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ATT&CK Technique

Data from Network Shared Drive

T1039 · collection

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.

LinuxmacOSWindows

Actors Using This

14
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
unknown_likely_russia_alignedAnubis Ransomware
chinaAPT17
russiaAPT28
chinaAPT3
russia_speaking_cybercrimeBlack Basta
russia_apt_sandwormBlackEnergy
unknown_likely_russia_aligned_eldorado_lineageBlackLock Ransomware
commercial_cybercrime_uefi_bootkitBlackLotus

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
initial-access earlier

Atomic Tests

2
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptelevatedwindowsCopy a sensitive File over Administrative share with copy
Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with copy cmd https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
copy \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} %TEMP%\#{local_file}
powershellelevatedwindowsCopy a sensitive File over Administrative share with Powershell
Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with powershell https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
copy-item -Path "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}"

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 2
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 1
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

CAR Analytics

1
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2013-01-003Moderate coverageSMB Events Monitoring

Server Message Block (SMB) is used by Windows to allow for file, pipe, and printer sharing over port 445/tcp. It allows for enumerating, and reading from and writing to file shares for a remote computer. Although it is heavily used by Windows servers for legitimate purposes and by users for file and printer sharing, many adversaries also use SMB to achieve Lateral Movement.

Looking at this activity more closely to obtain an adequate sense of situational awareness may make it possible to detect adversaries moving between hosts in a way that deviates from normal activity. Because SMB traffic is heavy in many environments, this analytic may be difficult to turn into something that can be used to quickly detect an APT. In some cases, it may make more sense to run this analytic in a forensic fashion.

Looking through and filtering its output after an intrusion has been discovered may be helpful in identifying the scope of compromise. ### Output Description The source, destination, content, and time of each event.

pseudocode
flow = search Flow:Message
smb_events = filter flow where (dest_port == "445" and protocol == "smb")
smb_events.file_name = smb_events.proto_info.file_name
output smb_write

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