Threat Actor

Akira

akira_ransomware · russia_speaking_cybercrime · active since 2023

Akira (Storm-1567 / Punk Spider / G1024) is one of the highest- volume ransomware operations of the 2023-2024 period - a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating predominantly from Russia, Ukraine, and adjacent post-Soviet states emerging in March 2023 - operating a Conti-codebase-leak- derived ransomware per Sophos technical analysis demonstrating substantial code similarity between Akira and the May 2022 ContiLeaks-leaked Conti source code, treated by modern vendor consensus as Conti-derived but operationally independent within the broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem.

with the most operationally significant FBI public attribution among newer ransomware operations: FBI + CISA + Europol + NCSC-NL joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-109A (April 18, 2024) documented Akira responsibility for compromise of 250+ organizations and approximately $42M USD in ransom collection by April 2024, with updated June 2024 FBI estimates documenting approximately $250M USD in cumulative ransom collection across the cluster's operational lifespan (positioning Akira among the highest-revenue ransomware operations alongside LockBit, Black Basta, and ALPHV / BlackCat)

distinguished operationally by two signature tradecraft patterns: (1) Cisco ASA / AnyConnect SSL VPN credential targeting against MFA-less VPN accounts using credentials harvested from underground marketplaces and infostealer deployments (Cisco Talos August 2023 detailed analysis, subsequently expanded to SonicWall and Fortinet VPN credential targeting) - operationally significant defender threat-modeling guidance for MFA-on-all- VPN-endpoints as primary control, and (2) VMware ESXi hypervisor targeting via Linux + ESXi ransomware variants enabling encryption of all virtual machines hosted on a single compromised ESXi hypervisor host (disproportionately high operational impact relative to deployment effort)

distinctive retro-aesthetic green-text 1980s-era computer terminal styling on the cluster's leak site representing operationally novel branding.

March 2024 Megazord Rust-language ransomware variant emergence consistent with broader contemporary cybercrime-cluster Rust-pivot patterns following ALPHV / BlackCat introduction.

high-profile documented victims including Nissan (Australia/New Zealand Dec 2023), Yamaha (Nov 2023), Stanford University, Tietoevry (Finland IT services Jan 2024 affecting Swedish public-sector customers), Lush Cosmetics, Hitachi Energy, City of Wichita Kansas.

russia_speaking_cybercrime confidence: high 16 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G1024 ↗

Profile

Akira (also tracked as Storm-1567 [Microsoft, earlier identifier], Punk Spider, and MITRE ATT&CK G1024) is one of the highest-volume ransomware operations of the 2023-2024 period
  • a financially- motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating predominantly from Russia, Ukraine, and adjacent post-Soviet states emerging in March 2023. The cluster operates a Conti-codebase-leak-derived ransomware per Sophos technical analysis demonstrating substantial code similarity between Akira ransomware and the May 2022 ContiLeaks-leaked Conti source code, supporting the analytical framing that Akira represents a Conti-derived operation operating Conti-codebase-derived tooling. Modern vendor consensus treats Akira as a Conti-derived but operationally independent cluster within the broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem. The cluster has the most operationally significant FBI public attribution among newer ransomware operations grounded in two coordinated international advisory events: First, FBI + CISA + Europol + Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-109A (April 18, 2024) documenting Akira responsibility for compromise of 250+ organizations and approximately $42 million USD in ransom collection by April 2024. The four-government joint attribution represented one of the most operationally consequential international counter-ransomware coordinated formal-attribution events of 2024. Second, FBI updated Akira tracking estimates in June 2024 documented approximately $250 million USD in cumulative ransom collection across the cluster's operational lifespan.
  • positioning Akira among the highest-revenue ransomware operations of the 2023-2024 period alongside LockBit, Black Basta, and ALPHV / BlackCat. The substantial revenue growth between April 2024 ($42M USD) and June 2024 ($250M USD) estimates reflects either improved FBI visibility into Akira ransom collection or actual continued operational tempo growth.
  • likely combination of both. The cluster operates two operationally distinctive tradecraft signatures that distinguish Akira from peer ransomware operations: First, Cisco ASA / AnyConnect VPN credential targeting. Akira operates extensive targeting of Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) and Cisco AnyConnect SSL VPN credential authentication infrastructure.
  • specifically MFA-less VPN accounts at target organizations. The tradecraft exploits the recurring defender pattern of Cisco ASA / AnyConnect deployments without multi- factor authentication on VPN accounts (despite Cisco's recommendation for MFA), with credential-stuffing attacks against VPN authentication endpoints using credentials harvested from underground marketplaces and infostealer-malware deployments. Cisco Talos published detailed August 2023 analysis documenting the tradecraft. Subsequent SonicWall and Fortinet VPN credential targeting expanded the tradecraft beyond Cisco infrastructure. The MFA-less-VPN-account targeting tradecraft represents operationally significant defender threat-modeling guidance.
  • organizations should enforce MFA on all VPN authentication endpoints. Second, VMware ESXi hypervisor targeting. Akira operates Linux + ESXi ransomware variants alongside the Windows ransomware variant. The tradecraft exploits the operational pattern where virtualization-dependent enterprise environments host substantial business-critical workloads on small numbers of ESXi hypervisor hosts.
  • compromise of an ESXi hypervisor host enables encryption of all virtual machines hosted on that hypervisor in a single ransomware deployment operation. ESXi-targeting ransomware represents disproportionately high operational impact relative to deployment effort. The tradecraft is consistent with broader contemporary cybercrime-cluster patterns (LockBit, Black Basta, ALPHV / BlackCat, Royal / BlackSuit all operate ESXi ransomware variants). A distinctive cluster operational signature is the retro- aesthetic green-text leak site with 1980s-era computer terminal styling.
  • operationally novel branding distinct from peer ransomware leak sites. The retro aesthetic gave Sophos' earliest detailed cluster disclosure (May 9, 2023) its memorable title "Akira Ransomware is Bringin' 1988 Back." The branding choice reflects the cluster's apparent recognition of public-facing operational positioning as a marketing dimension. In March 2024 Akira operators released Megazord.
  • a substantially-rewritten Rust-language ransomware variant consistent with broader contemporary cybercrime-cluster patterns following the ALPHV / BlackCat Rust-language ransomware introduction. Megazord operates alongside the original Akira ransomware variant. High-profile documented Akira victims include Nissan (Australia and New Zealand subsidiaries, December 2023), Yamaha (multiple subsidiaries November 2023), Stanford University (department- level compromise 2023), Tietoevry (Finland IT services provider, January 2024 affecting Swedish public-sector customers), Lush Cosmetics (January 2024), Hitachi Energy (March 2024), the City of Wichita Kansas (May 2024), and hundreds of additional manufacturing, healthcare, education, and government-sector targets. A handful of operational notes: First, the cluster represents one of the most operationally consequential newer ransomware operations of the 2023-2024 period. The $250M USD cumulative ransom collection estimate positions Akira among the highest-revenue ransomware operations alongside the major LockBit / Black Basta / ALPHV / BlackCat / Cl0p / Royal / BlackSuit references. Second, the cluster's analytical profile differs from peer contemporary cybercrime clusters in several ways: operational origin (Conti-codebase-derived emerging March 2023 vs LockBit's September 2019 emergence, Black Basta's April 2022 emergence as Conti successor, ALPHV / BlackCat's November 2021 emergence as DarkSide.
  • BlackMatter.
  • ALPHV lineage successor, Cl0p's February 2019 emergence from TA505 lineage), tradecraft emphasis (MFA-less-VPN-credential-targeting + ESXi-targeting), and operational branding (distinctive retro-aesthetic leak site). The cluster represents the central reference for understanding Conti-codebase-leak-derived ransomware operations that emerged following the May 2022 Conti source code leak. Third, no formal individual-operator attribution at the named- Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for Akira administrators.
  • consistent with the broader pattern of absence of similar named-individual-attribution for Cl0p, ALPHV / BlackCat, Black Basta, and several other contemporary cybercrime clusters. Only LockBit (Khoroshev), Evil Corp (Yakubets / Turashev), and FIN7 (Dunaev / Hladyr / Kolpakov / Witte) have received named-Russian-national-tier formal attribution among the major contemporary cybercrime clusters covered in this corpus. Fourth, the cluster's MFA-less-VPN-credential-targeting tradecraft provides operationally significant defender guidance. The sustained Akira success against MFA-less VPN accounts at target organizations demonstrates the operational vulnerability of VPN authentication infrastructure without multi-factor authentication.
  • an exposure category that traditional defender patch-management workflows do not address (the underlying VPN software is not vulnerable; the deployment without MFA is the vulnerability). Defender threat-modeling for ransomware operations should treat MFA-on-all-VPN-endpoints as a primary control requirement.

Aliases

16
akiraakira ransomwareakira_ransomwareakiraransomwareakira gangakira_gangakiragangakira operatorsakira_operatorspunk spiderpunk_spiderpunkspiderstorm-1567g1024atk 263atk263

MITRE ATT&CK aliases

2
Additional names MITRE lists for G1024.
GOLD SAHARAHowling Scorpius

Notable Campaigns

8
2024-2025Continued Operations (2024-2025)
2024Megazord Rust-Language Variant Emergence (March 2024)
2024FBI + CISA + Europol + NCSC-NL AA24-109A Akira Cybersecurity Advisory (April 18, 2024)
2024FBI Updated $250M USD Cumulative Ransom Collection Estimate (June 2024)
2023-2024Cisco ASA / AnyConnect VPN Credential Targeting (2023-2024)
2023-2024VMware ESXi Hypervisor Targeting Tradecraft (2023-2024)
2023-2024High-Profile Victims (2023-2024)
2023Akira Emergence (March 2023)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
FBI Cyber DivisionCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)Europol European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL)Mandiant / Google Cloud Threat IntelligenceMicrosoft Threat Intelligence CenterCrowdStrikeSophosRecorded Future Insikt GroupSentinelOneTrend MicroKaspersky GReATGroup-IBPRODAFTCovewareHalcyonCybereasonTrustwave SpiderLabsTrellixPWC Threat IntelligenceDFIR ReportCisco TalosArctic WolfGuidePoint Security
Key reporting
Sources & links

Operational

State sponsor
Akira is a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster
  • not a state-aligned cluster.
  • operating predominantly from Russia, Ukraine, and adjacent post-Soviet states. The cluster emerged in March 2023 as one of the highest-volume ransomware operations of the 2023-2024 period. The cluster operates a Conti-codebase-leak-derived ransomware (per Sophos technical analysis demonstrating substantial code similarity between Akira ransomware and the May 2022 ContiLeaks-leaked Conti source code) and maintains apparent personnel-overlap with the broader Wizard Spider / Conti ecosystem and Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem more broadly. Whether Akira represents a direct Conti successor brand, a related-but-separate cluster operating Conti-derived tooling, or a Conti-affiliate-spinoff cluster has been analytically open across vendor reporting.
  • modern vendor consensus tends toward treating Akira as a Conti- derived but operationally independent cluster within the broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem. The cluster has received the most operationally significant FBI public attribution among newer ransomware operations: the FBI + CISA + Europol + Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-109A (April 18, 2024, updated June 2024) documented Akira responsibility for compromise of 250+ organizations and approximately $42 million USD in ransom collection by April 2024, with updated June 2024 FBI estimates documenting approximately $250 million USD in cumulative ransom collection across the cluster's operational lifespan. No formal individual- operator attribution at the named-Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for Akira administrators.
Motivations
financial_gain, financially_motivated, cybercrime, ransomware_deployment, extortion, double_extortion, ransomware_as_a_service_operations, vmware_esxi_targeting, vpn_credential_theft
Sectors
Regions

Public detection by layer

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share for which public detection content exists in each layer (published detection content across Sigma, Elastic, MITRE CAR, Snort/Suricata, YARA, and Nuclei). Low bars mean little ready-made detection is published for this adversary, so you would likely have to write your own. This is a view of available public content, not of the rules you have deployed.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)29/60 · 48%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)1/60 · 1%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%
SIEM (Splunk ESCU)56/60 · 93%
SIEM (Elastic)57/60 · 95%
SIEM (Azure Sentinel)16/60 · 26%

Public detection by technique

59/60
Public detection content exists for 59 of this actor’s 60 mapped techniques (98%); 1 have no published detection content. The ones with no published rule are listed first - you would need to source or write detection for those. This reflects published rules, not your own deployment. Per-account coverage, where you upload your own rules and we compute your real gaps, is on the roadmap.
has rules T1059.001 PowerShell Sigma 219 rules 26
has rules T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Sigma 146 rules 63
has rules T1112 Modify Registry Sigma 95 rules 66
has rules T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Sigma 95 rules 20
has rules T1078 Valid Accounts Sigma 61 rules 51
has rules T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Sigma 87 rules 21
has rules T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Sigma 94 rules 4
has rules T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sigma 79 rules 10
has rules T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Sigma 41 rules 30
has rules T1098 Account Manipulation Sigma 34 rules 35
has rules T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sigma 51 rules 17
has rules T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sigma 45 rules 7
has rules T1036 Masquerading Sigma 40 rules 8
has rules T1071.001 Web Protocols Sigma 41 rules 6
has rules T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Sigma 30 rules 14
has rules T1082 System Information Discovery Sigma 33 rules 10
has rules T1087.002 Domain Account Sigma 21 rules 19
has rules T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Sigma 33 rules 6
has rules T1003 OS Credential Dumping Sigma 36 rules 2
has rules T1204 User Execution Sigma 10 rules 27
has rules T1018 Remote System Discovery Sigma 17 rules 18
has rules T1059.005 Visual Basic Sigma 28 rules 4
has rules T1083 File and Directory Discovery Sigma 24 rules 5
has rules T1059.007 JavaScript Sigma 23 rules 4
has rules T1070 Indicator Removal Sigma 20 rules 6
has rules T1090 Proxy Sigma 22 rules 3
has rules T1070.004 File Deletion Sigma 15 rules 7
has rules T1133 External Remote Services Sigma 20 rules 2
has rules T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Sigma 18 rules 2
has rules T1005 Data from Local System Sigma 14 rules 5
has rules T1087 Account Discovery Sigma 16 rules 3
has rules T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Sigma 12 rules 6
has rules T1087.001 Local Account Sigma 13 rules 5
has rules T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Sigma 12 rules 5
has rules T1071 Application Layer Protocol Sigma 7 rules 9
has rules T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Sigma 5 rules 6
has rules T1078.002 Domain Accounts Sigma 7 rules 4
has rules T1135 Network Share Discovery Sigma 7 rules 4
has rules T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Sigma 8 rules 1
has rules T1003.006 DCSync Sigma 7 rules 2
has rules T1057 Process Discovery Sigma 7 rules 2
has rules T1119 Automated Collection Sigma 5 rules 4
has rules T1189 Drive-by Compromise Sigma 3 rules 5
has rules T1078.001 Default Accounts Sigma 4 rules 3
has rules T1078.003 Local Accounts Sigma 5 rules 1
has rules T1027.005 Indicator Removal from Tools Sigma 4 rules 1
has rules T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Sigma 3 rules 1
has rules T1074.001 Local Data Staging Sigma 4
has rules T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Sigma 3 rules 1
has rules T1132.001 Standard Encoding Sigma 4
has rules T1204.001 Malicious Link Sigma 4
has rules T1074 Data Staged Sigma 2 rules 1
has rules T1199 Trusted Relationship Sigma 2 rules 1
has rules T1090.002 External Proxy Sigma 2
has rules T1027.002 Software Packing Sigma 1
has rules T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File rules 1
has rules T1132 Data Encoding rules 1

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

2 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MEGAZORD RUST VARIANTMEGA NZMETERPRETERMFA-LESS VPN ACCOUNT TARGETINGMFA LESS VPN ACCOUNT TARGETINGMSHTASHARPHOUNDSONICWALL VPN CREDENTIAL TARGETINGSPLASHTOP ABUSE
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves