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MOBILE ATT&CK

Input Capture

T1417 · collection, credential-access

Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g.

Keylogging) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine application prompt (e.g. GUI Input Capture).

AndroidiOS
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Actors Using This

8
private_mercenaryBahamut
brazilBanbra
indiaBitter
lebanonDark Caracal
indiaDoNot Team
pakistanTransparent Tribe
pakistanSideCopy
united_arab_emiratesWindshift
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
T1598 · Phishing for Information ×3.61T1598.003 · Spearphishing Link ×3.61
initial-access earlier
T1456 · Drive-By Compromise ×29.75
discovery later
T1426 · System Information Discovery ×29.75T1422 · System Network Configuration Discovery ×23.14
collection later
T1409 · Stored Application Data ×18.93T1430.001 · Remote Device Management Services ×18.93T1429 · Audio Capture ×16.02T1430 · Location Tracking ×10.41
command-and-control later
T1437 · Application Layer Protocol ×29.75T1437.001 · Web Protocols ×29.75T1102.001 · Dead Drop Resolver ×3.31
other same
T1218.007 · Msiexec ×6.87T1564.003 · Hidden Window ×5.95T1564.001 · Hidden Files and Directories ×4.08
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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CVETechnique ActorTool Family
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