Home/ATT&CK Technique/Manipulation of Control
ICS ATT&CK

Manipulation of Control

T0831 · impact

Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes.

The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle Spoof command message * Changing setpoints A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals.

As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.

None

Actors Using This

6
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
russia_consistent_state_actor_per_mandiant_dragos_high_confidence_no_specific_nation_attributionCHERNOVITE (PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLER)
dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_unc2630_apt5_significant_overlap_stage_2_capableKOSTOVITE
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyberStuxnet

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
persistence earlier
lateral-movement earlier

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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