Home/Threat Actor/Vadokrist
Threat Actor

Vadokrist

vadokrist · latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrime · active since 2018

Vadokrist (canonical ESET naming per January 21, 2021 "A wolf in sheep's clothing" disclosure by ESET researcher Jakub Soucek, title references signature unused-code anti-analysis tradecraft) is a Brazilian- origin banking trojan + ESET Dirty Dozen LATAM banking trojan member active since 2018 almost exclusively in Brazil per ESET tracking ("Vadokrist is a Latin American banking trojan that ESET has been tracking since 2018 and that is active almost exclusively in Brazil")

Brazilian-origin organized cybercrime attribution via ESET canonical January 2021 first documentation + ESET press release canonical Vadokrist dissection + ESET canonical December 15, 2021 Dirty Dozen retrospective listing Vadokrist as one of 9 actively covered LATAM banking trojans + Threatpost canonical October 2020 LatAm Banking Trojans coverage.

standalone malware platform cluster paralleling amavaldo + ousaban + numando in v0.1.142 LATAM banking trojan operators cell expansion.

operational target profile Brazil almost-exclusive primary target per ESET 2018-2021 tracking + Portuguese-speaking countries focus; operational attack architecture: (1) spam distribution typical LATAM banking trojan distribution.

(2) fake banking overlay windows credential capture typical LATAM banking trojan tradecraft + backdoor functionality + screenshots + mouse/keyboard simulation + keystroke logging.

(3) cluster-defining unusually large unused code anti- analysis tradecraft per ESET ("One of the most notable characteristics is the unusually large amount of unused code in the binaries. After further examination, we believe this is an attempt to evade detection and dissuade or slow analysis"), title "wolf in sheep's clothing" references this signature tradecraft.

(4) cluster-defining post-attack username-only collection per ESET researcher Jakub Soucek ("The vast majority of Latin American banking trojans collect information about the victim's machine when first run. The only information Vadokrist collects is the victim's username, and it does so only after initiating an attack on a targeted financial institution"), distinctive deviation from typical LATAM banking trojan operational pattern.

(5) cluster-defining kills browser process banking access denial tradecraft per ESET ("It is also able to prevent access to banking websites by killing the browser process, which we believe is a technique to prevent victims from accessing their online bank accounts, aiding the attackers in retaining control"), distinctive access denial signature.

(6) cluster-defining string table identical to Casbaneiro earlier versions per ESET ("Vadokrist stores strings inside string tables. It used to contain an implementation of a string table identical to Casbaneiro.

however, some recent versions of this banking trojan switched to using multiple string tables, each for a different purpose"), cluster- cell coherence with v0.1.139 casbaneiro.yaml string table implementation.

(7) Run key + LNK file startup folder persistence per ESET ("To ensure persistence, Vadokrist utilizes either a Run key or it creates a LNK file in the startup folder")

(8) mouse + keyboard simulation + keystroke logging + screenshots + restart machine capability per ESET; (9) cluster-defining family connections to Amavaldo + Casbaneiro + Grandoreiro + Mekotio per ESET ("Vadokrist shares several important features with families we have described earlier in the series, namely Amavaldo, Casbaneiro, Grandoreiro and Mekotio. We recently published a white paper dedicated to documenting the similarities between Latin American banking trojans"), cross-family operational signature.

(10) Delphi programming language origin signature typical LATAM banking trojan codebase.

cluster fills the ESET-Dirty-Dozen + unused-code-anti-analysis + post-attack-username- only-collection + browser-process-kill-tradecraft + Amavaldo-Casbaneiro-Grandoreiro-Mekotio-family- connections position in Latin American banking trojan operators cell.

canonical illustration of ESET Dirty Dozen LATAM banking trojan + unused code anti-analysis tradecraft + post-attack username- only collection + kill-browser-process access denial + Casbaneiro string table overlap + 4-family connections cited in essentially all subsequent Latin American banking trojan industry analyses through 2018-2026 period.

latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrime confidence: high 7 aliases
Sigma rules200 YARA rules0 Live IOCs0 CVEs exploited0

Profile

Vadokrist (canonical ESET naming per January 21, 2021 "A wolf in sheep's clothing" disclosure by ESET researcher Jakub Soucek, title references signature unused-code anti-analysis tradecraft) is a Brazilian- origin banking trojan + ESET Dirty Dozen LATAM banking trojan member active since 2018 almost exclusively in Brazil. Brazilian-origin organized cybercrime attribution via ESET canonical January 2021 first documentation + ESET canonical December 2021 Dirty Dozen retrospective + Threatpost canonical October 2020 industry coverage. Standalone malware platform cluster paralleling amavaldo + ousaban + numando in v0.1.142 LATAM banking trojan operators cell expansion.

Operational target profile
  • Brazil almost-exclusive primary target per ESET 2018-2021 tracking.
  • Banking + financial institutions per ESET.
  • Portuguese-speaking countries focus Operational attack architecture: (1) Spam distribution typical LATAM (signature) (2) Fake banking overlay windows credential capture (signature): typical LATAM banking trojan tradecraft (3) Unusually large unused code anti-analysis (cluster-defining): per ESET, Delphi binaries padded with unused code to evade detection + slow analysis (referenced in canonical "wolf in sheep's clothing" title) (4) Post-attack username-only collection (cluster- defining): per ESET, distinctive deviation from typical LATAM banking trojan pattern (only collects victim username AFTER initiating attack on targeted financial institution, not at install time like most other LATAM banking trojans) (5) Kills browser process banking access denial (cluster-defining): per ESET, distinctive access denial tradecraft preventing victims from accessing online banking accounts, aiding attackers in retaining control (6) String table identical to Casbaneiro earlier versions (cluster-defining): per ESET, cluster- cell coherence with v0.1.139 casbaneiro.yaml string table implementation (7) Run key + LNK file startup folder persistence (signature) (8) Mouse + keyboard simulation + keystroke logging + screenshots + restart machine capability (signature) (9) Family connections to Amavaldo + Casbaneiro + Grandoreiro + Mekotio (cluster-defining): per ESET , shared features with 4 other ESET Dirty Dozen families (10) Delphi programming language origin (signature) The cluster fills the ESET-Dirty-Dozen + unused- code-anti-analysis + post-attack-username-only- collection + browser-process-kill-tradecraft + Amavaldo-Casbaneiro-Grandoreiro-Mekotio-family- connections position in the Latin American banking trojan operators cell.

Aliases

7
vadokristvadokrist_banking_trojanvadokrist_malwarevadokrist eset dirty dozen wolf in sheeps clothingvadokrist brazil banking trojanvadokrist amavaldo casbaneiro grandoreiro mekotio family connectionsvadokrist string table casbaneiro overlap

Notable Campaigns

8
2021ESET Canonical First Disclosure, Wolf in Sheep's Clothing (January 21, 2021)
2021Vadokrist Family Connections Signature (Amavaldo + Casbaneiro + Grandoreiro + Mekotio)
2018-2026Continued Industry Reference Status (2018-2026)
2018-2021Vadokrist Unused Code Anti-Analysis Signature
2018-2021Vadokrist Post-Attack Username-Only Collection Signature
2018-2021Vadokrist Browser Process Kill Banking Access Denial Signature
2018-2021Vadokrist Casbaneiro String Table Overlap Signature
2018Vadokrist Origin, Brazil (2018)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
ESET WeLiveSecurity (canonical January 21, 2021 first documentation, "Vadokrist, A wolf in sheep's clothing" by Jakub Soucek)ESET press release (canonical January 2021 ESET dissects Vadokrist disclosure)ESET WeLiveSecurity (canonical December 15, 2021 Dirty Dozen retrospective)Threatpost (canonical October 2020 LatAm Banking Trojans collaboration coverage)ESET Research Team (canonical Latin American banking trojan white paper)Malpedia Software Profile (Vadokrist)
Key reporting
reportESET WeLiveSecurity (Jakub Soucek): Vadokrist, A wolf in sheep's clothing (January 21, 2021), canonical first documentation
reportESET press release: ESET dissects Vadokrist, a Trojan targeting financial institutions in Brazil (January 2021)
reportESET WeLiveSecurity: The Dirty Dozen of Latin America, From Amavaldo to Zumanek (December 15, 2021), canonical retrospective
reportThreatpost: LatAm Banking Trojans Collaborate (October 2020)
reportESET Research Team: canonical Latin American banking trojan white paper
reportMalpedia Software Profile: Vadokrist

Operational

State sponsor

Brazilian-origin organized cybercrime, ESET Dirty Dozen LATAM banking trojan member, active since 2018 almost exclusively in Brazil. Operationally separate from state-sponsored APT activity. Attribution chain: (1) ESET canonical January 21, 2021 first documentation: ESET WeLiveSecurity published canonical "Vadokrist, A wolf in sheep's clothing" Dirty Dozen entry by ESET researcher Jakub Soucek.

Per ESET: "Vadokrist is a Latin American banking trojan that ESET has been tracking since 2018 and that is active almost exclusively in Brazil. In this installment of our series, we examine its main features and some connections to other Latin American banking trojan families. Vadokrist shares several important features with families we have described earlier in the series, namely Amavaldo, Casbaneiro, Grandoreiro and Mekotio." (2) ESET canonical Amavaldo + Casbaneiro + Grandoreiro + Mekotio family-connections identification January 2021: per ESET, Vadokrist operationally connected to 4 other ESET Dirty Dozen families, with cluster-defining string table identical to Casbaneiro in earlier versions.

(3) ESET canonical Vadokrist signature tradecraft identification (Jakub Soucek): per ESET researcher coordinator: "The vast majority of Latin American banking trojans collect information about the victim's machine when first run. The only information Vadokrist collects is the victim's username, and it does so only after initiating an attack on a targeted financial institution... Despite its lack of capability to collect information, Vadokrist can manipulate the mouse and simulate keyboard input, log keystrokes, take screenshots, and restart the machine.

It is also able to prevent access to banking websites by killing the browser process, which we believe is a technique to prevent victims from accessing their online bank accounts, aiding the attackers in retaining control." (4) ESET Dirty Dozen canonical December 15, 2021 retrospective: per ESET WeLiveSecurity, Vadokrist listed as one of 9 actively covered LATAM banking trojans (remained active to this day per ESET retrospective unlike Amavaldo which became dormant November 2020).

(5) Threatpost canonical October 2020 industry coverage: per Threatpost: "Multiple, distinct malware families have plagued Latin American banking customers for years
  • the variants include Amavaldo, Casbaneiro, Grandoreiro, Guildma, Krachulka, Lokorrito, Mekotio, Mispadu, Numando, Vadokrist and Zumanek, according to ESET." Operational mission objective: Banking credential theft via fake pop-up overlay tradecraft + browser-process-kill access denial. Distinctive operational pattern of NOT collecting victim info upfront + only-attack-initiation- triggered username collection.
Operational target profile
  • Brazil almost-exclusive primary target per ESET 2018-2021 tracking.
  • Banking + financial institutions per ESET.
  • Portuguese-speaking countries focus The cluster fills the ESET-Dirty-Dozen + unused- code-anti-analysis + post-attack-username-only- collection + browser-process-kill-tradecraft + Amavaldo-Casbaneiro-Grandoreiro-Mekotio-family- connections position in the Latin American banking trojan operators cell.
Motivations
banking_credential_theft_brazil_almost_exclusive_targeting, eset_dirty_dozen_canonical_entry_status, unusually_large_unused_code_anti_analysis_tradecraft, post_attack_username_only_collection_distinctive_tradecraft, kills_browser_process_banking_access_denial_tradecraft, amavaldo_casbaneiro_grandoreiro_mekotio_family_connections_signature, casbaneiro_string_table_identical_earlier_versions_signature
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)59/60 · 98%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)26/60 · 43%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

0 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MULTIPLE STRING TABLES PER PURPOSE LATER VERSIONSSTRING TABLE IMPLEMENTATION IDENTICAL TO CASBANEIRO EARLIER VERSIONS
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