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ICS ATT&CK

Internet Accessible Device

T0883 · initial-access

Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network.

Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted. These services may be discoverable through the use of online scanning tools.

In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing. In Trend Micros manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.

None

Actors Using This

11
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
dprk_lazarus_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_electric_sector_2017_2018_retiredCOVELLITE (Lazarus-linked ICS)
state_actor_dragos_tracked_cis_central_asia_espionage_focus_2023_disclosedGANANITE
russia_aligned_state_actor_dragos_tracked_distinct_from_sandworm_electrumKAMACITE
dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_unc2630_apt5_significant_overlap_stage_2_capableKOSTOVITE
state_actor_dragos_tracked_oracle_isupplier_specialist_2023_disclosedLAURIONITE
iran_attributed_dragos_tracked_ics_threat_group_2017_activeRASPITE (Leafminer)
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyberStuxnet

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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