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ATT&CK Technique

Replication Through Removable Media

T1091 · lateral-movement, initial-access

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB. This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables. For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive.

If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).

Windows
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Actors Using This

14
chinaAoqin Dragon
russiaAPT28
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeEmotet Operators
united_statesEquation Group
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyber_speculationFlame
russiaGamaredon Group
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyber_speculationGauss
chinaGoblin Panda
chinaMustang Panda
chinaNaikon
suspected_state_aligned_unattributedProject Sauron / Strider
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyberStuxnet
chinaTropic Trooper
chinaUNC4191
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
T1589 · Gather Victim Identity Information ×3.17T1591 · Gather Victim Org Information ×2.80T1589.002 · Email Addresses ×2.76
persistence later
T1542.003 · Bootkit ×4.33T1542 · Pre-OS Boot ×3.40
privilege-escalation later
T1546.015 · Component Object Model Hijacking ×6.35T1546.001 · Change Default File Association ×3.97T1546 · Event Triggered Execution ×2.85
discovery later
T1120 · Peripheral Device Discovery ×11.33
lateral-movement later
T1080 · Taint Shared Content ×3.97
collection later
T1025 · Data from Removable Media ×7.05
command-and-control later
T1071.003 · Mail Protocols ×3.17
exfiltration later
T1052 · Exfiltration Over Physical Medium ×14.28T1052.001 · Exfiltration over USB ×14.28
other same
T1027.003 · Steganography ×3.97
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Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellwindowsUSB Malware Spread Simulation
Simulates an adversary copying malware to all connected removable drives. 
$RemovableDrives=@()
$RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter "drivetype=2" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID
ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives)
{
write-host "Removable Drive Found:" $Drive
New-Item -Path $Drive/T1091Test1.txt -ItemType "file" -Force -Value "T1091 Test 1 has created this file to simulate malware spread to removable drives."
}
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Mitigations

3
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1034Limit Hardware Installation

Prevent unauthorized users or groups from installing or using hardware, such as external drives, peripheral devices, or unapproved internal hardware components, by enforcing hardware usage policies and technical controls. This includes disabling USB ports, restricting driver installation, and implementing endpoint security tools to monitor and block unapproved devices.

Disable USB Ports and Hardware Installation Policies
  • Use Group Policy Objects (GPO) to disable USB mass storage devices:.
  • Navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Removable Storage Access.
  • Deny write and read access to USB devices.
  • Whitelist approved devices using unique serial numbers via Windows Device Installation Policies.
Deploy Endpoint Protection and Device Control Solutions
  • Use tools like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Symantec Endpoint Protection, or Tanium to monitor and block unauthorized hardware.
  • Implement device control policies to allow specific hardware types (e.g., keyboards, mice) and block others.
Harden BIOS/UEFI and System Firmware
  • Set strong passwords for BIOS/UEFI access.
  • Enable Secure Boot to prevent rogue hardware components from loading unauthorized firmware.
Restrict Peripheral Devices and Drivers
  • Use Windows Device Manager Policies to block installation of unapproved drivers.
  • Monitor hardware installation attempts through endpoint monitoring tools.
Disable Bluetooth and Wireless Hardware
  • Use GPO or MDM tools to disable Bluetooth and Wi-Fi interfaces across systems.
  • Restrict hardware pairing to approved devices only.
Logging and Monitoring
  • Enable logging for hardware installation events in Windows Event Logs (Event ID 20001 for Device Setup Manager).
  • Use SIEM solutions (e.g., Splunk, Elastic Stack) to detect unauthorized hardware installation activities.
Tools for Implementation USB and Device Control
  • Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO)
  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
  • Symantec Endpoint Protection.
McAfee Device Control Endpoint Monitoring
  • EDRs.
OSSEC (open-source host-based IDS) Hardware Whitelisting
  • BitLocker for external drives (Windows)
  • Windows Device Installation Policies.
Device Control BIOS/UEFI Security
  • Secure Boot (Windows/Linux) Firmware management tools like Dell Command Update or HP Sure Start.
M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack.

Suspicious Process Behavior
  • Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts.
  • Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.
Unauthorized File Access
  • Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization.
  • Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.
Abnormal API Calls
  • Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities.
  • Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like OpenProcess and WriteProcessMemory and terminates the offending process.
Exploit Prevention
  • Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access.
  • Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.
M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled.

Remove Legacy Software
  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.
Disable Unused Features
  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
Control Applications Installed by Users
  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.
Remove Unnecessary Services
  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.
Restrict Add-ons and Plugins
  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.
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Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 1
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-03, AC-06, CM-02, CM-06, CM-08, MP-07, RA-05, SC-41, SI-03, SI-04
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