Home/Threat Actor/Group5
Threat Actor

Group5

group5_syria_iran · iran_suspected · active since 2015-10

Group5 (canonical Citizen Lab naming per August 2, 2016 "Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection" 56-page comprehensive disclosure by Bahr Abdul Razzak + John Scott-Railton + colleagues from University of Toronto / Munk School of Global Affairs, naming chosen because Group5 was the 5th-discovered cluster targeting Syrian opposition after Syrian Electronic Army + ISIS-linked hackers + Lebanon-linked group per FireEye 2015 + Assad regime-linked malware groups) is an Iran-suspected state- aligned cyber-espionage cluster operating in support of Iranian state strategic interests in the Syrian conflict; active publicly since October 3, 2015 (signature Noura Al-Ameer phishing email date, Al-Ameer was a former Vice President of the opposition Syrian National Council / SNC, SNC political council delegate documenting war crimes, formerly detained and tortured by Assad regime security forces in Damascus Adra prison before fleeing Syria); Iran-aligned attribution operates at strong-circumstantial- evidence level (Citizen Lab explicitly NOT formally establishing high-confidence attribution per John Scott- Railton: "We do not attribute Group5 to a particular sponsor, but the operation has many features indicating that the operators may be Iranian, from tools, to language, to servers") supported by Iranian ISP hosting + Iranian IP space operator access via assadcrimes[.]info site logs inadvertently exposed by operators + Hostnegar Iranian hosting provider + Iranian Persian dialect language tools and texts + Persian-language mailer briefly hosted + Iranian malware developer "Mr. Tekide" (Shiraz-based) crypter connection + Iranian-themed bait content + target alignment with Iranian state strategic interest in Syrian conflict (Iran's active military engagement in Syria in support of Assad regime)

signature operational tradecraft includes assadcrimes[.]info watering hole infrastructure (cluster- defining hosting malicious .ppsx PowerPoint files + malicious .exe Windows executables + Android malicious APK files) + signature target identity theft for site registration (registering assadcrimes[.]info using Noura Al-Ameer's own stolen identity for credibility weaponization) + CVE-2014-4114 PowerPoint OLE Package Manager exploit (Sandworm CVE) in malicious .ppsx slideshow files + OLE objects via PowerPoint animation properties + njRat + NanoCore + DroidJack commodity RAT deployment (operationally-amateurish-but-sufficient tradecraft) + signature DroidJack Android RAT comprehensive Android surveillance (microphone + camera activation + encrypted messages reading + file removal + spoofed instant messages) operationally exploiting Syrian reality that Google Play Services were not available within Syria + "Assad Crimes" fake human rights documentation organization pretext via office@assadcrimes[.]info email persona + chameleon-like opposition content mimicry per Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert.

potential operational lineage to Infy cluster (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracked Iran-aligned cluster) per softpedia analysis though no definitive operational connection established; fills Syrian-conflict-era Iran-aligned cluster cell in the curated corpus as 11th Iran-aligned cluster, operationally distinct from existing 10 Iran-attributed clusters through signature Syrian-opposition-targeting focus + operationally- amateurish-but-sufficient tradecraft + Citizen Lab canonical disclosure context.

iran_suspected confidence: medium 10 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0043 ↗
Sigma rules200 YARA rules0 Live IOCs0 CVEs exploited1

Profile

Group5 (canonical Citizen Lab naming per August 2, 2016 "Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection" 56-page comprehensive disclosure, naming chosen because Group5 was the 5th-discovered cluster targeting Syrian opposition after Syrian Electronic Army + ISIS-linked hackers + Lebanon-linked group per FireEye 2015 + Assad regime- linked malware groups) is an Iran-suspected state-aligned cyber-espionage cluster operating in support of Iranian state strategic interests in the Syrian conflict. Active publicly since October 3, 2015 (signature Noura Al-Ameer phishing email date) with signature operational mission objectives of intelligence collection from Syrian opposition political figures, negotiators, Syrian National Council members, dissident activists, journalists, and war crimes documenters. Iran-aligned attribution operates at strong-circumstantial- evidence level (Citizen Lab explicitly NOT formally establishing high-confidence attribution) per multiple convergent evidence streams: Iranian ISP hosting + Iranian IP space operator access (assadcrimes[.]info site logs inadvertently exposed), Iranian hosting provider Hostnegar, Iranian Persian dialect language tools and texts, Persian-language mailer briefly hosted, Iranian malware developer connection ("Mr.

Tekide" Shiraz-based) operationally providing crypter possibly sold to Group5, Iranian-themed bait content, PowerPoint document exploit tradecraft consistent with recently-reported Iranian campaigns of the era, target alignment with Iranian state strategic interest in Syrian conflict (Iran's active military engagement in Syria in support of Assad regime). Operational phases: (1) OPERATIONAL EMERGENCE (October 3, 2015). Signature Noura Al-Ameer phishing email, former SNC Vice President and SNC political council delegate documenting war crimes, formerly detained and tortured by Assad regime security forces. assadcrimes[.]info site registered using Al-Ameer's stolen identity.

Al-Ameer recognized something suspicious and refrained from clicking, frustrating the operation.

(2) CITIZEN LAB INVESTIGATION (October 2015
  • August 2016). Bahr Abdul Razzak (Al-Ameer's husband + Citizen Lab fellow + cybersecurity trainer) led initial forensic investigation operationally identifying the cluster operationally assessment of Iranian connection via Iranian IP space access logs + Hostnegar + Persian language + Iranian malware developer Mr. Tekide attribution indicators. (3) CITIZEN LAB CANONICAL DISCLOSURE (August 2, 2016). 56-page report establishes canonical Group5 cluster naming and documents signature operational tradecraft. (4) POST-2016 OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY (Limited Public Visibility). Cluster has not been publicly disclosed under Group5 naming since 2016, though some analysts hypothesize operational lineage to Infy cluster.
Signature operational tradecraft
  • assadcrimes[.]info watering hole infrastructure: cluster-defining infrastructure hosting malicious .ppsx PowerPoint files, malicious .exe Windows executables, and Android malicious APK files. Persian-language mailer briefly hosted.
  • Target identity theft for site registration: operationally distinctive, registering the assadcrimes[.]info site using Noura Al-Ameer's own stolen identity for credibility weaponization in downstream campaign targeting her contacts.
  • CVE-2014-4114 PowerPoint OLE Package Manager exploit: signature Sandworm CVE exploitation in malicious .ppsx PowerPoint slideshow files. Plus OLE objects via PowerPoint animation properties.
  • njRat + NanoCore + DroidJack commodity RAT deployment: signature operationally-amateurish-but-sufficient tradecraft using commodity malware rather than custom development. DroidJack Android RAT operationally significant for comprehensive Android surveillance (microphone + camera activation + encrypted messages reading + file removal + spoofed instant messages).
  • Android APK targeting via off-Play-Store sharing pattern: signature operational pattern exploiting Syrian reality that Google Play Services were not available within Syria, leading Syrians to commonly share Android APK files outside the Google Play Store.
  • "Assad Crimes" fake human rights documentation organization pretext: signature social engineering pretext leveraging Syrian opposition's interest in documenting Iranian/regime crimes.
  • Chameleon-like opposition content mimicry: signature social engineering tradecraft per Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert, "ability to borrow the language and style of the opposition.".
  • Mr. Tekide Iranian malware developer connection (Shiraz): signature attribution indicator, operationally consistent with Iran-aligned cluster procurement of crypter tooling from Iranian malware-developer ecosystem.
  • Hostnegar Iranian hosting provider: signature infrastructure attribution indicator. The cluster fills the Syrian-conflict-era Iran-aligned cluster cell in this curated corpus, 11th Iran-aligned cluster operationally distinct from existing 10 Iran- attributed clusters (apt33_elfin + apt34_oilrig + apt35_charmingkitten + apt39_chafer + agrius + cyberav3ngers + hexane_lyceum + imperial_kitten_tortoiseshell + madi_mahdi + muddywater + pioneer_kitten_fox_kitten + stealth_falcon, all curated separately) through signature Syrian-opposition-targeting focus + operationally- amateurish-but-sufficient tradecraft + Citizen Lab canonical disclosure context + opposition-content-mimicry social engineering pattern. Operationally significant for representing the Iranian state-aligned offensive cyber operations in support of Iranian military engagement in the Syrian conflict.

Aliases

10
group5group 5group_5group5 syriagroup5_syriaassadcrimes.info operatorassadcrimes operatorgroup5_syria_iransyria iran clusteriranian syria cluster

Notable Campaigns

9
2016-PresentPost-2016 Operational Continuity (Limited Public Visibility)
2016Citizen Lab Canonical Disclosure (August 2, 2016)
2015-2026Syrian Conflict 'Petri Dish for Threat Actors' Operational Context
2015-2016assadcrimes[.]info Watering Hole Infrastructure (Signature)
2015-2016PowerPoint CVE-2014-4114 Exploit Tradecraft (Signature)
2015-2016njRat + NanoCore + DroidJack Commodity RAT Deployment (Signature)
2015-2016Chameleon-Like Opposition Content Mimicry Tradecraft (Signature Social Engineering)
2015Group5 Operational Emergence, Noura Al-Ameer Targeting (October 3, 2015)
2015Target Identity Theft for Site Registration (Operationally Distinctive Pattern)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
Citizen Lab (University of Toronto / Munk School of Global Affairs)John Scott-Railton (Citizen Lab lead author)Bahr Abdul Razzak (Citizen Lab fellow + cybersecurity trainer)Ron Deibert (Citizen Lab director)FireEye (John Hultquist threat intelligence manager outside expert review)Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (Infy cluster operational lineage hypothesis)Symantec / Broadcom Threat Hunter TeamTrend MicroMandiantMicrosoft Threat Intelligence CenterESETAssociated Press (AP coverage August 2016)CBC NewsThe Times of IsraelTimes of Toronto (University of Toronto press)
Key reporting
reportCitizen Lab (Bahr Abdul Razzak + John Scott-Railton + colleagues): Group5, Syria and the Iranian Connection (August 2, 2016), 56-page canonical disclosure
reportUniversity of Toronto / Munk School of Global Affairs (Ron Deibert): Syrian dissidents targeted by hackers, Citizen Lab Group5 disclosure context (August 2016)
reportFireEye / Mandiant (John Hultquist outside expert review): Group5 operational consistency with Iranian activity assessment (August 2016)
reportAssociated Press (Raphael Satter): Experts see Iranian role in bid to hack Syrian dissident (August 2, 2016)
reportCBC News: Syrian dissidents targeted by Iranian hackers per Citizen Lab (August 2, 2016)
reportTimes of Israel: Iranian role in attempted hack of Syrian dissident (August 2016)
reportSecurityWeek: Iranian Actor Group5 Targeting Syrian Opposition (August 2016)
reportsoftpedia (Catalin Cimpanu): New Cyber-Espionage Group Targets Syrian Dissidents (August 3, 2016), first to suggest Infy operational lineage hypothesis
reportIBTimes UK: New cyberespionage team Group5 using malware and RATs to target Syrian dissidents (August 2016)
reportPalo Alto Networks Unit 42: Infy cluster context (adjacent Iran-aligned operational lineage hypothesis)
reportSymantec / Broadcom Threat Hunter Team: Group5 adjacent cluster tracking
reportTrend Micro: Group5 contextual analysis
reportMandiant: Group5 Iran-aligned cluster tracking
reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence Center: Iran-aligned Syrian conflict cluster context
reportMITRE ATT&CK Group G0043, Group5
reportMalpedia Actor Profile: Group5

Operational

State sponsor

Iran-aligned cluster operating in support of Iranian state strategic interests in the Syrian conflict, Iran attribution operates at strong-circumstantial-evidence level per Citizen Lab August 2016 canonical disclosure but is explicitly NOT formally established at high-confidence by Citizen Lab. Per Citizen Lab: "We do not conclusively attribute Group5 to a sponsor, although we suspect the interests of a state are present, in some form... mindful of the limits of our investigation, we stop short of conclusive statements of attribution about the identity of the operators, or their possible sponsors." Per John Scott-Railton (Citizen Lab lead author): "We do not attribute Group5 to a particular sponsor, but the operation has many features indicating that the operators may be Iranian, from tools, to language, to servers." Iran-aligned attribution is operationally supported by multiple convergent circumstantial evidence streams: (a) Iranian Internet Service Provider (ISP) hosting + Iranian IP space access: per Citizen Lab forensic analysis of assadcrimes[.]info site logs (which were inadvertently exposed by operators): "logs of access to the assadcrimes[.]info site suggest that the operators are working from within Iranian IP space" and "during the site's early development in the first half of October, it was accessed hourly from an Iranian IP block." The operators also accessed the site from the malware's C&C server. Cluster infrastructure entirely hosted on servers of Iranian ISPs.

(b) Iranian hosting provider (Hostnegar): the cluster operationally used Hostnegar, an Iranian hosting provider, for assadcrimes[.]info infrastructure. (c) Iranian Persian dialect language tools + texts: per Citizen Lab: "the operators seem comfortable with Iranian Persian dialect tools and Iranian hosting companies." The mailer discovered on the assadcrimes[.]info website was in Persian. Persian language texts found in the malware's code.

(d) Iranian malware developer connection (Mr. Tekide, Shiraz): per Citizen Lab: "a string of data recovered from the malicious code used to target Al-Ameer appeared to refer to a developer who runs a malicious software site registered in the Iranian city of Shiraz", operationally named "Mr. Tekide," a known Iranian malware developer.

Per Citizen Lab: "the additional apparent involvement of an Iranian malware developer with ties to a known Iranian cyber actor, whether his involvement was unwitting or intentional, only strengthens the Iranian connection." Mr. Tekide operationally provided malware crypter that "may have been sold to Group5" per Citizen Lab analysis. (e) Iranian-themed bait content + Iranian political themes: bait content contains substantial Iranian themes.

The initial Noura Al-Ameer phishing lure was titled "Assad Crimes" (the operators using email address office@assadcrimes[.]info) and the sender claimed to be sharing information about Iranian "crimes", a theme familiar to many in the Syrian opposition because of Iran's active military engagement in Syria in support of the Assad regime. (f) PowerPoint document exploit tradecraft consistent with other recently-reported Iranian campaigns: per Citizen Lab: "PowerPoint documents containing exploits, albeit often with quite different (and sometimes custom) malware, is a commonly reported feature of many recently- reported Iranian campaigns" (operationally consistent with Iranian-aligned cluster tradecraft pattern of the 2014-2016 era). (g) Target alignment with Iranian state strategic interest in Syrian conflict: Per Citizen Lab: "The circumstantial evidence pointing to an Iranian group is unsurprising, given Iran's active military engagement in Syria, and the sympathies of many in that country for the Assad regime." Per John Hultquist (FireEye threat intelligence manager, outside expert review): "The botched cyberespionage attempt is consistent with Iranian activity we've previously observed, in terms of operational security, social engineering, and technical sophistication." (h) Potential operational lineage to Infy cluster (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42): per softpedia analysis: "Based on the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) the group had deployed, Citizen Lab claims that Group5 could be related to Infy, an APT activating from within Iran's borders." Infy is operationally a distinct Iran- aligned cluster, operational connection hypothesized but not definitively established.

Operational significance: per Citizen Lab: "Group5 is just the latest addition to an expanding cast of actors targeting Syrian opposition groups, and its entry into the conflict shows the continuing information security risks that they face." The cluster operationally represents the "petri dish for threat actors in the Middle East" per John Scott-Railton, operationally one of several state-aligned clusters that emerged during the Syrian conflict to compromise opposition communications. Operationally distinct from sibling Syrian-conflict-era clusters (Syrian Electronic Army + ISIS-linked hackers + Lebanon- linked group per FireEye 2015 + Assad regime-linked malware groups) through Iran-aligned attribution. The cluster fills the Syrian-conflict-era Iran-aligned cluster cell in this curated corpus, 11th Iran-aligned cluster operationally distinct from existing 10 Iran- attributed clusters through signature Syrian-opposition- targeting focus + operationally-amateurish tradecraft + Citizen Lab canonical disclosure context.

Motivations
iran_aligned_state_strategic_interest_intelligence_collection, syrian_opposition_communications_compromise, syrian_dissident_surveillance, syrian_opposition_political_figure_targeting, syrian_opposition_identity_theft_for_secondary_targeting, assad_regime_aligned_intelligence_support, syrian_national_council_targeting, opposition_journalist_activist_targeting
Sectors
Regions

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)58/60 · 96%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)30/60 · 50%
Runtime / container (Falco)9/60 · 15%
File / malware (YARA)1/60 · 1%
Network (Suricata/Snort)14/60 · 23%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

0 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MALICIOUS OLE OBJECTS IN POWERPOINTMALICIOUS POWERPOINT PPSX SLIDESHOW LURESMR. TEKIDE CRYPTERMR. TEKIDE IRANIAN MALWARE DEVELOPER SHIRAZSYRIAN OPPOSITION TEXT SLOGAN MIMICRY

CVEs Exploited

1
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