Home/ATT&CK Technique/Services Registry Permissions Weakness
ATT&CK Technique

Services Registry Permissions Weakness

T1574.011 · stealth, execution

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control.

When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.

The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL. If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL. Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths.

This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the Parameters key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the Parameters key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked. For example, the registry path HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters contains the AutodiaDLL value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality.

An adversary could set the AutodiaDLL to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL: "AutodialDLL"="c:\temp\foo.dll" This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.

Windows
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Actors Using This

14
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
chinaAoqin Dragon
chinaAPT17
chinaAPT3
indiaBitter
russia_speaking_cybercrimeBlack Basta
chinaBlackTech
russia_speaking_cybercrimeCarbanak
russia_speaking_cybercrimeCl0p
russia_speaking_cybercrimeCuba
chinaDaggerfly
chinaEarth Lusca
chinaAPT27
◈

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
T1598 · Phishing for Information ×3.88T1598.003 · Spearphishing Link ×3.88
execution same
T1059.008 · Network Device CLI ×4.58
persistence later
T1078.001 · Default Accounts ×3.98T1078.003 · Local Accounts ×3.38
credential-access later
T1212 · Exploitation for Credential Access ×5.21T1003.005 · Cached Domain Credentials ×3.85T1003.006 · DCSync ×3.66T1552.005 · Cloud Instance Metadata API ×3.66T1003.008 · /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow ×3.29
collection later
T1530 · Data from Cloud Storage ×4.07
command-and-control later
T1132.001 · Standard Encoding ×3.27
other same
T1562.009 · Safe Mode Boot ×4.36T1562.004 · Disable or Modify System Firewall ×3.18T1564.003 · Hidden Window ×3.14
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Atomic Tests

2
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellwindowsService Registry Permissions Weakness
Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg. reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe" 
get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL
command_promptwindowsService ImagePath Change with reg.exe
Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious file 
reg.exe add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "#{malicious_service_path}"
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1024Restrict Registry Permissions

Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.

Review and Adjust Permissions on Critical Keys
  • Regularly review permissions on keys such as Run, RunOnce, and Services to ensure only authorized users have write access.
  • Use tools like icacls or PowerShell to automate permission adjustments. Enable Registry Auditing.
  • Enable auditing on sensitive keys to log access attempts.
  • Use Event Viewer or SIEM solutions to analyze logs and detect suspicious activity.
  • Example Audit Policy: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable Protect Credential-Related Hives.
  • Limit access to hives like SAM,SECURITY, and SYSTEM to prevent credential dumping or other unauthorized access.
  • Use LSA Protection to add an additional security layer for credential storage. Restrict Registry Editor Usage.
  • Use Group Policy to restrict access to regedit.exe for non-administrative users.
  • Block execution of registry editing tools on endpoints where they are unnecessary. Deploy Baseline Configuration Tools.
  • Use tools like Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit or CIS Benchmarks to apply and maintain secure registry configurations.
Tools for Implementation Registry Permission Tools
  • Registry Editor (regedit): Built-in tool to manage registry permissions.
  • PowerShell: Automate permissions and manage keys. Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "KeyName" -Value "Value".
  • icacls: Command-line tool to modify ACLs.
Monitoring Tools
  • Sysmon: Monitor and log registry events.
  • Event Viewer: View registry access logs.
Policy Management Tools
  • Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce registry permissions via GPOs.
  • Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Deploy configuration baselines for registry permissions.
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Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 11
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 4
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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CAR Analytics

4
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2013-01-002Moderate coverageAutorun Differences

The Sysinternals tool [Autoruns](../sensors/autoruns) checks the registry and file system for known identify persistence mechanisms. It will output any tools identified, including built-in or added-on Microsoft functionality and third party software. Many of these locations are known by adversaries and used to obtain Persistence.

Running Autoruns periodically in an environment makes it possible to collect and monitor its output for differences, which may include the removal or addition of persistent tools. Depending on the persistence mechanism and location, legitimate software may be more likely to make changes than an adversary tool. Thus, this analytic may result in significant noise in a highly dynamic environment.

While Autoruns is a convenient method to scan for programs using persistence mechanisms its scanning nature does not conform well to streaming based analytics. This analytic could be replaced with one that draws from sensors that collect registry and file information if streaming analytics are desired. Utilizes the Sysinternals autoruns tool (ignoring validated Microsoft entries).

Primarily not a detection analytic by itself but through analysis of results by an analyst can be used for such. Building another analytic on top of this one identifying unusual entries would likely be a beneficial alternative.

CAR-2013-03-001Moderate coverageReg.exe called from Command Shell

Registry modifications are often essential in establishing persistence via known Windows mechanisms. Many legitimate modifications are done graphically via regedit.exe or by using the corresponding channels, or even calling the Registry APIs directly. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe.

When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exe will likely be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be learned so they can be tuned out accordingly. ### Output Description The sequence of processes that resulted in reg.exe being started from a shell.

That is, a hierarchy that looks like
  • great-grand_parent.exe.
  • grand_parent.exe.
  • parent.exe.
  • reg.exe.
pseudocode
processes = search Process:Create
reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe == "cmd.exe")
cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and parent_exe != "explorer.exe"")
reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)
output reg_and_cmd
DNIF
_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $Process=regex(.*reg\.exe.*)i AND $ParentProcess=regex(.*cmd\.exe.*)i as #A limit 100
>>_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $Process=regex(.*cmd\.exe.*)i NOT $ParentProcess=regex(.*explorer\.exe.*)i as #B limit 100
>>_checkif sjoin #B.$PPID = #A.$CPID str_compare #B.$SystemName eq #A.$SystemName include
CAR-2013-04-002Low coverageQuick execution of a series of suspicious commands

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

Commands of interest
  • arp.exe.
  • at.exe.
  • attrib.exe.
  • cscript.exe.
  • dsquery.exe.
  • hostname.exe.
  • ipconfig.exe.
  • mimikatz.exe.
  • nbstat.exe.
  • net.exe.
  • netsh.exe.
  • nslookup.exe.
  • ping.exe.
  • quser.exe.
  • qwinsta.exe.
  • reg.exe.
  • runas.exe.
  • sc.exe.
  • schtasks.exe.
  • ssh.exe.
  • systeminfo.exe.
  • taskkill.exe.
  • telnet.exe.
  • tracert.exe.
  • wscript.exe.
  • xcopy.exe ### Output Description The host on which the commands were executed, the time of execution, and what commands were executed.
pseudocode
processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
 or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
 or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
 or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
 or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
 or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
 or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
 or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
 or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped
DNIF
_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $App=regex(arp\.exe|at\.exe|attrib\.exe|cscript\.exe|dsquery\.exe|hostname\.exe|ipconfig\.exe|mimikatz.exe|nbstat\.exe|net\.exe|netsh\.exe|nslookup\.exe|ping\.exe|quser\.exe|qwinsta\.exe|reg\.exe|runas\.exe|sc\.exe|schtasks\.exe|ssh\.exe|systeminfo\.exe|taskkill\.exe|telnet\.exe|tracert\.exe|wscript\.exe|xcopy\.exe)i group count_unique $App limit 100
>>_agg count
>>_checkif int_compare Count > 1 include
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image IN ["*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\attrib.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsquery.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\mimikatz.exe", "*\nbstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nslookup.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\runas.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\ssh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\taskkill.exe", "*\telnet.exe", "*\tracert.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\xcopy.exe"]
| chart count() as cnt by host
| search cnt > 1
CAR-2020-05-003Low coverageRare LolBAS Command Lines

LoLBAS are binaries and scripts that are built in to Windows, frequently are signed by Microsoft, and may be used by an attacker. Some LoLBAS are used very rarely and it might be possible to alert every time they're used (this would depend on your environment), but many others are very common and can't be simply alerted on. This analytic takes all instances of LoLBAS execution and then looks for instances of command lines that are not normal in the environment.

This can detect attackers (which will tend to need the binaries for something different than normal usage) but will also tend to have false positives. The analytic needs to be tuned. The 1.5 in the query is the number of standard deviations away to look.

It can be tuned up to filter out more noise and tuned down to get more results. This means it is probably best as a hunting analytic when you have analysts looking at the screen and able to tune the analytic up and down, because the threshold may not be stable for very long.

Note
  • this analytic is related to [CAR-2013-04-002](/analytics/CAR-2013-04-002), but differs by looking for a different set of binaries and also looking at standard deviation across command lines of these binaries instead of their execution within a short time window.
Pseudocode - LolBAS Rare Commands
processes = search Process:Create
lolbas_processes = filter processes where (exe = "At.exe" OR exe = "Atbroker.exe" OR exe = "Bash.exe" OR exe = "Bitsadmin.exe" OR exe = "Certutil.exe" OR exe = "Cmd.exe" OR exe = "Cmdkey.exe" OR exe = "Cmstp.exe" OR exe = "Control.exe" OR exe = "Csc.exe" OR exe = "Cscript.exe" OR exe = "Dfsvc.exe" OR exe = "Diskshadow.exe" OR exe = "Dnscmd.exe" OR exe = "Esentutl.exe" OR exe = "Eventvwr.exe" OR exe = "Expand.exe" OR exe = "Extexport.exe" OR exe = "Extrac32.exe" OR exe = "Findstr.exe" OR exe = "Forfiles.exe" OR exe = "Ftp.exe" OR exe = "Gpscript.exe" OR exe = "Hh.exe" OR exe = "Ie4uinit.exe" OR exe = "Ieexec.exe" OR exe = "Infdefaultinstall.exe" OR exe = "Installutil.exe" OR exe = "Jsc.exe" OR exe = "Makecab.exe" OR exe = "Mavinject.exe" OR exe = "Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe" OR exe = "Mmc.exe" OR exe = "Msbuild.exe" OR exe = "Msconfig.exe" OR exe = "Msdt.exe" OR exe = "Mshta.exe" OR exe = "Msiexec.exe" OR exe = "Odbcconf.exe" OR exe = "Pcalua.exe" OR exe = "Pcwrun.exe" OR exe = "Presentationhost.exe" OR exe = "Print.exe" OR exe = "Reg.exe" OR exe = "Regasm.exe" OR exe = "Regedit.exe" OR exe = "Register-cimprovider.exe" OR exe = "Regsvcs.exe" OR exe = "Regsvr32.exe" OR exe = "Replace.exe" OR exe = "Rpcping.exe" OR exe = "Rundll32.exe" OR exe = "Runonce.exe" OR exe = "Runscripthelper.exe" OR exe = "Sc.exe" OR exe = "Schtasks.exe" OR exe = "Scriptrunner.exe" OR exe = "SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe" OR exe = "Tttracer.exe" OR exe = "Verclsid.exe" OR exe = "Wab.exe" OR exe = "Wmic.exe" OR exe = "Wscript.exe" OR exe = "Wsreset.exe" OR exe = "Xwizard.exe" OR exe = "Advpack.dll OR exe = "Comsvcs.dll OR exe = "Ieadvpack.dll OR exe = "Ieaframe.dll OR exe = "Mshtml.dll OR exe = "Pcwutl.dll OR exe = "Setupapi.dll OR exe = "Shdocvw.dll OR exe = "Shell32.dll OR exe = "Syssetup.dll OR exe = "Url.dll OR exe = "Zipfldr.dll OR exe = "Appvlp.exe" OR exe = "Bginfo.exe" OR exe = "Cdb.exe" OR exe = "csi.exe" OR exe = "Devtoolslauncher.exe" OR exe = "dnx.exe" OR exe = "Dxcap.exe" OR exe = "Excel.exe" OR exe = "Mftrace.exe" OR exe = "Msdeploy.exe" OR exe = "msxsl.exe" OR exe = "Powerpnt.exe" OR exe = "rcsi.exe" OR exe = "Sqler.exe" OR exe = "Sqlps.exe" OR exe = "SQLToolsPS.exe" OR exe = "Squirrel.exe" OR exe = "te.exe" OR exe = "Tracker.exe" OR exe = "Update.exe" OR exe = "vsjitdebugger.exe" OR exe = "Winword.exe" OR exe = "Wsl.exe" OR exe = "CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR exe = "CL_Invocation.ps1 OR exe = "Manage-bde.wsf OR exe = "Pubprn.vbs OR exe = "Slmgr.vbs OR exe = "Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR exe = "winrm.vbs OR exe = "Pester.bat)
process_count = count(lolbas_processes) by process
process_count_avg = average(process_count)
process_count_stdev = standard_deviation(process_count)
lower_bound = process_count_avg - stdev * 1.5
outliers = filter lolbas_processes where (process_count < lower_bound)
return outliers
Splunk - LolBAS Rare Commands
index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (OriginalFileName = At.exe OR OriginalFileName = Atbroker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bash.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bitsadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName = Certutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmdkey.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmstp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Control.exe OR OriginalFileName = Csc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dfsvc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Diskshadow.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dnscmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Esentutl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Eventvwr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Expand.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extexport.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extrac32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Findstr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Forfiles.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ftp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Gpscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Hh.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ie4uinit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ieexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Infdefaultinstall.exe OR OriginalFileName = Installutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Jsc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Makecab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mavinject.exe OR OriginalFileName = Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mmc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msbuild.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msconfig.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdt.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msiexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcalua.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcwrun.exe OR OriginalFileName = Presentationhost.exe OR OriginalFileName = Print.exe OR OriginalFileName = Reg.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regasm.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regedit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Register-cimprovider.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvcs.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvr32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Replace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rpcping.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runonce.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runscripthelper.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName = Scriptrunner.exe OR OriginalFileName = SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tttracer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Verclsid.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsreset.exe OR OriginalFileName = Xwizard.exe OR OriginalFileName = Advpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Comsvcs.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieadvpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieaframe.dll OR OriginalFileName = Mshtml.dll OR OriginalFileName = Pcwutl.dll OR OriginalFileName = Setupapi.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shdocvw.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shell32.dll OR OriginalFileName = Syssetup.dll OR OriginalFileName = Url.dll OR OriginalFileName = Zipfldr.dll OR OriginalFileName = Appvlp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bginfo.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cdb.exe OR OriginalFileName = csi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Devtoolslauncher.exe OR OriginalFileName = dnx.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dxcap.exe OR OriginalFileName = Excel.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mftrace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdeploy.exe OR OriginalFileName = msxsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Powerpnt.exe OR OriginalFileName = rcsi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqler.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqlps.exe OR OriginalFileName = SQLToolsPS.exe OR OriginalFileName = Squirrel.exe OR OriginalFileName = te.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tracker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Update.exe OR OriginalFileName = vsjitdebugger.exe OR OriginalFileName = Winword.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = CL_Invocation.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = Manage-bde.wsf OR OriginalFileName = Pubprn.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Slmgr.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR OriginalFileName = winrm.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Pester.bat)|eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)|eventstats count(process) as procCount by process|eventstats avg(procCount) as avg stdev(procCount) as stdev|eval lowerBound=(avg-stdev*1.5)|eval isOutlier=if((procCount < lowerBound),1,0)|where isOutlier=1|table host, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine, procCount
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