Home/ATT&CK Technique/Clipboard Data
MOBILE ATT&CK

Clipboard Data

T1414 · collection, credential-access

Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device. On Android, applications can use the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener() API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes.

However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME). On iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the UIPasteboard.general.string field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application.

For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.

AndroidiOS
◆

Actors Using This

4
italyCy4Gate
italyeSurv
spainMollitiam Industries
italyNegg Group
◈

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access earlier
T1458 · Replication Through Removable Media ×59.50
defense-evasion earlier
T1406 · Obfuscated Files or Information ×59.50T1628.001 · Suppress Application Icon ×59.50
discovery later
T1418 · Software Discovery ×59.50
collection later
T1512 · Video Capture ×59.50T1513 · Screen Capture ×59.50T1517 · Access Notifications ×59.50T1636.001 · Calendar Entries ×47.60T1636.002 · Call Log ×47.60T1636.003 · Contact List ×47.60T1636.004 · SMS Messages ×47.60T1409 · Stored Application Data ×21.64T1430.001 · Remote Device Management Services ×21.64T1429 · Audio Capture ×18.31T1430 · Location Tracking ×11.90
◈

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
MITRE ATT&CKAtomic Red Teamcar (MITRE)
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
About
All capabilities
Live statistics
Data sources
Privacy policy
Terms of service
threatengine.sh  ·  Open-source threat intelligence platform  ·  100+ authoritative sources  ·  Every fact traces to its origin