BianLian
BianLian (canonical CISA + FBI + ASD-ACSC naming per May 16, 2023 #StopRansomware joint advisory AA23-136A, updated November 20, 2024 with additional TTPs obtained as of June 2024 through FBI + ASD's ACSC investigations + industry threat intelligence) is a Russia-based ransomware developer + deployer + data extortion cybercriminal group with multiple Russia-based affiliates ("likely based in Russia, with multiple Russia-based affiliates" per CISA), active since June 2022 targeting U.S. + Australian critical infrastructure.
Russia-based organized cybercrime attribution via CISA + FBI + ASD-ACSC canonical joint advisory + CrowdStrike + Microsoft + Sophos contributing parties + CISA November 2024 cluster-defining foreign-language-name-misattribution signature ("The reporting agencies are aware of multiple ransomware groups, like BianLian, that seek to misattribute location and nationality by choosing foreign-language names, almost certainly to complicate attribution efforts")
standalone cluster paralleling inc_ransom + base_8 + noescape in v0.1.148 post-Conti-takedown 2022-2024 RaaS fragmentation operators cell.
operational target profile U.S. critical infrastructure sectors primary target per FBI June 2022 onward + Australian critical infrastructure + private enterprises + professional services + property development per ACSC + 154+ victims listed on extortion portal 2024 per Bleeping Computer with notable victims Air Canada + Northern Minerals + Boston Children's Health Physicians + global Japanese sportswear manufacturer + Texas clinic + global mining group + international financial advisory + major U.S. dermatology practice.
operational attack architecture: (1) cluster-defining valid RDP credentials initial access "possibly purchased from initial access brokers or acquired through phishing" per CISA.
(2) cluster-defining custom Go-based backdoor signature implant per CISA + Bleeping Computer.
(3) PowerShell + Windows Command Shell native tools for discovery + credential harvesting + AV disabling per CISA.
(4) Windows Defender + Sophos SAVEnabled tamper protection bypass via Registry modifications + Windows firewall rule modification for RDP access + Remote Desktop Users group account addition per CISA.
(5) cluster-defining Rclone + FTP + Mega exfiltration tradecraft with Rclone installed in generic typically-unchecked folders (programdata/vmware + music folders per FBI)
(6) cluster-defining November 2024 update TTPs: Windows + ESXi infrastructure targeting + possible ProxyShell exploit chain (CVE-2021-34473 + CVE-2021-34523 + CVE-2021-31207) + Ngrok + modified Rsocks SOCKS5 tunnel destination masking.
(7) cluster-defining extortion-model pivot from double-extortion to exclusively-exfiltration January 2023 - January 2024 per CISA following Avast decryptor January 2023 defeat of encryption capability ("BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they encrypted victims' systems after exfiltrating the data; however, they shifted primarily to exfiltration-based extortion around January 2023 and shifted to exclusively exfiltration-based extortion around January 2024")
(8) cluster-defining foreign- language-name-misattribution tradecraft per CISA November 2024, Mandarin-like name chosen to complicate attribution.
cluster fills the Russia- based-2022-onward + Go-based-backdoor + extortion- model-pivot-January-2024 + foreign-language-name- misattribution position in post-Conti-takedown 2022-2024 RaaS fragmentation operators cell; canonical illustration of double-extortion - exclusively-exfiltration ransomware operational pivot + Russia-based cybercrime + foreign-language- misattribution tradecraft + custom Go-based backdoor + Rclone/FTP/Mega exfiltration + ProxyShell + Ngrok- Rsocks-SOCKS5 traffic masking cited in essentially all subsequent post-Conti-takedown ransomware industry analyses through 2022-2026 period.