Home/Threat Actor/Hazel Sleet
Threat Actor

Hazel Sleet

hazel_sleet · north_korea · active since 2014-01

Hazel Sleet (Microsoft canonical Sleet taxonomy for DPRK clusters.

previously tracked as ZINC under Microsoft's legacy framework) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage cluster operating under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) / Bureau 121 DPRK cyber-operations structure with a generalized cyber espionage and intelligence- collection operational mission consistent with DPRK state intelligence collection priorities.

selective targeting of government administration, financial services institutions, technology vendors, higher education research, and adjacent organizations primarily in South Korea (primary geography), United States, Japan, and Western Europe.

spearphishing operational tradecraft with Korean Hangul Word Processor (HWP) and Microsoft Office macro-enabled lure documents, credential harvesting infrastructure, custom DPRK ecosystem shared tooling (BabyShark, AppleSeed variants), and operational coordination with adjacent DPRK clusters within the broader RGB-controlled ecosystem.

thin public technical documentation relative to higher-profile DPRK clusters (Lazarus, BlueNoroff, Andariel, Kimsuky, APT37), curated for DPRK cyber-operations ecosystem completeness alongside all other DPRK clusters curated separately in this corpus.

north_korea confidence: medium 7 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0032 ↗

Profile

Hazel Sleet (Microsoft canonical designation, Sleet taxonomy , all DPRK clusters.

previously tracked as ZINC under Microsoft's legacy naming framework) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage cluster operating under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) / Bureau 121 DPRK cyber-operations structure with a generalized cyber espionage and intelligence-collection operational mission. The cluster's operational profile is comparatively thinner in public-record documentation than DPRK clusters with high-profile disclosed operations (Lazarus Group, BlueNoroff, Andariel, Kimsuky, APT37), Hazel Sleet operational visibility in public reporting is primarily through Microsoft Threat Intelligence threat briefings and selective vendor reporting rather than through canonical disclosure reports detailing specific named operations. Microsoft's threat-actor naming framework recognizes Hazel Sleet as an operationally-distinct DPRK cluster based on infrastructure, tradecraft, and persona differentiation, operating within the broader RGB-controlled DPRK cyber- operations ecosystem with selective operational coordination with adjacent DPRK clusters. The ecosystem-coordination pattern is operationally distinct from the more operationally- independent operational patterns observed in some other state-aligned cyber-operations ecosystems (Chinese-aligned APT* clusters and Iranian-aligned MOIS / IRGC clusters show more operational independence between clusters than the DPRK RGB-controlled ecosystem), DPRK clusters share operationally-developed tooling (BabyShark, AppleSeed, and adjacent shared malware families) and operational tradecraft across clusters while preserving operationally-distinct mission focuses per cluster. The cluster's targeting profile is operationally consistent with broader DPRK state intelligence collection priorities , including selective targeting of government administration organizations, financial services institutions, technology and software vendors, higher education research institutions, and adjacent organizations with intelligence-value to the North Korean state. The targeting profile shows selective operational overlap with adjacent DPRK clusters' targeting priorities while maintaining operationally-distinct cluster characteristics. Operational tradecraft includes spearphishing operations with Korean Hangul Word Processor (HWP) and Microsoft Office macro-enabled lure documents for South Korean targeting, credential harvesting infrastructure mimicking commonly- used webmail providers, custom DPRK ecosystem shared tooling (BabyShark, AppleSeed variants), commodity tools (mimikatz, custom PowerShell stagers), and operational coordination with adjacent DPRK clusters within the broader RGB-controlled ecosystem. Hazel Sleet is curated as a thin-documentation entry relative to flagship DPRK cluster entries in this corpus, the public technical disclosure record for Hazel Sleet is significantly less dense than for Lazarus Group, BlueNoroff / Sapphire Sleet, Andariel, Kimsuky, Moonstone Sleet, Jade Sleet / TraderTraitor, Ruby Sleet, Pearl Sleet, or APT37 / Reaper. The entry is structurally significant for DPRK cyber-operations ecosystem completeness rather than for deep technical tradecraft analysis. Analysts requiring technical depth on DPRK cyber-operations should prioritize the higher-public-documentation cluster entries listed above.

Aliases

7
hazel_sleethazel sleetzincdprk it consulting workers clusternorth korea fake job applicantsdprk-affiliated worker-mediated intelligence clusterhazelsleet

MITRE ATT&CK aliases

6
Additional names MITRE lists for G0032.
Lazarus GroupLabyrinth ChollimaHIDDEN COBRAGuardians of PeaceNICKEL ACADEMYDiamond Sleet

Notable Campaigns

3
2014-2025Microsoft Hazel Sleet Operational Tracking (2014-2025)
2014-2025Hazel Sleet Targeting Profile Operational Assessment
2014-2025DPRK Cyber-Operations Ecosystem Coordination Context

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
Microsoft Threat Intelligence (MSTIC)Mandiant (Google Threat Intelligence)Recorded Future Insikt GroupKISA (Korea Internet and Security Agency)NIS (Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service)SentinelOneCrowdStrikeUS Treasury Department OFACFBI (selective DPRK cyber-operations advisories)
Key reporting
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence: DPRK Cyber Threat Actors Overview (including Hazel Sleet)
reportMicrosoft Digital Defense Report (annual editions), DPRK Cyber Operations Coverage
reportMandiant / Google Threat Intelligence: DPRK Cyber Operations Ecosystem
reportRecorded Future Insikt Group: DPRK Cyber Operations Tracking
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: Hazel Sleet

Operational

State sponsor

North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage cluster assessed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (canonical Hazel Sleet designation, Sleet taxonomy assigned to all DPRK-origin clusters in Microsoft's 2023 naming framework) as operating under North Korean state direction with an operational mission focused on cyber espionage and intelligence collection against targets aligned with North Korean strategic priorities. The cluster is assessed with high confidence to operate under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) / Bureau 121 DPRK cyber-operations structure or related DPRK intelligence-agency structures. Microsoft and adjacent industry analysis (Mandiant, Recorded Future) has documented Hazel Sleet operational tradecraft including spearphishing operations against intelligence-value targets, credential harvesting infrastructure, and operational coordination with adjacent DPRK clusters within the broader RGB-controlled cyber-operations ecosystem.

The cluster has comparatively thin public-record technical disclosure relative to DPRK clusters with high-profile disclosed operations (Lazarus Group, BlueNoroff / Sapphire Sleet, Andariel, Kimsuky, APT37 / Reaper), Hazel Sleet operational visibility in public reporting is primarily through Microsoft Threat Intelligence threat briefings and selective vendor reporting rather than through canonical disclosure reports detailing specific named operations. The cluster operates as a North Korean state- sponsored espionage cluster within the broader RGB cyber- operations ecosystem and is operationally distinct from all other DPRK clusters curated separately in this corpus: Lazarus Group (lazarus_group.yaml), Kimsuky (kimsuky.yaml), Andariel (andariel.yaml), BlueNoroff / Sapphire Sleet (sapphire_sleet.yaml), Citrine Sleet (citrine_sleet.yaml), Moonstone Sleet (moonstone_sleet.yaml), Jade Sleet / TraderTraitor (jade_sleet_tradertraitor.yaml), Ruby Sleet (ruby_sleet.yaml, aerospace and defense intelligence), Pearl Sleet (pearl_sleet.yaml, defectors and human rights organization targeting), DarkSeoul Operators (darkseoul_operators.yaml), Contagious Interview (contagious_interview.yaml), and APT37 / Reaper (apt37_reaper.yaml).

Motivations
cyber_espionage, intelligence_collection_for_dprk_strategic_priorities, financial_services_targeting_selective, dprk_state_intelligence_priorities, persistent_access_for_long_dwell_collection
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)58/60 · 96%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)33/60 · 55%
Runtime / container (Falco)7/60 · 11%
File / malware (YARA)1/60 · 1%
Network (Suricata/Snort)14/60 · 23%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

1 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MALICIOUS HWP DOCUMENTSMALICIOUS OFFICE MACROS

CVEs Exploited

3
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
About
All capabilities
Live statistics
Data sources
Privacy policy
Terms of service
threatengine.sh  ·  Open-source threat intelligence platform  ·  100+ authoritative sources  ·  Every fact traces to its origin