Home/Threat Actor/Cuba
Threat Actor

Cuba

cuba_ransomware · russia_speaking_cybercrime · active since 2019

Cuba (Tropical Scorpius / ColdDraw / Fidel ransomware) is one of the more sustained operationally-consistent ransomware operations of the 2019-2024 period, a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating predominantly from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states, active since approximately December 2019, with no documented operational relationship with Cuba the country or Cuban government entities despite the unfortunate naming overlap (cluster naming reflects Spanish- language "Cuba" branding that cluster operators selected for ransomware family alongside imagery referencing Cuban revolutionary figures)

compromised 100+ organizations globally with estimated ransom collection exceeding $60M USD across the 2019-2022 operational period per CISA + FBI joint cybersecurity advisory AA22-335A (December 1, 2022) with sustained continued operations subsequently through 2024-2025.

documented selective tooling- and-operational-overlap with RomCom RAT operations (also tracked as Storm-0978 by Microsoft) during 2022-2023, RomCom RAT operations documented in selective Ukrainian-targeting and Western-critical-infrastructure-targeting consistent with broader Russian state security service interests during the Russia- Ukraine war period complicating conventional financially-motivated- vs-state-aligned categorical framing.

documented Industrial Spy data-marketplace operational overlap (2022) with stolen Cuba victim data appearing on Industrial Spy alongside Cuba's own leak-site infrastructure suggesting operational partnership or personnel-overlap.

high-profile documented victims including multiple US regional hospital systems, Montenegro government (August 2022, operationally consequential attack against a NATO member-state government IT infrastructure during Russia-Ukraine war period), multiple US municipal-government targets, and ~100+ additional commercial and government-sector victims; operates custom Cuba-cluster tooling including BugHatch backdoor + BurntCigar anti-EDR utility + Wedgecut reconnaissance tool + ColdDraw loader alongside standard commodity post-exploitation tooling.

initial-access tradecraft centers on Hancitor loader deployment via spear-phishing + selective n-day exploitation including ProxyLogon + Windows CLFS + Citrix ADC + Confluence + MSDT Follina + credential-theft-based access.

russia_speaking_cybercrime confidence: high 21 aliases

Profile

Cuba (also tracked as Tropical Scorpius [Palo Alto Networks Unit 42], ColdDraw, Fidel ransomware) is one of the more sustained operationally-consistent ransomware operations of the 2019-2024 period, a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating predominantly from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states. The cluster has been active since approximately December 2019. Important naming disambiguation: the cluster naming reflects the Spanish-language "Cuba" branding that cluster operators selected for the ransomware family (alongside imagery referencing Cuban revolutionary figures)

the cluster has no documented operational relationship with Cuba the country or Cuban government entities. The naming has contributed to occasional analytical confusion in non-specialist reporting. The cluster operates from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states consistent with the broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem patterns. The cluster has compromised more than 100 organizations globally and collected estimated ransoms exceeding $60 million US dollars across the 2019-2022 operational period per CISA + FBI joint cybersecurity advisory AA22-335A (December 1, 2022), with sustained continued operations subsequently through 2024-2025. Operationally the cluster has documented selective relationships with two adjacent operations that have been analytically interesting: First, RomCom RAT selective operational overlap (2022-2023). Documented selective tooling-and-operational-overlap between Cuba ransomware operations and RomCom RAT operations (also tracked as Storm-0978 by Microsoft). RomCom RAT operations have been documented in selective Ukrainian-targeting and Western- critical-infrastructure-targeting consistent with broader Russian state security service interests during the Russia-Ukraine war period, complicating the conventional financially-motivated-vs- state-aligned categorical framing. Modern vendor consensus typically tracks RomCom / Storm-0978 as related-but-separate cluster with partial operational overlap rather than identical cluster identity. The overlap pattern is consistent with broader analytical observations about Russia-speaking organized cybercrime and Russian state security service intersection visible across Wizard Spider / Conti (ContiLeaks contacts), Indrik Spider / Evil Corp (OFAC explicit Russian FSB tasking allegation), Black Basta (BlackBastaLeaks revelations), and Play (selective Ukrainian targeting). Second, Industrial Spy data-marketplace operational overlap (2022). Documented operational overlap between Cuba ransomware leak-site infrastructure and the Industrial Spy data-marketplace (a stolen-data sales platform). Stolen Cuba victim data was documented as appearing on Industrial Spy alongside Cuba's own leak-site infrastructure, suggesting either operational partnership between Cuba operators and Industrial Spy operators or personnel-overlap.

High-profile documented Cuba victims include
  • Multiple US regional hospital systems across the operational lifespan.
  • Montenegro government (August 2022), operationally consequential attack against a NATO member-state government IT infrastructure, contributing to Western policy attention to Russia-aligned cybercrime operations during the Russia- Ukraine war period.
  • Multiple US municipal-government targets.
  • Multiple US critical-infrastructure-sector targets including financial services and information technology.
  • Approximately 100+ additional commercial and government- sector victims during the 2019-2025 operational lifespan Operationally the cluster's signature toolkit centers on the Cuba ransomware (with version evolution across v1-v3 variants) alongside cluster-specific tooling:.
  • BugHatch backdoor, custom Cuba-associated backdoor providing extensive command execution and persistence capability.
  • BurntCigar, custom anti-EDR utility for tampering with endpoint detection and response tooling on compromised hosts.
  • Wedgecut, reconnaissance tool for compromised network enumeration.
  • ColdDraw loader, selective alternative naming for cluster loader infrastructure Plus standard commodity post-exploitation tooling (Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, PsExec, BloodHound). Initial-access tradecraft has centered on Hancitor loader deployment via spear-phishing, selective n-day vulnerability exploitation (notably Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-26855 ProxyLogon, Windows CLFS CVE-2022-24521, Windows Defender CVE-2023-3519 Citrix ADC, Atlassian Confluence CVE-2022-26134, Microsoft MSDT Follina CVE-2022-30190), and credential-theft- based initial access. A handful of operational notes: First, the cluster represents one of the more sustained operationally-consistent ransomware operations of the 2019-2024 period. The cluster's longevity (6+ years of sustained operations) positions Cuba alongside LockBit, Evil Corp, and other major long-running contemporary cybercrime cluster references. Second, the cluster's analytical profile differs from peer contemporary cybercrime clusters in several ways: operational tempo (lower victim-volume than major RaaS operations like LockBit / Black Basta / ALPHV, but sustained over substantially longer operational duration), tooling sophistication (custom BugHatch + BurntCigar + Wedgecut tooling demonstrating sustained capability development), and victim-targeting (concentrated US healthcare-and-government sector targeting consistent with broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime patterns). Third, the RomCom RAT selective operational overlap (2022-2023) represents an analytically interesting historical data point about contemporary Russia-speaking organized cybercrime and Russian state security service intersection. The pattern complements broader analytical observations across Wizard Spider / Conti, Indrik Spider / Evil Corp, Black Basta, and Play contributing to the cumulative gray-zone analytical framing. Fourth, no formal individual-operator attribution at the named- Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for Cuba administrators, consistent with the broader pattern of absence of similar named-individual-attribution for Cl0p, ALPHV / BlackCat, Black Basta, Akira, Play, Medusa, Rhysida, Royal / BlackSuit, RansomHub, Qilin, Hive, Maze, and several other contemporary cybercrime clusters. Only LockBit (Khoroshev), Evil Corp (Yakubets / Turashev), FIN7 (Dunaev / Hladyr / Kolpakov / Witte), and REvil (Vasinskyi / Polyanin) have received named- individual-operator-tier formal attribution among the major contemporary cybercrime clusters covered in this corpus.

Aliases

21
cubacuba ransomwarecuba_ransomwarecubaransomwarecuba gangcuba_gangtropical scorpiustropical_scorpiustropicalscorpiuscolddrawcold drawcold_drawfidel ransomwarefidel_ransomwarefidelransomwarestorm-0978 selective overlapstorm_0978_selective_overlapv_is_vendetta variantsv_is_vendetta_variantsatk 254atk254

Notable Campaigns

8
2024-2025Continued Operations (2024-2025)
2022-2023RomCom RAT Selective Operational Overlap (2022-2023)
2022CISA + FBI AA22-335A Cuba Ransomware Cybersecurity Advisory (December 1, 2022)
2022Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 Tropical Scorpius Naming (August 2022)
2022Industrial Spy Leak Site Operational Overlap (2022)
2021FBI Flash Message Cuba Ransomware Indicators (December 2021)
2020-2024Sustained US Healthcare and Government Sector Targeting (2020-2024)
2019Cuba Emergence (December 2019)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
FBI Cyber DivisionCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)HHS Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3)Mandiant / Google Cloud Threat IntelligenceMicrosoft Threat Intelligence CenterCrowdStrikeRecorded Future Insikt GroupSentinelOneSophosTrend MicroKaspersky GReATGroup-IBPRODAFTCovewareHalcyonCybereasonIBM X-ForceTrustwave SpiderLabsPalo Alto Networks Unit 42Symantec (Broadcom)Cisco TalosBitdefenderDFIR ReportBlackBerry Cybersecurity
Key reporting
reportCISA + FBI: AA22-335A #StopRansomware Cuba Ransomware Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (December 1, 2022), most operationally significant US-government formal public attribution documenting 100+ orgs and $60M+ USD collected ransoms
reportFBI Flash Message: Cuba Ransomware Indicators of Compromise (December 2021), earliest US-government formal public attribution
reportPalo Alto Networks Unit 42: Cuba Ransomware Tropical Scorpius (August 2022), seminal Tropical Scorpius naming
reportBlackBerry Cybersecurity: Threat Thursday Cuba Ransomware (July 2022)
reportCrowdStrike: Cuba Ransomware Tracking (multiple years)
reportMandiant: Cuba Ransomware Continued Tracking
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence: Cuba Ransomware Storm-0978 (May 2022)
reportCisco Talos: Cuba Ransomware Tropical Scorpius
reportTrend Micro: Ransomware Spotlight Cuba
reportSentinelOne Labs: Cuba Ransomware Tracking
reportBitdefender: Cuba Ransomware Tracking
reportRecorded Future Insikt Group: Cuba Ransomware Tracking
reportSophos: Cuba Ransomware Continued Tracking
reportCoveware: Cuba Ransomware Affiliate Tracking
reportHalcyon: Cuba Operational Profile
reportPRODAFT: Cuba Detailed Operational Analysis
reportGroup-IB: Cuba Continued Tracking
reportTrustwave SpiderLabs: Cuba Tracking
reportSymantec (Broadcom): Cuba Ransomware Tracking
reportDFIR Report: Cuba Operational Analysis
reportIBM X-Force: Cuba Continued Tracking
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: Cuba

Operational

State sponsor

Cuba is a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster , not a state-aligned cluster and not associated with the Cuban government despite the unfortunate naming overlap, operating predominantly from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states. The cluster naming reflects the Spanish-language "Cuba" branding that cluster operators selected for the ransomware family (alongside imagery referencing Cuban revolutionary figures)

the cluster has no documented operational relationship with Cuba the country or Cuban government entities. The cluster has been active since approximately December 2019 and represents one of the more sustained operationally-consistent ransomware operations of the 2019-2024 period. The cluster has documented operational relationships with the RomCom RAT operations (also tracked as Storm-0978, with apparent selective tooling-and-operational- overlap during 2022-2023, though Storm-0978 / RomCom is typically tracked as a related-but-separate cluster with partial operational overlap rather than identical cluster identity). The cluster received the most operationally significant US- government formal public attribution among 2019-emerging ransomware operations through CISA + FBI joint cybersecurity advisory AA22-335A (December 1, 2022) documenting Cuba responsibility for compromise of more than 100 organizations globally and estimated ransom collection exceeding $60 million US dollars across the 2019-2022 operational period (with sustained continued operations subsequently). No formal individual-operator attribution at the named-Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for Cuba administrators.

Motivations
financial_gain, financially_motivated, cybercrime, ransomware_deployment, extortion, double_extortion, ransomware_as_a_service_operations, healthcare_sector_targeting, government_sector_targeting
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)58/60 · 96%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)31/60 · 51%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

2 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
METERPRETERMSHTASHARPHOUND
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
About
All capabilities
Live statistics
Data sources
Privacy policy
Terms of service
threatengine.sh  ·  Open-source threat intelligence platform  ·  100+ authoritative sources  ·  Every fact traces to its origin