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MOBILE ATT&CK

Video Capture

T1512 · collection

An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system.

Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen. In Android, an application must hold the android.permission.CAMERA permission to access the cameras.

In iOS, applications must include the NSCameraUsageDescription key in the Info.plist file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user.

AndroidiOS
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Actors Using This

4
italyCy4Gate
italyeSurv
spainMollitiam Industries
italyNegg Group
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access earlier
T1458 · Replication Through Removable Media ×59.50
defense-evasion earlier
T1406 · Obfuscated Files or Information ×59.50T1628.001 · Suppress Application Icon ×59.50
discovery earlier
T1418 · Software Discovery ×59.50
collection same
T1414 · Clipboard Data ×59.50T1513 · Screen Capture ×59.50T1517 · Access Notifications ×59.50T1636.001 · Calendar Entries ×47.60T1636.002 · Call Log ×47.60T1636.003 · Contact List ×47.60T1636.004 · SMS Messages ×47.60T1409 · Stored Application Data ×21.64T1430.001 · Remote Device Management Services ×21.64T1429 · Audio Capture ×18.31T1430 · Location Tracking ×11.90
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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