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ATT&CK Technique

Code Signing

T1553.002 · defense-impairment

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary.

Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature. Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.

Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.

macOSWindows
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Actors Using This

14
chinaAPT17
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT41
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
chinaBillbug
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
chinaBlackTech
spainCareto / The Mask
russia_consistent_state_actor_per_mandiant_dragos_high_confidence_no_specific_nation_attributionCHERNOVITE (PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLER)
india_aligned_apt_active_2013_pakistan_china_south_asia_government_military_targetingConfucius (India-Aligned APT)
dprk_lazarus_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_electric_sector_2017_2018_retiredCOVELLITE (Lazarus-linked ICS)
chinaDaggerfly
south_koreaDarkhotel
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access same
T0822 · External Remote Services ×5.80T0865 · Spearphishing Attachment ×5.80T0866 · Exploitation of Remote Services ×4.84T0883 · Internet Accessible Device ×4.75
execution same
T1574.006 · Dynamic Linker Hijacking ×3.87
persistence same
T0859 · Valid Accounts ×4.84
discovery same
T0846 · Remote System Discovery ×5.16
collection same
T0801 · Monitor Process State ×5.80
impact same
T0813 · Denial of Control ×5.80T0831 · Manipulation of Control ×4.84T0815 · Denial of View ×4.35T0827 · Loss of Control ×4.15T0832 · Manipulation of View ×4.15
other same
T1070.003 · Clear Command History ×4.35T1562.003 · Impair Command History Logging ×4.35
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Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 1
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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