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ATT&CK Technique

Systemd Service

T1543.002 · persistence, privilege-escalation

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Systemd utilizes unit configuration files with the .service file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the /systemd/system directory of the root owned directories (/). User level unit files are stored in the /systemd/user directories of the user owned directories ($HOME).

Inside the .service unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands: ExecStart, ExecStartPre, and ExecStartPost directives execute when a service is started manually by systemctl or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. ExecReload directive executes when a service restarts. * ExecStop, ExecStopPre, and ExecStopPost directives execute when a service is stopped. Adversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a .service file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a .service file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.

The .service file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions. Systemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts).

Linux
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Actors Using This

12
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_canonical_microsoft_mulberry_typhoonAPT5 (UNC2630 / UNC2717 / Mulberry Typhoon)
iran_linked_dragos_tracked_ics_activity_group_cyberav3ngers_persona_2024_disclosedBAUXITE
spainCareto / The Mask
iranCyberAv3ngers (IRGC-CEC)
state_actor_dragos_tracked_oracle_isupplier_specialist_2023_disclosedLAURIONITE
turkeySea Turtle
chinaTAG-100
financially_motivated_cybercrime_cloud_native_cryptojacking_specialist_german_speaking_indicatorsTeamTNT (Cloud Cryptojacking Operator)
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_unc3886_virtualization_firewall_zero_day_specialistUNC3886
china_state_sponsored_mandiant_unc4841_barracuda_esg_zero_day_specialistUNC4841
china_nexus_suspected_mandiant_unc5325_ivanti_2024_zero_day_specialistUNC5325 (Ivanti Connect Secure 2024 Operator)
chinaVelvet Ant
◈

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development earlier
T1587.003 · Digital Certificates ×2.98
initial-access earlier
T0883 · Internet Accessible Device ×5.41T0866 · Exploitation of Remote Services ×4.96
execution earlier
T1053.003 · Cron ×15.58T1059.004 · Unix Shell ×11.90T1574.006 · Dynamic Linker Hijacking ×11.02T1059.006 · Python ×3.97
persistence same
T0859 · Valid Accounts ×4.96T1556 · Modify Authentication Process ×3.97
privilege-escalation later
T1055.001 · Dynamic-link Library Injection ×2.95
discovery later
T1046 · Network Service Discovery ×2.98
lateral-movement later
T1021.004 · SSH ×4.05
other same
T1562.003 · Impair Command History Logging ×14.88T1070.002 · Clear Linux or Mac System Logs ×13.22T1553.002 · Code Signing ×3.39
▸

Atomic Tests

3
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
bashelevatedlinuxCreate Systemd Service
This test creates a Systemd service unit file and enables it as a service. 
echo "[Unit]" > #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Service" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "[Service]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "Type=simple"
echo "ExecStart=#{execstart_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "ExecStartPre=#{execstartpre_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "ExecStartPost=#{execstartpost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "ExecReload=#{execreload_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "ExecStop=#{execstop_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "ExecStopPost=#{execstoppost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "[Install]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
echo "WantedBy=default.target" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable #{systemd_service_file}
systemctl start #{systemd_service_file}
shelevatedlinuxCreate SysV Service
This test creates a SysV service unit file and enables it as a service. 
echo '#\!/bin/sh' > #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '#' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '# PROVIDE: art-test' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '# REQUIRE: LOGIN' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '# KEYWORD: shutdown' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '. /etc/rc.subr' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'name="art_test"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'rcvar=art_test_enable' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'load_rc_config ${name}' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'command="/usr/bin/touch"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'start_cmd="art_test_start"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo 'art_test_start()' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     
echo '{' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '  ${command} /tmp/art-test.marker' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo '}' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
echo ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     
echo 'run_rc_command "$1"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
chmod +x #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
service art-test enable
service art-test start
bashelevatedlinuxCreate Systemd Service file, Enable the service , Modify and Reload the service.
This test creates a systemd service unit file and enables it to autostart on boot. Once service is created and enabled, it also modifies this same service file showcasing both Creation and Modification of system process. 
echo "#!/bin/bash" > /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "### BEGIN INIT INFO" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Provides : Atomic Test T1543.002" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Required-Start: \$all" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Required-Stop : " >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Default-Stop: " >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "# Short Description: Atomic Test for Systemd Service Creation" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "### END INIT INFO" >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
echo "python3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBDcmVhdGluZyBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLmNyZWF0aW9uJykK')) \" " >> /etc/init.d/T1543.002
chmod +x /etc/init.d/T1543.002
if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu) ] || [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ]; then update-rc.d T1543.002 defaults; elif [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'ID="centos"') ]; then chkconfig T1543.002 on ; else echo "Please run this test on Ubnutu , kali OR centos" ; fi
systemctl enable T1543.002
systemctl start T1543.002
echo "python3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgYSBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLm1vZGlmaWNhdGlvbicpCg=='))\"" | sudo tee -a /etc/init.d/T1543.002
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl restart T1543.002
▣

Mitigations

4
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1018User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies.

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege
  • Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted.
  • Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies.
  • Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse.
  • Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts.
  • Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits.
  • Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies.
  • Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes.
  • Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts.
  • Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics.
  • Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins.
  • Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions.
  • Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.
Tools for Implementation Built-in Tools
  • Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement.
  • Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools
  • Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration.
  • Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.
Privileged Account Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions
  • Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories.
  • Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder.
  • Properties.
  • Security tab.
  • Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.
Harden File Shares
  • Disable anonymous access to shared folders.
  • Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., /bin or /sbin on Linux). Use tools like chown and chmod to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.
conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
  • Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.
Audit File System Access
  • Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts.
  • Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.
Restrict Startup Directories
  • Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like /etc/, /usr/local/, and Windows directories such as C:\Windows\System32.
  • On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F.
  • On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like lsattr or auditd.
M1026Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.

Account Permissions and Roles
  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security
  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring
  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
Tools for Implementation Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management
  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management
  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
M1033Limit Software Installation

Prevent users or groups from installing unauthorized or unapproved software to reduce the risk of introducing malicious or vulnerable applications. This can be achieved through allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management tools, and least privilege access principles.

Application Whitelisting
  • Implement Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create and enforce allowlists for approved software.
  • Whitelist applications based on file hash, path, or digital signatures. Restrict User Permissions.
  • Remove local administrator rights for all non-IT users.
  • Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to restrict installation permissions to privileged accounts only. Software Restriction Policies (SRP)
  • Use GPO to configure SRP to deny execution of binaries from directories such as %AppData%, %Temp%, and external drives.
  • Restrict specific file types (.exe, .bat, .msi, .js, .vbs) to trusted directories only. Endpoint Management Solutions.
  • Deploy tools like Microsoft Intune, SCCM, or Jamf for centralized software management.
  • Maintain a list of approved software, versions, and updates across the enterprise. Monitor Software Installation Events.
  • Enable logging of software installation events and monitor Windows Event ID 4688 and Event ID 11707 for software installs.
  • Use SIEM or EDR tools to alert on attempts to install unapproved software. Implement Software Inventory Management.
  • Use tools like OSQuery or Wazuh to scan for unauthorized software on endpoints and servers.
  • Conduct regular audits to detect and remove unapproved software.
Tools for Implementation Application Whitelisting
  • Microsoft AppLocker.
Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) Endpoint Management
  • Microsoft Intune.
  • SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager)
  • Jamf Pro (macOS)
Puppet or Ansible for automation Software Restriction Policies
  • Group Policy Object (GPO)
Microsoft Software Restriction Policies (SRP) Monitoring and Logging
  • Splunk.
  • OSQuery.
  • Wazuh (open-source SIEM and XDR)
EDRs Inventory Management and Auditing
  • OSQuery.
  • Wazuh.
◈

Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 2
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
▣

Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-02, AC-03, AC-05, AC-06, CA-07, CM-02, CM-03, CM-05, CM-06, CM-11, IA-02, SA-22, SI-03, SI-04, SI-07, SI-16
D3FEND12 defensive techniques
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