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ATT&CK Technique

Data Encoding

T1132 · command-and-control

Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.

Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.

ESXiLinuxmacOSWindows

Actors Using This

14
russia_speaking_cybercrimeAkira
russia_speaking_cybercrimeALPHV / BlackCat
north_koreaAndariel
chinaAPT10
chinaAPT17
chinaAPT1
chinaAPT31
iranAPT33
iranOilRig
iranAPT35
north_koreaAPT37
north_koreaAPT38
iranAPT39

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
resource-development earlier
initial-access earlier

Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1031Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) 1
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

Falco Runtime Rules

1
Container / Linux runtime detections that fire on this technique.
INFODecoding Payload in Container
Detect any use of {base64} decoding in a container. Legitimate applications may decode encoded payloads. The template list known_decode_payload_containers can be used for simple tuning and customization, or you can adopt custom, more refined tuning. Less sophisticated adversaries may {base64}-decode their payloads not only to obfuscate them, but also to ensure that the payload remains intact when the application processes it. Note that injecting commands into an application's input often results in the application processing passed strings like "sh -c". In these cases, you may be lucky and the encoded blob will also be logged. Otherwise, all you will see is the {base64} decoding command, as the encoded blob was already interpreted by the shell.
view condition
spawned_process and container and base64_decoding and not container.image.repository in (known_decode_payload_containers)

Comply & Defend

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