Home/Threat Actor/DoubleZero
Threat Actor

DoubleZero

doublezero · russia_aligned_destructive_operations_uncertain_sandworm_attribution · active since 2022-03

DoubleZero (canonical CERT-UA naming per March 22, 2022 advisory with UAC-0088 tracking) is a C#/.NET obfuscated Windows wiper deployed March 17, 2022 against Ukrainian enterprises via spearphishing ZIP archive delivery (one archive named "Virus ... extremely dangerous !!!.zip" per CERT-UA); important attribution caveat, CERT-UA tracks DoubleZero under UAC-0088 identifier DISTINCT from Sandworm UAC-0082 (Ukrinform January 2023) + UAC-0165 (RoarBAT April-May 2023), placing DoubleZero within Russia-aligned 2022 destructive operations ecosystem but operationally distinct from Sandworm Team per CERT-UA + ESET wiper-year-review tracking (which includes DoubleZero in 2022 Ukraine wiper timeline without explicit Sandworm attribution); Russia-aligned destructive operations attribution via CERT-UA canonical March 22 2022 advisory ("The activity is tracked by the UAC-0088 identifier and is directly related to attempts to violate the regular mode of operation of information systems of Ukrainian enterprises") + Acronis canonical technical analysis + SOC Prime + eSentire TRU detailed malware analysis + Council on Foreign Relations Russia-Ukraine war cyber operations tracking + BlackBerry Russian Wrecking Crews compilation.

standalone cluster paralleling nikowiper + roarbat + awfulshred in v0.1.151 Russia-aligned 2022-2023 destructive wiper operations cell.

operational target profile Ukrainian enterprises primary target March 2022 per CERT-UA + signature cluster-defining domain controller exclusion preserving DC for potential follow-on operations.

operational attack architecture: (1) cluster-defining spearphishing ZIP archive delivery with distinctive "Virus ... extremely dangerous !!!.zip" payload naming tradecraft per CERT-UA.

(2) cluster-defining C#/.NET obfuscated codebase distinguishing from typical C/C++ Sandworm wiper signatures (CaddyWiper + HermeticWiper + NikoWiper) per Acronis ("DoubleZero, although written in .NET, is obfuscated, another technique to make it difficult for researchers to inspect further. After de- obfuscation, the wiper functionality can be divided into three parts: host reconnaissance, permission modification and wiping")

(3) cluster-defining dual-mode zeroing mechanism per CERT-UA + SOC Prime ("It erases files in one of two ways: overwriting files with zero blocks of 4096 bytes (FileStream.Write method) or using NtFileOpen, NtFsControlFile API calls (code: FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA)") , first mechanism uses standard file-stream zero- block overwrite, second uses NTFS sparse-file API for efficient zero-data signaling.

(4) cluster- defining domain controller exclusion per Acronis ("This malware does not run on domain controllers, and it checks for the host's role within the network. If the host is a domain controller, the malware terminates but does not wipe itself off the system"), operationally significant DC preservation for potential follow-on operations or intelligence collection.

(5) cluster-defining UAC-privilege- dependent adaptive scope per eSentire ("The executables need to be run as an Administrator for it to gain the full access to the system files and registry keys to proceed with deletion/wiping process. If the executables are opened as a user without UAC privilege elevation - the malware only wipes the files under C:\Users and the system shuts down after")

(6) signature LSASS termination OR manual shutdown completion behavior per Acronis adaptive shutdown completion tradecraft; (7) registry branch destruction extending beyond file destruction per CERT-UA.

cluster fills the March-2022-onward + C#/.NET-codebase + UAC-0088- separate-tracking + spearphishing-ZIP-delivery + dual-mode-zeroing + DC-exclusion + UAC-dependent- scope position in Russia-aligned 2022-2023 destructive wiper operations cell with honest attribution caveat preserving analytic clarity; canonical illustration of 2022 Ukraine destructive- wiper-landscape diversity + CERT-UA UAC-0088 separate-from-Sandworm tracking taxonomy + C#/.NET wiper codebase variant + dual-mode zeroing mechanism + DC-exclusion + UAC-privilege-dependent adaptive scope cited in essentially all subsequent destructive cyberweapon industry analyses of the 2022 Ukraine wiper landscape through 2022-2026 period.

russia_aligned_destructive_operations_uncertain_sandworm_attribution confidence: high 11 aliases
Sigma rules200 YARA rules0 Live IOCs0 CVEs exploited0

Profile

DoubleZero (canonical CERT-UA naming per March 22, 2022 advisory with UAC-0088 tracking) is a C#/.NET obfuscated Windows wiper deployed March 17, 2022 against Ukrainian enterprises via spearphishing ZIP archive delivery. Important attribution caveat: CERT-UA tracks DoubleZero under UAC-0088 identifier, DISTINCT from Sandworm UAC-0082 (Ukrinform January 2023) + UAC-0165 (RoarBAT April-May 2023). DoubleZero operates within the Russia-aligned 2022 destructive operations ecosystem but specific Sandworm attribution is NOT established by CERT-UA or ESET. Honest attribution preserves analytic clarity: Russia-aligned destructive operations cluster separate from Sandworm Team operationally.

Standalone cluster paralleling nikowiper + roarbat + awfulshred in v0.1.151 Russia-aligned 2022-2023 destructive wiper operations cell.

Operational target profile
  • Ukrainian enterprises primary target March 2022 per CERT-UA.
  • Excludes domain controllers signature.
  • Multiple ZIP payloads including "Virus ... extremely dangerous !!!.zip" signature Operational attack architecture: (1) Spearphishing ZIP archive delivery (cluster- defining): per CERT-UA, "threat actors used phishing attacks to deliver the malware" (2) C#/.NET obfuscated codebase (cluster- defining): distinguishes from typical C/C++ Sandworm wiper signatures per CERT-UA + Acronis (3) Three-stage operational structure (signature): per Acronis, host reconnaissance + permission modification + wiping (4) Dual-mode zeroing (cluster-defining): per CERT-UA + SOC Prime, FileStream.Write 4096-byte zero blocks + NtFsControlFile FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA API sparse-file approach (5) Domain controller exclusion (cluster- defining): per Acronis, preserves DC for potential follow-on operations (6) UAC-privilege-dependent scope (signature): per eSentire, full-system-wipe with Admin OR degraded C:\Users-only wipe without UAC (7) LSASS termination OR manual shutdown completion (signature): per Acronis, adaptive shutdown completion behavior (8) Registry branch destruction (signature): extends beyond file destruction per CERT-UA The cluster fills the March-2022-onward + C#/.NET- codebase + UAC-0088-separate-tracking + spearphishing-ZIP-delivery + dual-mode-zeroing + DC-exclusion + UAC-dependent-scope position in Russia-aligned 2022-2023 destructive wiper operations cell with honest attribution caveat.

Aliases

11
doublezerodouble zerodouble_zerodoublezero wiperdoublezero c# .net wiperdoublezero uac-0088 cert-ua trackingdoublezero march 17 2022 ukrainian enterprises spearphishingdoublezero filestream.write 4096 byte zero blockdoublezero ntfscontrolfile fsctl_set_zero_data api wipingdoublezero virus extremely dangerous zip spearphishingdoublezero domain controller exclusion check

Adversary Emulation Plan

8 steps
Runnable Caldera emulation profile Check - Profile to check proper platform configuration. Observe outputs to verify.. Ordered along the attack lifecycle; each step maps to an ATT&CK technique with a concrete executor command. For authorized red-team / purple-team exercises only.
0 discovery T1033 · System Owner/User Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Current User
whoami
1 discovery T1083 · File and Directory Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Print Working Directory
pwd
2 discovery T1083 · File and Directory Discovery darwin, linux, windows
List Directory
ls
3 discovery T1057 · Process Discovery darwin, linux, windows
View Processes
ps
4 discovery T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Network Interface Configuration
sudo ifconfig
5 discovery T1518 · Software Discovery darwin, linux
Check Go
which go
6 discovery T1518 · Software Discovery darwin, linux
Check Chrome
which google-chrome
7 discovery T1518 · Software Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Check Python
python3 --version;python2 --version;python --version

Notable Campaigns

9
2022-2026Continued Industry Reference Status (2022-2026)
2022DoubleZero Origin, CERT-UA Discovery (March 17, 2022)
2022DoubleZero UAC-0088 Separate-from-Sandworm Tracking (CERT-UA)
2022DoubleZero C#/.NET Codebase Signature
2022DoubleZero Obfuscated .NET Signature
2022DoubleZero Dual-Mode Zeroing Signature
2022DoubleZero Domain Controller Exclusion Signature
2022DoubleZero LSASS Termination + Shutdown Completion Signature
2022DoubleZero UAC-Privilege-Dependent Wipe Scope Signature

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
CERT-UA (canonical March 22, 2022 DoubleZero advisory + UAC-0088 tracking identification)Acronis (canonical DoubleZero wiper technical analysis with March 17, 2022 origin documentation)SOC Prime (canonical CERT-UA alert analysis with UAC-0088 attribution)eSentire Threat Response Unit TRU (canonical detailed DoubleZero malware analysis)SecurityAffairs (canonical DoubleZero coverage)The Hacker News (canonical March 2022 DoubleZero coverage)ESET WeLiveSecurity (canonical "A year of wiper attacks in Ukraine" February 2023 timeline)Council on Foreign Relations (canonical Russia-Ukraine war cyber operations tracking)BlackBerry researchers (canonical Russian Wrecking Crews wipers analysis)Help Net Security (canonical wiper malware Ukrainian organizations coverage)SecureReading (canonical DoubleZero hits Ukrainian Enterprises coverage)
Key reporting
reportCERT-UA: canonical March 22, 2022 DoubleZero advisory + UAC-0088 tracking identification
reportAcronis: DoubleZero, A data wiper deployed against Ukraine (canonical technical analysis with three-stage operational structure)
reportSOC Prime: DoubleZero Destructive Malware Used in Cyber-Attacks at Ukrainian Companies, CERT-UA Alert
reporteSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU): Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis, DoubleZero (canonical detailed analysis)
reportESET WeLiveSecurity: A year of wiper attacks in Ukraine (February 2023), canonical 2022 wiper timeline
reportCouncil on Foreign Relations: Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia-Ukraine War
reportBlackBerry: Russian Wrecking Crews Go Phishing with Worms and Wipers (February 2023)
reportSecurityAffairs: Ukrainian enterprises hit with the DoubleZero wiper (March 2022)
reportHelp Net Security: A glut of wiper malware hits Ukrainian targets (January 2023)

Operational

State sponsor

Russia-aligned destructive cyber operations, CERT-UA UAC-0088 separate-from-Sandworm tracking. Honest attribution: while DoubleZero is part of the 2022 Ukraine destructive-wiper landscape operating in apparent coordination with Russian military objectives, CERT-UA explicitly tracks DoubleZero under UAC-0088 identifier which is separate from Sandworm UAC-0082 (Ukrinform January 2023) + UAC-0165 (RoarBAT April-May 2023). Specific attribution to Sandworm is NOT established by ESET or CERT-UA.

Industry consensus places DoubleZero in Russia-aligned destructive operations ecosystem but the operational cluster is distinct from Sandworm Team. Curated honestly as standalone cluster acknowledging this distinct UAC-0088 tracking. Attribution chain: (1) CERT-UA canonical March 22, 2022 advisory + UAC-0088 tracking: per CERT-UA: "On March 17, 2022, the government team responding to computer emergencies in Ukraine CERT-UA discovered several ZIP archives, one of which was called 'Virus ... extremely dangerous !!!.zip'.

As a result of the analysis, the identified programs are classified as DoubleZero, a malicious destructor program developed using the C# programming language... The activity is tracked by the UAC-0088 identifier and is directly related to attempts to violate the regular mode of operation of information systems of Ukrainian enterprises." (2) UAC-0088 separation from Sandworm: CERT-UA uses distinct tracking identifiers, DoubleZero = UAC-0088, while Sandworm = UAC-0082 (Ukrinform January 2023) + UAC-0165 (RoarBAT April-May 2023). The UAC-0088 tracking deliberately separates DoubleZero from Sandworm operations.

Important attribution clarity for analyst-grade intelligence. (3) ESET 2023 wiper-year-review inclusion: per ESET WeLiveSecurity February 2023 "A year of wiper attacks in Ukraine", DoubleZero included in 2022 Ukraine wiper timeline alongside other destructive operations. ESET acknowledges Sandworm attribution "with varying degrees of confidence" for many wipers but does NOT explicitly attribute DoubleZero to Sandworm.

(4) Acronis + SOC Prime + eSentire + SecurityAffairs canonical industry analysis: detailed industry research focusing on technical capabilities without specific Sandworm attribution. Per Acronis: "The DoubleZero wiper, so named for its tactic of zeroing files, was first discovered on March 17, 2022 by CERT-UA." (5) Cyber Foreign Relations Council canonical Russia-Ukraine war tracking: per CFR: "Ukraine CERT-UA released an alert about a new wiper variant, dubbed DoubleZero, being used to target Ukrainian entities. The wiper campaign was first observed March 17, 2022, when threat actors used phishing attacks to deliver the malware which overwrites content and deletes Windows registries before shutting down the infected system." Operational mission objective: Destructive wiper deployment against Ukrainian enterprises March 2022 onward.

Operating in apparent alignment with Russia-aligned 2022 destructive operations ecosystem but operationally distinct from Sandworm operations per CERT-UA UAC-0088 separate tracking.

Operational target profile
  • Ukrainian enterprises primary target March 2022 per CERT-UA.
  • Excludes domain controllers signature.
  • Multiple ZIP archive payloads including "Virus ... extremely dangerous !!!.zip" The cluster fills the March-2022-onward + C#/.NET- codebase + UAC-0088-separate-tracking + spearphishing- ZIP-delivery + dual-mode-zeroing position in the Russia-aligned 2022-2023 destructive wiper operations cell with honest attribution caveat.
Motivations
russia_aligned_destructive_cyber_operations_against_ukraine, ukrainian_enterprise_destruction, dot_net_csharp_wiper_codebase_signature_capability, dual_mode_zeroing_filestream_and_nt_api_capability, registry_branch_destruction_capability, spearphishing_zip_archive_delivery_signature_tradecraft, domain_controller_exclusion_signature_tradecraft
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)58/60 · 96%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)38/60 · 63%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)15/60 · 25%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
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Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
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