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ATT&CK Technique

Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

T1070.002 · stealth

Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as: /var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages /var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs /var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp: Login records /var/log/kern.log: Kernel logs /var/log/cron.log: Crond logs /var/log/maillog: Mail server logs * /var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs.

LinuxmacOS

Actors Using This

9
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)
state_actor_dragos_tracked_oracle_isupplier_specialist_2023_disclosedLAURIONITE
israel_commercial_cyber_mercenaryNSO Group / Pegasus
unattributed_apt_nation_state_speculationOperation Triangulation
financially_motivated_cybercrime_cloud_native_cryptojacking_specialist_german_speaking_indicatorsTeamTNT (Cloud Cryptojacking Operator)
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_unc3886_virtualization_firewall_zero_day_specialistUNC3886
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_unc4841_barracuda_esg_zero_day_specialistUNC4841
china_nexus_suspected_mandiant_unc5325_ivanti_2024_zero_day_specialistUNC5325 (Ivanti Connect Secure 2024 Operator)

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
lateral-movement same

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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