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ATT&CK Technique

Data from Removable Media

T1025 · collection

Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.

Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.

LinuxmacOSWindows
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Actors Using This

14
chinaAoqin Dragon
russiaAPT28
spainCareto / The Mask
israel_private_sector_mobile_forensics_cyber_mercenaryCellebrite
russiaCloud Atlas
chinaDark Pink
united_statesEquation Group
russiaGamaredon Group
belarusMoustachedBouncer
chinaMustang Panda
pakistanTransparent Tribe
chinaNaikon
indiaPatchwork
suspected_state_aligned_unattributedProject Sauron / Strider
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
persistence earlier
T1137 · Office Application Startup ×7.56T1542 · Pre-OS Boot ×3.78T1547.009 · Shortcut Modification ×3.73T1542.003 · Bootkit ×3.61
privilege-escalation earlier
T1546.015 · Component Object Model Hijacking ×5.29
discovery earlier
T1120 · Peripheral Device Discovery ×9.44
lateral-movement earlier
T1091 · Replication Through Removable Media ×7.05
command-and-control later
T1071.003 · Mail Protocols ×3.17
exfiltration later
T1052 · Exfiltration Over Physical Medium ×9.26T1052.001 · Exfiltration over USB ×9.26
other same
T1221 · Template Injection ×11.33T1480.001 · Environmental Keying ×6.01T1480 · Execution Guardrails ×4.41T1564.003 · Hidden Window ×3.40T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation ×3.09
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Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsIdentify Documents on USB and Removable Media via PowerShell
This test simulates an attack where PowerShell is used to detect connected USB or other removable storage devices and gather a list of specific document files (e.g., .docx, .xls, .txt, .pdf). The command works by first identifying removable drives on the system and then recursively searching through each one for files matching the targeted extensions. If no removable drives are present, the script will return a message stating that no media is detected. This behavior mimics how adversaries might scan for sensitive documents on removable devices for exfiltration or analysis. 
powershell.exe -c "Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'} | ForEach-Object { Get-ChildItem -Path ($_.DriveLetter + ':\*') -Recurse -Include '*.doc*','*.xls*','*.txt','*.pdf' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {Write-Output $_.FullName} } ; if (-not (Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'})) { Write-Output 'No removable media.' }"
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1057Data Loss Prevention

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) involves implementing strategies and technologies to identify, categorize, monitor, and control the movement of sensitive data within an organization. This includes protecting data formats indicative of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), intellectual property, or financial data from unauthorized access, transmission, or exfiltration. DLP solutions integrate with network, endpoint, and cloud platforms to enforce security policies and prevent accidental or malicious data leaks.

Sensitive Data Categorization
  • Use Case: Identify and classify data based on sensitivity (e.g., PII, financial data, trade secrets).
  • Implementation: Use DLP solutions to scan and tag files containing sensitive information using predefined patterns, such as Social Security Numbers or credit card details.
Exfiltration Restrictions
  • Use Case: Prevent unauthorized transmission of sensitive data.
  • Implementation: Enforce policies to block unapproved email attachments, unauthorized USB usage, or unencrypted data uploads to cloud storage.
Data-in-Transit Monitoring
  • Use Case: Detect and prevent the transmission of sensitive data over unapproved channels.
  • Implementation: Deploy network-based DLP tools to inspect outbound traffic for sensitive content (e.g., financial records or PII) and block unapproved transmissions.
Endpoint Data Protection
  • Use Case: Monitor and control sensitive data usage on endpoints.
  • Implementation: Use endpoint-based DLP agents to block copy-paste actions of sensitive data and unauthorized printing or file sharing.
Cloud Data Security
  • Use Case: Protect data stored in cloud platforms.
  • Implementation: Integrate DLP with cloud storage platforms like Google Drive, OneDrive, or AWS to monitor and restrict sensitive data sharing or downloads.
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53AC-02, AC-03, AC-06, AC-16, AC-23, CM-12, CP-09, MP-07, SA-08, SC-13, SC-28, SC-38, SC-41, SI-03, SI-04
D3FEND3 defensive techniques
Intelligence Graph · click any node to traverse
CVETechnique ActorTool Family
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MITRE ATT&CKAtomic Red Teamcar (MITRE)
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