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ICS ATT&CK

External Remote Services

T0822 · initial-access

Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms.

Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network.

In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network.

Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point-to-point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.

None

Actors Using This

9
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
dprk_lazarus_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_electric_sector_2017_2018_retiredCOVELLITE (Lazarus-linked ICS)
state_actor_dragos_tracked_cis_central_asia_espionage_focus_2023_disclosedGANANITE
russia_aligned_state_actor_dragos_tracked_distinct_from_sandworm_electrumKAMACITE
dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_unc2630_apt5_significant_overlap_stage_2_capableKOSTOVITE
state_actor_dragos_tracked_oracle_isupplier_specialist_2023_disclosedLAURIONITE
iran_attributed_dragos_tracked_ics_threat_group_2017_activeRASPITE (Leafminer)

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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