Home/ATT&CK Technique/Screen Capture
MOBILE ATT&CK

Screen Capture

T1513 · collection

Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android MediaProjectionManager (generally requires the device user to grant consent). Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.

An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android screencap or screenrecord commands.

Android
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Actors Using This

4
italyCy4Gate
italyeSurv
spainMollitiam Industries
italyNegg Group
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access earlier
T1458 · Replication Through Removable Media ×59.50
defense-evasion earlier
T1406 · Obfuscated Files or Information ×59.50T1628.001 · Suppress Application Icon ×59.50
discovery earlier
T1418 · Software Discovery ×59.50
collection same
T1414 · Clipboard Data ×59.50T1512 · Video Capture ×59.50T1517 · Access Notifications ×59.50T1636.001 · Calendar Entries ×47.60T1636.002 · Call Log ×47.60T1636.003 · Contact List ×47.60T1636.004 · SMS Messages ×47.60T1409 · Stored Application Data ×21.64T1430.001 · Remote Device Management Services ×21.64T1429 · Audio Capture ×18.31T1430 · Location Tracking ×11.90
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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