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ICS ATT&CK

Valid Accounts

T0859 · persistence, lateral-movement

Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems.

Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.

The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.

None

Actors Using This

12
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
russia_consistent_state_actor_per_mandiant_dragos_high_confidence_no_specific_nation_attributionCHERNOVITE (PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLER)
dprk_lazarus_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_electric_sector_2017_2018_retiredCOVELLITE (Lazarus-linked ICS)
state_actor_dragos_tracked_cis_central_asia_espionage_focus_2023_disclosedGANANITE
russia_aligned_state_actor_dragos_tracked_distinct_from_sandworm_electrumKAMACITE
dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_unc2630_apt5_significant_overlap_stage_2_capableKOSTOVITE
state_actor_dragos_tracked_oracle_isupplier_specialist_2023_disclosedLAURIONITE
iran_attributed_dragos_tracked_ics_threat_group_2017_activeRASPITE (Leafminer)
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyberStuxnet

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
lateral-movement later

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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