title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Script Interpreter
id: 992a6cae-db6a-43c8-9cec-76d7195c96fc
related:
    - id: 08249dc0-a28d-4555-8ba5-9255a198e08c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_main_ms_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr: '20.0.0.0/11' # Microsoft range, caused some FPs
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts
level: high

title: Outbound RDP Connections Over Non-Standard Tools
id: ed74fe75-7594-4b4b-ae38-e38e3fd2eb23
status: test
description: |
    Detects Non-Standard tools initiating a connection over port 3389 indicating possible lateral movement.
    An initial baseline is required before using this utility to exclude third party RDP tooling that you might use.
references:
    - https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-05-15
modified: 2024-02-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: 3389
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_mstsc:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mstsc.exe'
    filter_optional_dns:
        # Note: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2249
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dns.exe'
        SourcePort: 53
        Protocol: 'udp'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
            - '\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
    filter_optional_sysinternals_rdcman:
        Image|endswith: '\RDCMan.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_third_party:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\FSAssessment.exe'
            - '\FSDiscovery.exe'
            - '\MobaRTE.exe'
            - '\mRemote.exe'
            - '\mRemoteNG.exe'
            - '\Passwordstate.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager64.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManagerFree.exe'
            - '\RSSensor.exe'
            - '\RTS2App.exe'
            - '\RTSApp.exe'
            - '\spiceworks-finder.exe'
            - '\Terminals.exe'
            - '\ws_TunnelService.exe'
    filter_optional_thor:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    filter_optional_splunk:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\'
    filter_optional_sentinel_one:
        Image|endswith: '\Ranger\SentinelRanger.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_tsplus:  # Some RAS
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_unknown:
        Image: '<unknown process>'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Third party RDP tools
level: high

title: Outdated Dependency Or Vulnerability Alert Disabled
id: 34e1c7d4-0cd5-419d-9f1b-1dad3f61018d
status: test
description: |
    Dependabot performs a scan to detect insecure dependencies, and sends Dependabot alerts.
    This rule detects when an organization owner disables Dependabot alerts private repositories or Dependabot security updates for all repositories.
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-01-27
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-alerts/about-dependabot-alerts
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/managing-security-and-analysis-settings-for-your-organization
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.001
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'dependabot_alerts_new_repos.disable'
            - 'dependabot_alerts.disable'
            - 'dependabot_security_updates_new_repos.disable'
            - 'dependabot_security_updates.disable'
            - 'repository_vulnerability_alerts.disable'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved changes by the Organization owner. Please validate the 'actor' if authorized to make the changes.
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled
id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # Registry variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
id: e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\Level'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001' # Enable all Macros
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load
id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
status: test
description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE
id: 145095eb-e273-443b-83d0-f9b519b7867b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process.
    This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses.
references:
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2024/dumping-lsa-secrets-a-story-about-task-decorrelation/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pdf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled
id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd
status: test
description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Disable PIM Alert
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice.
level: high

title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation
id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d
status: test
description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Request Approved/Denied
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual admin using PIM.
level: high

title: PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure
id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2
related:
    - id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c
      type: similar
    - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze security solutions (EDR/antivirus).
    This technique is used by tools such as EDR-Freeze and WSASS to bypass PPL protections and access sensitive information or disable security software.
    Distinct command line patterns help identify the specific tool:
    - WSASS usage typically shows: "WSASS.exe WerFaultSecure.exe [PID]" in ParentCommandLine
    - EDR-Freeze usage typically shows: "EDR-Freeze_[version].exe [PID] [timeout]" in ParentCommandLine
    Legitimate debugging operations using WerFaultSecure are rare in production environments and should be investigated.
references:
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDR-Freeze/blob/a7f61030b36fbde89871f393488f7075d2aa89f6/EDR-Freeze.cpp#L53
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS/blob/2c8fd9fa32143e7bc9f066e9511c6f8a57bc64b5/WSASS.cpp#L251
author: Jason (https://github.com/0xbcf)
date: 2025-09-23
modified: 2025-11-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\WerFaultSecure.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WerFaultSecure.exe'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /h '
            - ' /pid ' # Antimalware or EDR process pid will be after this flag
            - ' /tid '
            - ' /encfile '
            - ' /cancel '
            - ' /type '
            - ' 268310'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of WerFaultSecure for debugging purposes
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_werfaultsecure_abuse/info.yml

title: PSAsyncShell - Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell
id: afd3df04-948d-46f6-ae44-25966c44b97f
status: test
description: Detects the use of PSAsyncShell an Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell written in powershell
references:
    - https://github.com/JoelGMSec/PSAsyncShell
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'PSAsyncShell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact
id: 304afd73-55a5-4bb9-8c21-0b1fc84ea9e4
status: test
description: Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system
references:
    - https://aboutdfir.com/the-key-to-identify-psexec/
    - https://twitter.com/davisrichardg/status/1616518800584704028
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-21
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PSEXEC-'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.key'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block
id: 97b9ce1e-c5ab-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
status: test
description: Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands
    - https://twitter.com/duff22b/status/1280166329660497920
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\psexesvc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - 3Proxy Execution
id: f38a82d2-fba3-4781-b549-525efbec8506
status: test
description: Detects the use of 3proxy, a tiny free proxy server
references:
    - https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\3proxy.exe'
    selection_pe:
        Description: '3proxy - tiny proxy server'
    selection_params: # param combos seen in the wild
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe -i127.0.0.1 -p'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high

title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
      type: similar
    - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2025-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - '-sc dclist'
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e

title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
    - id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/EXEFilename'
            - '/CommandLine'
    selection_runas:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' /RunAs 8 '
              - ' /RunAs 4 '
              - ' /RunAs 10 '
              - ' /RunAs 11 '
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '/RunAs 8'
              - '/RunAs 4'
              - '/RunAs 10'
              - '/RunAs 11'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml

title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high

title: PUA - CleanWipe Execution
id: f44800ac-38ec-471f-936e-3fa7d9c53100
status: test
description: Detects the use of CleanWipe a tool usually used to delete Symantec antivirus.
references:
    - https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/CleanWipe
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-18
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '\SepRemovalToolNative_x64.exe'
    selection2:
        Image|endswith: '\CATClean.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--uninstall'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: '\NetInstaller.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '-r'
    selection4:
        Image|endswith: '\WFPUnins.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/uninstall'
            - '/enterprise'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use (Should be investigated either way)
level: high

title: PUA - Crassus Execution
id: 2c32b543-1058-4808-91c6-5b31b8bed6c5
status: test
description: Detects Crassus, a Windows privilege escalation discovery tool, based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
    - https://github.com/vu-ls/Crassus
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1590.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Crassus.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Crassus.exe'
        - Description|contains: 'Crassus'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - CsExec Execution
id: d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31
status: test
description: Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative
references:
    - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\csexec.exe'
    selection_pe:
        Description: 'csexec'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - DIT Snapshot Viewer
id: d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b
status: test
description: Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20201124182207/https://github.com/yosqueoy/ditsnap
author: Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)
date: 2020-07-04
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\ditsnap.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'ditsnap.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin usage
level: high

title: PUA - DefenderCheck Execution
id: f0ca6c24-3225-47d5-b1f5-352bf07ecfa7
status: test
description: Detects the use of DefenderCheck, a tool to evaluate the signatures used in Microsoft Defender. It can be used to figure out the strings / byte chains used in Microsoft Defender to detect a tool and thus used for AV evasion.
references:
    - https://github.com/matterpreter/DefenderCheck
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-30
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\DefenderCheck.exe'
        - Description: 'DefenderCheck'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
id: 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863
status: test
description: Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/
    - https://github.com/fatedier/frp
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\frpc.exe'
            - '\frps.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '\frpc.ini'
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.44.0
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=7D9C233B8C9E3F0EA290D2B84593C842"
            - "SHA1=06DDC9280E1F1810677935A2477012960905942F"
            - "SHA256=57B0936B8D336D8E981C169466A15A5FD21A7D5A2C7DAF62D5E142EE860E387C"
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high

title: PUA - Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) Execution
id: e76ca062-4de0-4d79-8d90-160a0d335eca
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) tool.
    KDU can be used to bypass driver signature enforcement and load unsigned or malicious drivers into the Windows kernel.
    Potentially allowing for privilege escalation, persistence, or evasion of security controls.
references:
    - https://github.com/h4rmy/KDU
    - https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit
author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress)
date: 2026-01-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\kdu.exe'
              - '\hamakaze.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'hamakaze.exe'
    selection_cli_suspicious:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-map ' # map driver to the kernel and execute it entry point
            - '-prv ' # optional, select vulnerability driver provider
            - '-dse ' # write user defined value to the system DSE state flags; dse=0(disable),dse=1(enable)
            - '-ps ' #  modify process object of given ProcessID;
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate driver development, testing, or administrative troubleshooting (e.g., enabling/disabling hardware)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_kdu_driver_tool/info.yml

title: PUA - Memory Dump Mount Via MemProcFS
id: 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of MemProcFS a memory forensics tool with the '-device' parameter.
    MemProcFS mounts physical memory as a virtual file system, allowing direct access to process memory and system structures.
    Threat actors were seen abusing this utility to mount memory dumps and then extract sensitive information from processes like LSASS or extract registry hives to obtain credentials, LSA secrets, SAM data, and cached domain credentials.
    MemProcFS usage that is not part of authorized forensic analysis should be treated as suspicious and warrants further investigation.
references:
    - https://github.com/ufrisk/MemProcFS
    - https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2024/10/05/htb-freelancer.html#
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/curling-for-data-a-dive-into-a-threat-actors-malicious-ttps
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MemProcFS.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MemProcFS.exe'
        - Description: 'MemProcFS'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-device'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use during memory forensics; if not part of authorized analysis, warrants urgent investigation
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_memprocfs/info.yml

title: PUA - NPS Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e
status: test
description: Detects the use of NPS, a port forwarding and intranet penetration proxy server
references:
    - https://github.com/ehang-io/nps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\npc.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -server='
            - ' -vkey='
            - ' -password='
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -config=npc'
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.26.10
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=AE8ACF66BFE3A44148964048B826D005"
            - "SHA1=CEA49E9B9B67F3A13AD0BE1C2655293EA3C18181"
            - "SHA256=5A456283392FFCEEEACA3D3426C306EB470304637520D72FED1CC1FEBBBD6856"
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high

title: PUA - NSudo Execution
id: 771d1eb5-9587-4568-95fb-9ec44153a012
status: test
description: Detects the use of NSudo tool for command execution
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\NSudo.exe'
              - '\NSudoLC.exe'
              - '\NSudoLG.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'NSudo.exe'
              - 'NSudoLC.exe'
              - 'NSudoLG.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Covers Single/Double dash "-"/"--" + ":"
            - '-U:S ' # System
            - '-U:T ' # Trusted Installer
            - '-U:E ' # Elevated
            - '-P:E ' # Enable All Privileges
            - '-M:S ' # System Integrity
            - '-M:H ' # High Integrity
            # Covers Single/Double dash "-"/"--" + "="
            - '-U=S '
            - '-U=T '
            - '-U=E '
            - '-P=E '
            - '-M=S '
            - '-M=H '
            - '-ShowWindowMode:Hide'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high

title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
status: test
description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
references:
    - https://nmap.org/ncat/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-21
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1095
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # can not use OriginalFileName as is empty
        Image|endswith:
            - '\nc.exe'
            - '\ncat.exe'
            - '\netcat.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        # Typical command lines
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -lvp '
            - ' -lvnp'
            - ' -l -v -p '
            - ' -lv -p '
            - ' -l --proxy-type http '
            # - ' --exec cmd.exe ' # Not specific enough for netcat
            - ' -vnl --exec '
            - ' -vnl -e '
            - ' --lua-exec '
            - ' --sh-exec '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ncat use
level: high

title: PUA - Ngrok Execution
id: ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31
status: test
description: |
  Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available.
  Involved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/docs
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42442320/ssh-tunnel-to-ngrok-and-initiate-rdp
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/58d21840d915aaf4040ceb89522396124c82f325282f805d1085527e1e2ccfa1/detection
    - https://cybleinc.com/2021/02/15/ngrok-platform-abused-by-hackers-to-deliver-a-new-wave-of-phishing-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/xorJosh/status/1598646907802451969
    - https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/how-to-use-ngrok/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp 139'
            - ' tcp 445'
            - ' tcp 3389'
            - ' tcp 5985'
            - ' tcp 5986'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' start '
            - '--all'
            - '--config'
            - '.yml'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: 'ngrok.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp '
            - ' http '
            - ' authtoken '
    selection4:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe authtoken '
            - '.exe start --all'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of Ngrok
    - Ngrok http 3978 (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bot-service/bot-service-debug-channel-ngrok?view=azure-bot-service-4.0)
level: high

title: PUA - Nimgrab Execution
id: 74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6
status: test
description: Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\nimgrab.exe'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - MD5=2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B
            - SHA256=F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559
            - IMPHASH=C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems
level: high

title: PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM
id: d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4
status: test
description: Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user
references:
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' runassystem '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high

title: PUA - PingCastle Execution From Potentially Suspicious Parent
id: b37998de-a70b-4f33-b219-ec36bf433dc0
related:
    - id: b1cb4ab6-ac31-43f4-adf1-d9d08957419c
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level via a script located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon location.
references:
    - https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://github.com/fengjixuchui/Start-ADEnum/blob/e237a739db98b6104427d833004836507da36a58/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L450
    - https://github.com/lkys37en/Start-ADEnum/blob/5b42c54215fe5f57fc59abc52c20487d15764005/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L680
    - https://github.com/projectHULK/AD_Recon/blob/dde2daba9b3393a9388cbebda87068972cc0bd3b/SecurityAssessment.ps1#L2699
    - https://github.com/802-1x/Compliance/blob/2e53df8b6e89686a0b91116b3f42c8f717dca820/Ping%20Castle/Get-PingCastle-HTMLComplianceReport.ps1#L8
    - https://github.com/EvotecIT/TheDashboard/blob/481a9ce8f82f2fd55fe65220ee6486bae6df0c9d/Examples/RunReports/PingCastle.ps1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent_ext:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '.bat'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.hta'
            - '.htm'
            - '.html'
            - '.js'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    selection_parent_path_1:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_parent_path_2:
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    selection_cli:
        - Image|endswith: '\PingCastle.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: PingCastle.exe
        - Product: 'Ping Castle'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '--scanner aclcheck'
              - '--scanner antivirus'
              - '--scanner computerversion'
              - '--scanner foreignusers'
              - '--scanner laps_bitlocker'
              - '--scanner localadmin'
              - '--scanner nullsession'
              - '--scanner nullsession-trust'
              - '--scanner oxidbindings'
              - '--scanner remote'
              - '--scanner share'
              - '--scanner smb'
              - '--scanner smb3querynetwork'
              - '--scanner spooler'
              - '--scanner startup'
              - '--scanner zerologon'
        - CommandLine|contains: '--no-enum-limit'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--level Full'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--server '
    condition: 1 of selection_parent_* and selection_parent_ext and selection_cli
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Process Hacker Driver Load
id: 67add051-9ee7-4ad3-93ba-42935615ae8d
related:
    - id: 10cb6535-b31d-4512-9962-513dcbc42cc1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
references:
    - https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - cve.2021-21551
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\kprocesshacker.sys'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=821D74031D3F625BCBD0DF08B70F1E77'
              - 'IMPHASH=F86759BB4DE4320918615DC06E998A39'
              - 'IMPHASH=0A64EEB85419257D0CE32BD5D55C3A18'
              - 'IMPHASH=6E7B34DFC017700B1517B230DF6FF0D0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of process hacker or system informer by developers or system administrators
level: high

title: PUA - Rclone Execution
id: e37db05d-d1f9-49c8-b464-cee1a4b11638
related:
    - id: a0d63692-a531-4912-ad39-4393325b2a9c
      type: obsolete
    - id: cb7286ba-f207-44ab-b9e6-760d82b84253
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects execution of RClone utility for exfiltration as used by various ransomwares strains like REvil, Conti, FiveHands, etc
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware
    - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/egregor-raas-continues-the-chaos-with-cobalt-strike-and-rclone
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/darkside-ransomware-splunk-threat-update-and-detections.html
author: Bhabesh Raj, Sittikorn S, Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
date: 2021-05-10
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific_options:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--config '
            - '--no-check-certificate '
            - ' copy '
    selection_rclone_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe'
        - Description: 'Rsync for cloud storage'
    selection_rclone_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'pass'
            - 'user'
            - 'copy'
            - 'sync'
            - 'config'
            - 'lsd'
            - 'remote'
            - 'ls'
            - 'mega'
            - 'pcloud'
            - 'ftp'
            - 'ignore-existing'
            - 'auto-confirm'
            - 'transfers'
            - 'multi-thread-streams'
            - 'no-check-certificate '
    condition: selection_specific_options or all of selection_rclone_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
id: 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
    Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
    If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/#exfiltration
    - https://restic.net/
    - https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_repo.html
author: Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--password-file'
              - 'init'
              - ' -r '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--use-fs-snapshot'
              - 'backup'
              - ' -r '
    selection_restic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sftp:'
            - 'rest:http'
            - 's3:s3.'
            - 's3.http'
            - 'azure:'
            - ' gs:'
            - 'rclone:'
            - 'swift:'
            - ' b2:'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' init '
            - ' -r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Restic for backup purposes within the organization.
level: high

title: PUA - RunXCmd Execution
id: 93199800-b52a-4dec-b762-75212c196542
status: test
description: Detects the use of the RunXCmd tool to execute commands with System or TrustedInstaller accounts
references:
    - https://www.d7xtech.com/free-software/runx/
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_account:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /account=system '
            - ' /account=ti '
    selection_exec:
        CommandLine|contains: '/exec='
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high

title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution
id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt
    - https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1526
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Seatbelt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Seatbelt.exe'
        - Description: 'Seatbelt'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # This just a list of the commands that will produce the least amount of FP in "theory"
              # Comment out/in as needed in your environment
              # To get the full list of commands see reference section
              - ' DpapiMasterKeys'
              - ' InterestingProcesses'
              - ' InterestingFiles'
              - ' CertificateThumbprints'
              - ' ChromiumBookmarks'
              - ' ChromiumHistory'
              - ' ChromiumPresence'
              - ' CloudCredentials'
              - ' CredEnum'
              - ' CredGuard'
              - ' FirefoxHistory'
              - ' ProcessCreationEvents'
              # - ' RDPSessions'
              # - ' PowerShellHistory'
    selection_group_list:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -group=misc'
            - ' -group=remote'
            - ' -group=chromium'
            - ' -group=slack'
            - ' -group=system'
            - ' -group=user'
            - ' -group=all'
    selection_group_output:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile='
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
related:
    - id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
      type: similar
    - id: 514e7e3e-b3b4-4a67-af60-be20f139198b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects active directory enumeration activity using known AdFind CLI flags
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_password: # Listing password policy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - lockoutduration
            - lockoutthreshold
            - lockoutobservationwindow
            - maxpwdage
            - minpwdage
            - minpwdlength
            - pwdhistorylength
            - pwdproperties
    selection_enum_ad: # Enumerate Active Directory Admins
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc admincountdmp'
    selection_enum_exchange: # Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc exchaddresses'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized administrative activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_enumeration/info.yml

title: PUA - Wsudo Suspicious Execution
id: bdeeabc9-ff2a-4a51-be59-bb253aac7891
status: test
description: Detects usage of wsudo (Windows Sudo Utility). Which is a tool that let the user execute programs with different permissions (System, Trusted Installer, Administrator...etc)
references:
    - https://github.com/M2Team/Privexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-02
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_metadata:
        - Image|endswith: '\wsudo.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wsudo.exe'
        - Description: 'Windows sudo utility'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wsudo-bridge.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-u System'
            - '-uSystem'
            - '-u TrustedInstaller'
            - '-uTrustedInstaller'
            - ' --ti '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
id: d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc
status: test
description: Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
references:
    - https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\iox.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe fwd -l '
            - '.exe fwd -r '
            - '.exe proxy -l '
            - '.exe proxy -r '
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.4
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=9DB2D314DD3F704A02051EF5EA210993"
            - "SHA1=039130337E28A6623ECF9A0A3DA7D92C5964D8DD"
            - "SHA256=C6CF82919B809967D9D90EA73772A8AA1C1EB3BC59252D977500F64F1A0D6731"
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high

title: PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation Related Indicators
id: de1bd0b6-6d59-417c-86d9-a44114aede3b
status: test
description: Detects exploitation indicators related to PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /c '
            - 'powershell'
            - '-nop -w hidden'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'setup.msi'
            - '-OutFile'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'msiexec '
            - '/i '
            - 'setup.msi '
            - '/qn '
            - 'IntegratorLogin=fimaribahundq'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PaperCut MF/NG Potential Exploitation
id: 0934ac71-a331-4e98-a034-d49c491fbbcb
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "pc-app.exe". Which could indicate potential exploitation of PaperCut
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://github.com/huntresslabs/threat-intel/blob/3bad6b0fadfcca3ff5680923e74e39edd72f32da/2023/2023-04/20-PaperCut/win_susp_papercut_code_execution.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntress DE&TH Team (idea)
date: 2023-04-20
modified: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pc-app.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\csc.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: high

title: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
related:
    - id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
      type: similar
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.
    The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
    Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4794
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2020-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4794
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Initial installation of a domain controller.
level: high

title: Password Dumper Activity on LSASS
id: aa1697b7-d611-4f9a-9cb2-5125b4ccfd5c
status: test
description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jackcr/status/807385668833968128
author: sigma
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessMask: '0x705'
        ObjectType: 'SAM_DOMAIN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS
id: f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505
status: stable
description: |
    Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage.
    The process in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds of events.
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2021-06-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.s0005
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        StartModule: ''
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Antivirus products
level: high

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains|all:
            - 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)
id: 54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains: 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
    selection_filename:
        TargetName|contains:
            - 'invoice'
            - 'new order'
            - 'rechnung'
            - 'factura'
            - 'delivery'
            - 'purchase'
            - 'order'
            - 'payment'
    condition: selection and selection_filename
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

title: Password Spray Activity
id: 28ecba0a-c743-4690-ad29-9a8f6f25a6f9
status: test
description: Indicates that a password spray attack has been successfully performed.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#password-spray
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'passwordSpray'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high