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MOBILE ATT&CK

Stored Application Data

T1409 · collection

Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail. Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: An application stores files in unprotected external storage An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device.

AndroidiOS
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Actors Using This

11
private_mercenaryBahamut
indiaBitter
italyCy4Gate
lebanonDark Caracal
indiaDoNot Team
italyeSurv
spainMollitiam Industries
pakistanTransparent Tribe
italyNegg Group
pakistanSideCopy
united_arab_emiratesWindshift
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access earlier
T1456 · Drive-By Compromise ×21.64T1458 · Replication Through Removable Media ×21.64
defense-evasion earlier
T1406 · Obfuscated Files or Information ×21.64T1628.001 · Suppress Application Icon ×21.64
discovery earlier
T1422 · System Network Configuration Discovery ×21.64T1426 · System Information Discovery ×21.64T1418 · Software Discovery ×21.64
collection same
T1430.001 · Remote Device Management Services ×21.64T1414 · Clipboard Data ×21.64T1512 · Video Capture ×21.64T1513 · Screen Capture ×21.64T1517 · Access Notifications ×21.64T1417 · Input Capture ×18.93
command-and-control later
T1437 · Application Layer Protocol ×21.64T1437.001 · Web Protocols ×21.64
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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