Home/Threat Actor/RansomHub
Threat Actor

RansomHub

ransomhub · russia_speaking_cybercrime · active since 2024

RansomHub (Knight Ransomware Overlap / Cyclops Ransomware Overlap / G1058) is one of the most operationally consequential newer ransomware operations of 2024, a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating from Russia and adjacent post- Soviet states emerging in February 2024 with documented operational overlap with earlier Knight ransomware (active 2023) and Cyclops ransomware operations, treated by modern vendor consensus as either Knight-codebase-evolved or personnel- overlapping successor brand, with 210+ documented victim organizations across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors per CISA + FBI + HHS + MS-ISAC joint cybersecurity advisory (August 29, 2024)

most operationally distinctive business- model signature the 90% affiliate revenue split versus the conventional 70-80% affiliate cut on competing ransomware-as-a- service operations, affiliate-favorable revenue split operationally consequential because it contributed substantially to rapid affiliate-recruitment success following the March 5 2024 ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam with disaffected ALPHV affiliates (notably the Scattered Spider-affiliated operator who had executed the Change Healthcare operation and been screwed by ALPHV's exit-scam) migrating to RansomHub.

most operationally distinctive single operation the Change Healthcare data publication (April 2024), RansomHub published the Change Healthcare data on the RansomHub leak site after the Scattered Spider-affiliated operator brought it from ALPHV, effectively double-extorting the same victim despite UnitedHealth Group already having paid the original $22M USD ransom to ALPHV, operationally unprecedented double-extortion pattern in the publicly-tracked record undermining one of the core operational arguments for ransom payment (that payment guarantees data non-publication)

high-profile documented victims including Christie's auction house (May 2024 disrupting online bidding ahead of major spring auctions), Frontier Communications US telecommunications (June 2024), Halliburton US oilfield services (August 2024), Kawasaki Motors Europe (September 2024), Patelco Credit Union (July 2024), Bologna FC Italian Serie A football club (January 2025)

RansomHub became the most prolific RaaS by reported victim count for portions of mid-to-late 2024 following LockBit Operation Cronos disruption and ALPHV exit-scam, collectively creating a market gap that RansomHub's affiliate-favorable revenue split positioned the cluster to fill.

russia_speaking_cybercrime confidence: high 17 aliases

Profile

RansomHub (also tracked as Knight Ransomware Overlap, Cyclops Ransomware Overlap, and MITRE ATT&CK G1058) is one of the most operationally consequential newer ransomware operations of 2024 , a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating predominantly from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states emerging in February 2024. The cluster has documented operational overlap with earlier Knight ransomware (active 2023) and Cyclops ransomware operations, with modern vendor consensus treating RansomHub as either a Knight-codebase-evolved operation or a personnel-overlapping successor brand. The cluster has compromised 210+ organizations across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors since February 2024 per CISA + FBI + HHS + MS-ISAC joint cybersecurity advisory (August 29, 2024).

The cluster's most operationally distinctive business-model signature is the 90% affiliate revenue split, versus the conventional 70-80% affiliate cut on competing ransomware-as-a- service operations. The affiliate-favorable revenue split was operationally consequential and contributed substantially to rapid affiliate-recruitment success following the March 5, 2024 ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam. Disaffected ALPHV / BlackCat affiliates (notably including the Scattered Spider-affiliated operator who had executed the Change Healthcare operation and been screwed by ALPHV's exit-scam) migrated to RansomHub for continued operational monetization.

The 90% affiliate revenue split represents one of the most operationally consequential business-model innovations in the publicly-tracked ransomware- as-a-service ecosystem. The cluster's most operationally distinctive single operation was the Change Healthcare data publication (April 2024). Following the March 5, 2024 ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam in which ALPHV administrators stole the affiliate cut from the Change Healthcare $22M USD Bitcoin ransom payment, the affected Scattered Spider-affiliated operator migrated to RansomHub and brought the previously-stolen Change Healthcare data with them.

RansomHub published the Change Healthcare data on the RansomHub leak site in April 2024, effectively double-extorting the same victim despite UnitedHealth Group already having paid the original $22M USD ransom to ALPHV. The double-extortion pattern was operationally unprecedented in the publicly-tracked record and represents one of the most operationally significant data points for ongoing counter-ransomware policy discussion, payment to ALPHV did not prevent subsequent publication by RansomHub of the same data, undermining one of the core operational arguments for ransom payment (that payment guarantees data non-publication). The cluster operates a sustained operational partnership with Scattered Spider (already covered as scattered_spider.yaml) following Scattered Spider's migration from ALPHV / BlackCat to RansomHub in mid-2024.

The partnership represents continuation of the broader Scattered Spider operational model of operating as affiliate to various ransomware-as-a-service brands rather than maintaining their own dedicated ransomware operations. High-profile documented RansomHub victims include Christie's auction house (May 2024 attack disrupting Christie's online bidding ahead of major spring auctions), Frontier Communications US telecommunications (June 2024), Halliburton US oilfield services (August 2024), Kawasaki Motors Europe (September 2024), Patelco Credit Union (July 2024), Bologna FC Italian Serie A football club (January 2025), and hundreds of additional commercial and government-sector targets. RansomHub became the most prolific ransomware-as-a-service operation by reported victim count for portions of mid-to-late 2024 following the LockBit Operation Cronos disruption (February 2024) and the ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam (March 2024), collectively creating a market gap that RansomHub's affiliate- favorable revenue split positioned the cluster to fill.

A handful of operational notes: First, the cluster represents one of the most analytically interesting recent developments in the publicly-tracked ransomware ecosystem. The combination of LockBit operational degradation (Operation Cronos February 2024), ALPHV / BlackCat operator exit-scam (March 5, 2024), and RansomHub's affiliate- favorable business model (February 2024 onward) collectively represents a substantial mid-2024 reorganization of the ransomware-as-a-service affiliate ecosystem with disaffected affiliates migrating to RansomHub. The pattern illustrates market-dynamics-driven cluster-ecosystem evolution and represents a meaningful operational-doctrine data point about how counter- ransomware operations and operator misbehavior can drive ecosystem-level reorganization.

Second, the Change Healthcare double-extortion case represents one of the most operationally significant data points for ongoing counter-ransomware policy discussion. The case demonstrates that ransom payment does not guarantee data non-publication when operator-affiliate disputes (or operator exit-scams) result in data migration between cluster brands. The pattern undermines one of the core operational arguments for ransom payment and should inform corporate threat-modeling for ransomware victim response.

Third, no formal individual-operator attribution at the named- Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for RansomHub administrators, consistent with the broader pattern of absence of similar named-individual-attribution for Cl0p, ALPHV / BlackCat, Black Basta, Akira, Play, Medusa, Rhysida, Royal / BlackSuit, and several other contemporary cybercrime clusters. Only LockBit (Khoroshev), Evil Corp (Yakubets / Turashev), and FIN7 (Dunaev / Hladyr / Kolpakov / Witte) have received named- Russian-national-tier formal attribution among the major contemporary cybercrime clusters covered in this corpus. Fourth, the cluster's continued operations through 2025 illustrate that the broader Russia-speaking organized cybercrime ecosystem has demonstrated substantial resilience and adaptability across major operational disruptions (LockBit Operation Cronos, ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam, ContiLeaks, BlackBastaLeaks).

Defender threat-modeling for ransomware operations should treat the broader ecosystem as continuing operational threat with brand-identity-changes rather than treating individual cluster disruptions as operational pauses.

Aliases

17
ransomhubransom hubransom_hubransomhub ransomwareransomhub_ransomwareransomhubransomwareransomhub gangransomhub_gangransomhub operatorsransomhub_operatorsknight ransomware overlapknight_ransomware_overlapcyclops ransomware overlapcyclops_ransomware_overlapg1058atk 283atk283

Notable Campaigns

7
2024-2025High-Profile Victims (2024-2025)
2024-2025Continued Operations (2024-2025)
2024RansomHub Emergence (February 2024)
202490% Affiliate Revenue Split, Aggressive Affiliate Recruitment Strategy (February 2024 onward)
2024Change Healthcare Data Publication (April 2024), Double-Extortion of Same Victim
2024Scattered Spider Partnership Migration to RansomHub (2024)
2024CISA + FBI + HHS + MS-ISAC #StopRansomware RansomHub Cybersecurity Advisory (August 29, 2024)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
FBI Cyber DivisionCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)HHS Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3)Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)US Department of Health and Human ServicesMandiant / Google Cloud Threat IntelligenceMicrosoft Threat Intelligence CenterCrowdStrikeRecorded Future Insikt GroupSentinelOneSophosTrend MicroKaspersky GReATGroup-IBPRODAFTCovewareHalcyonCybereasonIBM X-ForceTrustwave SpiderLabsPalo Alto Networks Unit 42Symantec (Broadcom)TrellixDFIR ReportGuidePoint SecurityBitdefender
Key reporting
reportCISA + FBI + HHS + MS-ISAC: #StopRansomware RansomHub Ransomware Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (August 29, 2024), most operationally significant US-government formal public attribution documenting 210+ orgs since February 2024
reportCrowdStrike: RansomHub Affiliates Cyber-Criminal Revenue Share Tracking
reportMandiant: RansomHub Ransomware Continued Tracking
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence: RansomHub Emergence (August 2024)
reportPalo Alto Networks Unit 42: Threat Assessment RansomHub Ransomware
reportCisco Talos: RansomHub Tycoon Tracking
reportTrend Micro: RansomHub Ransomware Spotlight (July 2024)
reportSentinelOne Labs: RansomHub Ransomware Tracking
reportBitdefender: RansomHub Ransomware Tracking
reportRecorded Future Insikt Group: RansomHub Ransomware Emerging Tracking
reportSophos: RansomHub Tracking (August 2024)
reportCoveware: RansomHub Ransomware Affiliate Tracking
reportHalcyon: RansomHub Operational Profile
reportPRODAFT: RansomHub Detailed Operational Analysis
reportGroup-IB: RansomHub Continued Tracking
reportTrustwave SpiderLabs: RansomHub Tracking
reportTrellix: RansomHub Operational Analysis
reportSymantec (Broadcom): RansomHub Ransomware Tracking
reportDFIR Report: RansomHub Operational Analysis
reportGuidePoint Security: RansomHub Incident Response Tracking
reportIBM X-Force: RansomHub Continued Tracking
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: RansomHub
reportMITRE ATT&CK Group G1058, RansomHub

Operational

State sponsor

RansomHub is a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster, not a state-aligned cluster, operating predominantly from Russia and adjacent post-Soviet states. The cluster emerged in February 2024 and rapidly became the major affiliate- recruitment destination following the March 5, 2024 ALPHV / BlackCat exit-scam (already covered as alphv_blackcat.yaml). The cluster has documented operational overlap with earlier Knight ransomware (active 2023, brief operational lifespan) and Cyclops ransomware operations, and modern vendor consensus widely treats RansomHub as either a Knight-codebase-evolved operation or a personnel-overlapping successor brand to those earlier shorter- lived operations.

The cluster offers an unusually affiliate- favorable revenue split, 90% affiliate cut versus the conventional 70-80% affiliate cut on competing ransomware-as-a- service operations, which contributed substantially to rapid affiliate-recruitment success following the ALPHV exit-scam. The cluster has documented partnerships with Scattered Spider (already covered as scattered_spider.yaml) following the Scattered Spider operational migration from ALPHV / BlackCat to RansomHub in mid-2024.

The cluster has received the most operationally significant US-government formal public attribution among 2024-emerging ransomware operations through CISA + FBI + HHS + MS-ISAC joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-242A (actually two separate advisories
  • AA24-242A is the Royal / BlackSuit advisory; the RansomHub advisory is AA24-242A), more precisely the AA24-242B RansomHub Cybersecurity Advisory (August 29, 2024) documenting RansomHub responsibility for compromise of more than 210 organizations across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors since February 2024. The cluster published the Change Healthcare data (originally obtained by a Scattered Spider-affiliated operator working as ALPHV / BlackCat affiliate in February 2024) in April 2024 following the ALPHV exit-scam, effectively double-extorting the same victim. No formal individual-operator attribution at the named- Russian-national tier has been publicly issued for RansomHub administrators.
Motivations
financial_gain, financially_motivated, cybercrime, ransomware_deployment, extortion, double_extortion, ransomware_as_a_service_operations, affiliate_recruitment_destination, affiliate_favorable_revenue_split_business_model
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)57/60 · 95%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)30/60 · 50%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

2 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MEGA NZMETERPRETERMSHTASHARPHOUNDSPLASHTOP ABUSE
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
About
All capabilities
Live statistics
Data sources
Privacy policy
Terms of service
threatengine.sh  ·  Open-source threat intelligence platform  ·  100+ authoritative sources  ·  Every fact traces to its origin