

External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves

MITRE ATT&CK Atomic Red Team car (MITRE)

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