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Threat Actor

Indrik Spider

indrik_spider_evilcorp · russia_aligned_cybercrime · active since 2014

Indrik Spider / Evil Corp (Dridex Gang / Dridex Group / Gold Drake / TAG-90 / DEV-0243 / Manatee Tempest / BitPaymer Gang / WastedLocker Gang / Hades Operators / G0119) is a financially- motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating from Russia with apparent operational coordination with Russian state security services per US Treasury OFAC public allegations, active since at least 2014 (Dridex banking trojan emergence) with continued operations through 2024-2025 across more than a decade of sustained operations, with the strongest formal- attribution profile of any sanctioned organized cyber-criminal cluster in the publicly-tracked record grounded in the seminal December 5, 2019 US Treasury OFAC sanctions designations of Maksim Yakubets (cluster leader, born May 20, 1987, Russian national resident of Moscow) and Igor Turashev (Russian national, born July 4, 1981) plus seventeen additional Russian nationals, accompanied by US DOJ Western District of Pennsylvania indictment and $5M USD US State Department Rewards for Justice reward (at time of designation the largest cybercrime reward ever offered) with OFAC's announcement explicitly stating Yakubets "is also known to work for the Russian FSB and tasked to work on projects for the Russian state, including projects to obtain confidential documents through cyber means", one of the relatively few public allegations of explicit Russian state intelligence service tasking of an organized cybercrime cluster; Yakubets allegedly married to the daughter of former FSB Colonel Eduard Bendersky (former head of FSB Counterintelligence Operations Directorate's Department K cyber-investigation unit) per US government public statements and extensive Brian Krebs investigative reporting.

defined operationally by the unique sanctions-evasion-via-ransomware-brand-diversification tradecraft following the December 2019 sanctions, Dridex banking trojan - Locky commodity ransomware - BitPaymer + DoppelPaymer targeted ransomware - post-sanctions WastedLocker (May 2020, including Garmin July 2020 attack with reported $10M USD ransom payment) - Hades - PhoenixLocker - Macaw - PayloadBin - LockBit-affiliate operations (2022-2024), each new ransomware brand involving substantial codebase modification to obscure technical continuity with the sanctioned Evil Corp identity while maintaining underlying operational personnel and infrastructure, collectively representing one of the most analytically interesting cluster-evolution case studies in the publicly- tracked record and demonstrating the strategic value of formal sanctions designations as a counter-cybercrime tool.

October 1 2024 UK NCA detailed disclosure accompanied by parallel UK + US + Australian sanctions of additional Evil Corp members.

russia_aligned_cybercrime confidence: high 33 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0119 ↗

Profile

Indrik Spider / Evil Corp (also tracked as Dridex Gang, Dridex Group, Gold Drake, TAG-90 in Recorded Future taxonomy, DEV-0243 and Manatee Tempest [Microsoft], BitPaymer Gang, WastedLocker Gang, Hades Operators, and MITRE ATT&CK G0119) is a financially- motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster operating from Russia with apparent operational coordination with Russian state security services per US Treasury OFAC public allegations. The cluster has been active since at least 2014 (Dridex banking trojan emergence) with continued operations through 2024-2025 across more than a decade of sustained operations. The cluster has the strongest formal-attribution profile of any sanctioned organized cyber-criminal cluster in the publicly- tracked record.

The seminal December 5, 2019 US Treasury OFAC sanctions designations against Maksim Yakubets (cluster leader, born May 20, 1987, Russian national resident of Moscow) and Igor Turashev (Russian national, born July 4, 1981) as Evil Corp members, plus seventeen additional Russian nationals designated as members and associates of the cluster. The OFAC action was accompanied by US DOJ Western District of Pennsylvania indictment of Yakubets and Turashev and a five million US dollar US State Department Rewards for Justice reward for information leading to Yakubets's arrest, at time of designation the largest cybercrime reward ever offered. OFAC's announcement explicitly stated Yakubets "is also known to work for the Russian FSB and tasked to work on projects for the Russian state, including projects to obtain confidential documents through cyber means", making this one of the relatively few public allegations of explicit Russian state intelligence service tasking of an organized cybercrime cluster.

The Yakubets-FSB-Bendersky connection has been documented in US government public statements, in extensive Brian Krebs investigative reporting, and in selected vendor analysis. Yakubets is allegedly married to the daughter of former FSB Colonel Eduard Bendersky (former head of the FSB Counterintelligence Operations Directorate's Department K, the cyber-investigation unit of the FSB Counterintelligence Operations Directorate). The connection supports the OFAC-asserted framing of apparent Russian state intelligence service tasking of the cluster and is among the most operationally significant publicly-documented connections between organized cybercrime and Russian state security services.

The cluster should therefore be treated analytically as financially-motivated organized cybercrime with apparent operational coordination with Russian state security services rather than as conventional financially-motivated organized cybercrime alone. This dual-motivation framing complicates simple state-aligned-vs-cybercriminal categorization and represents an analytically interesting gray zone in cluster taxonomy comparable to Wizard Spider / Conti (also covered in this corpus) where similar apparent Russian state security service connections have been alleged. The cluster's most operationally distinctive tradecraft pattern is sustained sanctions-evasion-via-ransomware-brand- diversification following the December 2019 OFAC sanctions.

The sanctions-compliance restrictions effectively prevented victim organizations from paying ransoms to Evil Corp (since such payments would constitute prohibited transactions with sanctioned entities under US OFAC regulations and parallel UK sanctions).

The cluster's response was a sustained pattern of operating under multiple ransomware brand identities to obscure operational continuity with the sanctioned Evil Corp identity
  • WastedLocker (operational from May 2020), first major post-sanctions ransomware brand pivot. High-profile victim: Garmin (July 2020 attack disrupting global Garmin services for days, with reported $10M USD ransom payment)
  • Hades (operational from December 2020)
  • PhoenixLocker (operational from approximately mid-2021)
  • Macaw (operational from October 2021)
  • PayloadBin (selectively operational 2021)
  • LockBit affiliate operations (2022-2024) Each new ransomware brand involved substantial codebase modification to obscure technical continuity with the sanctioned Evil Corp identity while maintaining underlying operational personnel and infrastructure. The diversification pattern represents ongoing operational adaptation to sanctions-compliance constraints, a relatively unusual operational pattern driven specifically by formal sanctions action rather than by conventional law-enforcement disruption. The pattern collectively represents one of the most analytically interesting cluster-evolution case studies in the publicly-tracked record and demonstrates the strategic value of formal sanctions designations as a counter-cybercrime tool (sanctions can drive sustained operational adaptation and resource expenditure even when individual operators remain at liberty). Operationally the cluster's foundational tooling centered on the Dridex banking trojan (also tracked as Bugat or Cridex), one of the most prolific banking trojans of the 2014-2019 period. Subsequent ransomware operations evolved through Locky (commodity ransomware, 2016-2017), BitPaymer (targeted big-game-hunting ransomware, 2017 onward), DoppelPaymer (2019 onward), WastedLocker (2020 onward), Hades / PhoenixLocker / Macaw (2020-2021 diversification brands), and LockBit-affiliate operations (2022- 2024). The substantial multi-brand codebase evolution represents sustained capability development across more than a decade of operations. The October 1, 2024 UK National Crime Agency Evil Corp detailed disclosure, accompanied by parallel UK, US, and Australian sanctions designations targeting additional Evil Corp members beyond the original 2019 OFAC designations, represented one of the most operationally significant non-US formal attributions of the cluster and demonstrated sustained Western law-enforcement attention despite the multi-year operational evolution. A handful of operational notes: First, the cluster's analytical profile differs from peer financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal clusters covered in this corpus in several ways: alleged state-security-service tasking (explicit OFAC public allegation vs absence of similar explicit allegations for FIN7, Scattered Spider, LockBit, ALPHV), sanctions-evasion-via-brand-diversification tradecraft (operational pattern unique among publicly-tracked clusters of this corpus), and operational longevity (2014-2025, eleven-plus years of sustained operations through multiple major Western law- enforcement actions). The cluster represents the central reference for understanding sanctions-driven cluster-evolution dynamics. Second, the cluster's continued operations through 2024-2025 despite the December 2019 OFAC sanctions, US DOJ indictment, $5M USD US State Department reward, October 2024 UK NCA disclosure and parallel sanctions, and broader Western law- enforcement pressure illustrate (consistent with the Wizard Spider / Conti, LockBit, ALPHV / BlackCat, and Cl0p patterns) that formal action does not necessarily produce operational pauses for sophisticated cybercriminal clusters operating from Russian jurisdictional safe-havens. The Yakubets case in particular, where the named-and-indicted cluster leader remains in Russia, has not been arrested or extradited, and continues to operate the cluster, represents the central case study for understanding Russian jurisdictional tolerance of cybercrime operations targeting Western victims. Third, the apparent Russian state security service connections (Yakubets-Bendersky-FSB-Department-K) represent one of the most analytically interesting documented connections between organized cybercrime and state security services in the publicly- tracked record. The connection should inform analytical framing for the broader Russian organized-cybercrime-and-state-security- services intersection question that has surfaced for Wizard Spider / Conti (ContiLeaks contacts), Killnet (alleged hacktivist coordination with Russian state interests), and other Russia- based cluster ecosystems. Fourth, Brian Krebs's sustained investigative reporting on the cluster, particularly his detailed publicly-source-research documentation of Yakubets's personal life, Moscow residence, Lamborghini Huracán with vanity plate "VOR" (Russian slang for thief), and Bendersky family connection, represents one of the most consequential publicly-source-research-driven cluster investigations in the publicly-tracked record. The Krebs reporting complements vendor and government attribution and provides accessible public-source-research that has informed broader public understanding of organized-cybercrime-and- Russian-state-security-services dynamics.

Aliases

33
indrik spiderindrik_spiderindrikspiderevil corpevil_corpevilcorpdridex gangdridex_gangdridexgangdridex groupdridex_groupdridexgroupgold drakegold_drakegolddraketag-90tag_90tag90dev-0243dev_0243dev0243manatee tempestmanatee_tempestmanateetempestbitpaymer gangbitpaymer_gangwastedlocker gangwastedlocker_ganghades operatorshades_operatorsg0119atk 188atk188

MITRE ATT&CK aliases

1
Additional names MITRE lists for G0119.
UNC2165

Notable Campaigns

10
2024-2025Continued Operations (2024-2025)
2024UK National Crime Agency: Evil Corp Detailed Disclosure (October 1, 2024)
2022-2024LockBit Affiliate Operations (2022-2024)
2020-2021Hades / PhoenixLocker / Macaw Brand Diversification (2020-2021)
2020WastedLocker Ransomware, Sanctions-Evasion Pivot (May 2020 onward)
2019US Treasury OFAC: Yakubets + Turashev + 17 Russian Nationals Sanctioned (December 5, 2019)
2019Alleged FSB Bendersky Connection (December 2019 onward)
2017-2019BitPaymer / DoppelPaymer Targeted Ransomware Operations (2017-2019)
2016-2017Locky Ransomware Operations (2016-2017)
2014Dridex Banking Trojan Emergence (2014)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
US Treasury OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control)US Department of JusticeFBI Cyber DivisionUK Office of Financial Sanctions ImplementationUK National Crime AgencyAustralian Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeCISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)CrowdStrikeMandiant / Google Cloud Threat IntelligenceMicrosoft Threat Intelligence CenterRecorded Future Insikt GroupSentinelOneSophosTrend MicroKaspersky GReATGroup-IBPRODAFTCovewareHalcyonTrellixCybereasonSymantec (Broadcom)IBM X-ForcePWC Threat IntelligenceBrian Krebs (independent investigative reporting)
Key reporting
reportUS Treasury OFAC: Evil Corp + Yakubets + Turashev + 17 Russian Nationals Sanctions (December 5, 2019), seminal formal-attribution event
reportUS DOJ Western District of Pennsylvania: Yakubets and Turashev Indictment (December 5, 2019)
reportUS State Department Rewards for Justice: $5M USD Reward for Information on Evil Corp Leader (December 2019), at time the largest cybercrime reward ever offered
reportUK National Crime Agency: Evil Corp Detailed Disclosure and Sanctions (October 1, 2024)
reportUS Treasury OFAC: Additional Evil Corp Sanctions (October 1, 2024), parallel to UK NCA disclosure
reportCrowdStrike: Indrik Spider Adversary Profile (multiple years), seminal cluster naming
reportCrowdStrike: WastedLocker Ransomware Analysis (June 2020)
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence: Manatee Tempest / Evil Corp (April 2022)
reportSymantec: WastedLocker Ransomware Targets US (June 2020)
reportCisco Talos: Evil Corp Ransomware Pivots (multiple analyses)
reportBrian Krebs (independent investigative reporting): Inside Evil Corp, A $100M Cybercrime Menace (multiple years), foundational public-source-research on Yakubets and FSB Bendersky connection
reportRecorded Future Insikt Group: Evil Corp Tracking (multiple years)
reportMandiant: Financially-Motivated Actors Expanding Access into OT
reportPRODAFT: Evil Corp Detailed Operational Analysis
reportGroup-IB: Indrik Spider Continued Tracking
reportSophos: WastedLocker / Evil Corp Continued Tracking
reportCoveware: Evil Corp Ransomware Affiliate Tracking
reportHalcyon: Evil Corp Operational Profile
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: Indrik Spider
reportMITRE ATT&CK Group G0119, Indrik Spider

Operational

State sponsor

Indrik Spider / Evil Corp is a financially-motivated organized cyber-criminal cluster, not formally a state-aligned cluster, operating from Russia. The cluster has the strongest formal- attribution profile of any sanctioned organized cyber-criminal cluster in the publicly-tracked record grounded in the seminal December 5, 2019 US Treasury OFAC sanctions designations of Maksim Yakubets (the cluster's alleged primary leader, born May 20, 1987, Russian national resident of Moscow) and Igor Turashev (Russian national, born July 4, 1981) as Evil Corp members, plus seventeen additional Russian nationals designated as members and associates of the cluster. The OFAC action was accompanied by US Department of Justice Western District of Pennsylvania December 2019 indictment of Yakubets and Turashev on charges including conspiracy to commit fraud, computer hacking, and wire fraud, and a five million US dollar US State Department Rewards for Justice reward for information leading to Yakubets's arrest, at time of designation the largest cybercrime reward ever offered.

The cluster's leadership has been alleged in US government and public-source-research reporting to maintain connections with Russian state security services. Yakubets is allegedly married to the daughter of former FSB Colonel Eduard Bendersky (former head of the FSB Counterintelligence Operations Directorate's Department K, the cyber-investigation unit of the FSB Counterintelligence Operations Directorate). US Treasury OFAC's December 2019 designation explicitly stated Yakubets "is also known to work for the Russian FSB and tasked to work on projects for the Russian state, including projects to obtain confidential documents through cyber means", making this one of the relatively few public allegations of explicit Russian state intelligence service tasking of an organized cybercrime cluster.

The cluster should be treated analytically as financially-motivated organized cybercrime with apparent operational coordination with Russian state security services rather than as conventional financially- motivated organized cybercrime alone. Yakubets remains in Russia and has not been arrested or extradited as of publicly-tracked record. Following the December 2019 sanctions the cluster pursued a sustained ransomware-brand-diversification strategy apparently designed to evade sanctions-compliance restrictions that prevent ransom payments to designated entities, operating under multiple ransomware brand identities to obscure operational continuity with the sanctioned Evil Corp identity.

Motivations
financial_gain, financially_motivated, cybercrime, banking_fraud, banking_trojan_operations, ransomware_deployment, extortion, double_extortion, sanctions_evasion_via_brand_diversification, cryptocurrency_theft, business_email_compromise, apparent_state_security_service_tasking
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)58/60 · 96%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)30/60 · 50%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)16/60 · 26%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
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Tools Used

2 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MACAW LOCKERMEGA NZMETERPRETERMSHTASHARPHOUNDSIGNED CERTIFICATE ABUSESPLASHTOP ABUSE
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